Published Tue, Sep 22nd, 2020
Platforms
CloudFormation allows the use of Lambda-backed resource providers, wherein Lambda can be used to write custom provisioning logic to be executed during CloudFormation stack operations. The aforementioned Lambda functions were executed in an AWS-managed account (thus effectively allowing arbitrary code execution in that account), and were passed a set of credentials ("platformCredentials") for a role in this account that had several EventBridge permissions. These were sufficient for an attacker to create new rules in the AWS-managed account that leaked credentials belonging to other users of resource providers. For example, creating a rule that matched events with {"detail-type": ["AWS API Call via CloudTrail"]} exposed records of other tenants' API calls, which included copies of credentials for roles in other tenants' accounts.
CloudFormation
None required
No tracked CVEs
Contributed by https://github.com/korniko98
Entry Status
Finalized
Disclosure Date
Tue, Jan 21st, 2020
Exploitability Period
-
Known ITW Exploitation
-
Detection Methods
None
Piercing Index Rating
-
Discovered by
Aidan Steele