<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/">
    <channel>
        <title>The Open Cloud Vulnerability and Security Issue Database</title>
        <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org</link>
        <description>An open project to list all known cloud vulnerabilities and Cloud Service Provider security issues.</description>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 10 May 2026 10:27:02 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <docs>https://validator.w3.org/feed/docs/rss2.html</docs>
        <generator>https://github.com/jpmonette/feed</generator>
        
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Entra ID actor token validation bug allowing cross-tenant global admin]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/global-admin-entra-id-actor-tokens</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/global-admin-entra-id-actor-tokens</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A critical vulnerability discovered in Microsoft's Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) allowed for cross-tenant
access and potential global admin privilege escalation. The flaw was found in the legacy Azure AD Graph API,
which improperly validated the originating tenant for undocumented "Actor tokens." An attacker could use a
token from their own tenant to authenticate as any user, including Global Admins, in any other tenant. This
vulnerability bypassed security policies like Conditional Access. The issue was reported to Microsoft, who
deployed a global fix within days.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A critical vulnerability discovered in Microsoft's Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) allowed for cross-tenant
access and potential global admin privilege escalation. The flaw was found in the legacy Azure AD Graph API,
which improperly validated the originating tenant for undocumented "Actor tokens." An attacker could use a
token from their own tenant to authenticate as any user, including Global Admins, in any other tenant. This
vulnerability bypassed security policies like Conditional Access. The issue was reported to Microsoft, who
deployed a global fix within days.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dataform cross-tenant path traversal]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dataform-path-traversal</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dataform-path-traversal</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Dataform could have allowed a malicious customer to gain unauthorized cross-tenant access
to other customer's code repositories and data. By preparing a maliciously crafted package.json
file, an attacker could exploit a path traversal vulnerability in the npm package installation
process, thereby gaining read and write access in other customers' repositories. According to
Google, there was no evidence of exploitation in the wild.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Dataform could have allowed a malicious customer to gain unauthorized cross-tenant access
to other customer's code repositories and data. By preparing a maliciously crafted package.json
file, an attacker could exploit a path traversal vulnerability in the npm package installation
process, thereby gaining read and write access in other customers' repositories. According to
Google, there was no evidence of exploitation in the wild.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS ECS Agent Information Disclosure Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-ecs-agent-information-disclosure-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-ecs-agent-information-disclosure-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in the Amazon ECS agent could allow an introspection server to be accessed off-host.
This information disclosure issue, if exploited, could allow another instance in the same security
group to access the server's data. The vulnerability does not affect instances where off-host access
is set to 'false'. The issue has been patched in version 1.97.1 of the ECS agent.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in the Amazon ECS agent could allow an introspection server to be accessed off-host.
This information disclosure issue, if exploited, could allow another instance in the same security
group to access the server's data. The vulnerability does not affect instances where off-host access
is set to 'false'. The issue has been patched in version 1.97.1 of the ECS agent.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Remote Prompt Injection in GitLab Duo Leaks Source Code]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gitlab-duo-prompt-injection-leak</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gitlab-duo-prompt-injection-leak</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A remote prompt injection vulnerability in GitLab Duo allowed attackers to steal source code from private projects, manipulate code suggestions, and exfiltrate confidential information. The attack chain involved hidden prompts, HTML injection, and exploitation of Duo's access to private data. GitLab has since patched both the HTML and prompt injection vectors.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A remote prompt injection vulnerability in GitLab Duo allowed attackers to steal source code from private projects, manipulate code suggestions, and exfiltrate confidential information. The attack chain involved hidden prompts, HTML injection, and exploitation of Duo's access to private data. GitLab has since patched both the HTML and prompt injection vectors.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Security Tool Introduces Privilege Escalation Risk]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-security-tool-risk</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-security-tool-risk</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS's Account Assessment for AWS Organizations tool, designed to audit cross-account access, inadvertently introduced privilege escalation risks due to flawed deployment instructions. Customers were encouraged to deploy the tool in lower-sensitivity accounts, creating risky trust paths from insecure environments into highly sensitive ones. This could allow attackers to pivot from compromised development accounts into production and management accounts.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS's Account Assessment for AWS Organizations tool, designed to audit cross-account access, inadvertently introduced privilege escalation risks due to flawed deployment instructions. Customers were encouraged to deploy the tool in lower-sensitivity accounts, creating risky trust paths from insecure environments into highly sensitive ones. This could allow attackers to pivot from compromised development accounts into production and management accounts.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[FreeRTOS and coreSNTP Security Advisories]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/freertos-coresntp-advisories</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/freertos-coresntp-advisories</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 10 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Security advisories were issued for FreeRTOS and coreSNTP releases containing unintended scripts that could potentially transmit AWS credentials if executed on Linux/macOS. Affected releases have been removed and users are advised to rotate credentials and delete downloaded copies.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Security advisories were issued for FreeRTOS and coreSNTP releases containing unintended scripts that could potentially transmit AWS credentials if executed on Linux/macOS. Affected releases have been removed and users are advised to rotate credentials and delete downloaded copies.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure AZNFS-mount Utility Root Privilege Escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-aznfs-mount-privilege-escalation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-aznfs-mount-privilege-escalation</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A critical vulnerability in AZNFS-mount utility, preinstalled on Azure HPC/AI images, allowed unprivileged users to escalate privileges to root on Linux machines. The flaw existed in versions up to 2.0.10 and involved a SUID binary. Azure classified it as low severity but fixed it in version 2.0.11.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A critical vulnerability in AZNFS-mount utility, preinstalled on Azure HPC/AI images, allowed unprivileged users to escalate privileges to root on Linux machines. The flaw existed in versions up to 2.0.10 and involved a SUID binary. Azure classified it as low severity but fixed it in version 2.0.11.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Default Roles Can Lead to Service Takeover]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-default-roles-service-takeover</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-default-roles-service-takeover</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Apr 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Research uncovered security flaws in default AWS service roles, granting overly broad permissions like full S3 access. This allows privilege escalation, cross-service access, and potential account compromise across services like SageMaker, Glue, and EMR. Attackers could exploit these roles to manipulate critical assets and move laterally within AWS environments. AWS has since updated default policies and documentation to mitigate risks.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Research uncovered security flaws in default AWS service roles, granting overly broad permissions like full S3 access. This allows privilege escalation, cross-service access, and potential account compromise across services like SageMaker, Glue, and EMR. Attackers could exploit these roles to manipulate critical assets and move laterally within AWS environments. AWS has since updated default policies and documentation to mitigate risks.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud ConfusedComposer Privilege Escalation Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-confused-composer-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-confused-composer-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Tenable discovered a privilege escalation vulnerability in Google Cloud Platform's Cloud Composer service, dubbed ConfusedComposer. It allowed users with composer.environments.update permission to escalate privileges to the default Cloud Build service account by injecting malicious PyPI packages. This could grant broad permissions across the victim's GCP project.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Tenable discovered a privilege escalation vulnerability in Google Cloud Platform's Cloud Composer service, dubbed ConfusedComposer. It allowed users with composer.environments.update permission to escalate privileges to the default Cloud Build service account by injecting malicious PyPI packages. This could grant broad permissions across the victim's GCP project.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Burning Data with Malicious Firewall Rules in Azure SQL]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/burning-data-azure-sql-firewall</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/burning-data-azure-sql-firewall</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Apr 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Varonis Threat Labs discovered a vulnerability in Azure SQL Server allowing privileged users to create malicious firewall rules that can delete Azure resources when triggered by admin actions. The exploit involves manipulating rule names via TSQL to inject destructive commands, potentially leading to large-scale data loss in affected Azure accounts.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Varonis Threat Labs discovered a vulnerability in Azure SQL Server allowing privileged users to create malicious firewall rules that can delete Azure resources when triggered by admin actions. The exploit involves manipulating rule names via TSQL to inject destructive commands, potentially leading to large-scale data loss in affected Azure accounts.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Path Traversal in AWS SSM Agent Plugin ID Validation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-ssm-agent-path-traversal</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-ssm-agent-path-traversal</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Apr 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A path traversal vulnerability in AWS SSM Agent's ValidatePluginId function allows attackers to create directories and execute scripts in unintended locations on the filesystem. This could lead to privilege escalation or other malicious activities, as files may be written to or executed from sensitive areas of the system with root privileges.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A path traversal vulnerability in AWS SSM Agent's ValidatePluginId function allows attackers to create directories and execute scripts in unintended locations on the filesystem. This could lead to privilege escalation or other malicious activities, as files may be written to or executed from sensitive areas of the system with root privileges.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ImageRunner: Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in GCP Cloud Run]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/imagerunner</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/imagerunner</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An attacker with `run.services.update` and `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permissions but without
explicit registry access could deploy new revisions of Cloud Run services that pulled private
container images stored in the same GCP project. This was possible because Cloud Run uses a
service agent with the necessary registry read permissions to retrieve these images, regardless
of the caller’s access level. By updating a service revision and injecting malicious commands
into the container's arguments (e.g., using Netcat for reverse shell access), attackers could
extract secrets or run unauthorized code. The flaw stemmed from the Cloud Run service agent’s
trust model, which did not enforce a separate registry permission check on the deploying identity.
Google has since modified this behavior to require that the identity updating the Cloud Run
resource also has explicit Artifact Registry Reader or Storage Object Viewer roles.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An attacker with `run.services.update` and `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permissions but without
explicit registry access could deploy new revisions of Cloud Run services that pulled private
container images stored in the same GCP project. This was possible because Cloud Run uses a
service agent with the necessary registry read permissions to retrieve these images, regardless
of the caller’s access level. By updating a service revision and injecting malicious commands
into the container's arguments (e.g., using Netcat for reverse shell access), attackers could
extract secrets or run unauthorized code. The flaw stemmed from the Cloud Run service agent’s
trust model, which did not enforce a separate registry permission check on the deploying identity.
Google has since modified this behavior to require that the identity updating the Cloud Run
resource also has explicit Artifact Registry Reader or Storage Object Viewer roles.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CodeQLEAKED - CodeQL Supply Chain Attack via Exposed Secret]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/codeql-supply-chain-attack-exposed-secret</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/codeql-supply-chain-attack-exposed-secret</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A publicly exposed GitHub token in CodeQL workflow artifacts could allow attackers to execute malicious code
in repositories using CodeQL, potentially leading to source code exfiltration, secrets compromise, and supply
chain attacks. The vulnerability stemmed from a debug artifact containing environment variables, which could be
downloaded and exploited within a 1-2 second window.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A publicly exposed GitHub token in CodeQL workflow artifacts could allow attackers to execute malicious code
in repositories using CodeQL, potentially leading to source code exfiltration, secrets compromise, and supply
chain attacks. The vulnerability stemmed from a debug artifact containing environment variables, which could be
downloaded and exploited within a 1-2 second window.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Entra ID Bug Creates Immutable Users]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/entra-id-immutable-users-bug</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/entra-id-immutable-users-bug</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A bug in Entra ID restricted management administrative units allowed creating immutable users that couldn't be modified or disabled, even by Global Administrators. This could enable an attacker to protect a compromised account from containment. The issue was caused by a timing vulnerability when removing users from restricted AUs and required specific steps to remediate affected accounts.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A bug in Entra ID restricted management administrative units allowed creating immutable users that couldn't be modified or disabled, even by Global Administrators. This could enable an attacker to protect a compromised account from containment. The issue was caused by a timing vulnerability when removing users from restricted AUs and required specific steps to remediate affected accounts.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS CDK CLI Issue with Custom Credential Plugins]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-cdk-cli-credential-plugin-issue</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-cdk-cli-credential-plugin-issue</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS identified a security issue in the AWS CDK CLI versions 2.172.0-2.178.1 where temporary credentials from custom credential plugins could be printed to console output. This potentially exposes sensitive information to users with access to the console. The issue affects plugins that include an expiration property when returning temporary credentials.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS identified a security issue in the AWS CDK CLI versions 2.172.0-2.178.1 where temporary credentials from custom credential plugins could be printed to console output. This potentially exposes sensitive information to users with access to the console. The issue affects plugins that include an expiration property when returning temporary credentials.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure API Connections Expose Backend Secrets]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-api-connections-secrets</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-api-connections-secrets</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure API Connections were found to allow any reader on a subscription to access backend resources through a proxy endpoint, potentially exposing secrets from Key Vaults, databases, and third-party services. This vulnerability affects various Azure services and external APIs, enabling privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure API Connections were found to allow any reader on a subscription to access backend resources through a proxy endpoint, potentially exposing secrets from Key Vaults, databases, and third-party services. This vulnerability affects various Azure services and external APIs, enabling privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Issue with AWS Temporary Elevated Access Management]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-team-cve-2025-1969</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-team-cve-2025-1969</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS Temporary Elevated Access Management (TEAM) allows users to modify valid requests and spoof approvals due to improper input validation. This affects versions prior to 1.2.2 of TEAM for AWS IAM Identity Center. AWS has released a fix in version 1.2.2 and recommends customers upgrade to the latest release.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS Temporary Elevated Access Management (TEAM) allows users to modify valid requests and spoof approvals due to improper input validation. This affects versions prior to 1.2.2 of TEAM for AWS IAM Identity Center. AWS has released a fix in version 1.2.2 and recommends customers upgrade to the latest release.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Silent Reaper (Azure LogicApp Secrets Control Plane Exfiltration)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-logic-apps-secrets-control-plane-exfiltration</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-logic-apps-secrets-control-plane-exfiltration</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure iPaaS services, such as Logic Apps, separate the Control Plane (management) from the Data Plane (execution), but a flaw in this model enabled undetectable data harvesting.
An attacker with Azure Reader access to workflow run history can silently extract sensitive data from executions, including secrets and API responses. This is possible because execution details are exposed via the Control Plane, bypassing Data Plane access controls.
The root cause of this issue is the unintended exposure of runtime data through metadata endpoints, which could allow an attacker to passively collect information without triggering alerts or requiring direct execution privileges.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure iPaaS services, such as Logic Apps, separate the Control Plane (management) from the Data Plane (execution), but a flaw in this model enabled undetectable data harvesting.
An attacker with Azure Reader access to workflow run history can silently extract sensitive data from executions, including secrets and API responses. This is possible because execution details are exposed via the Control Plane, bypassing Data Plane access controls.
The root cause of this issue is the unintended exposure of runtime data through metadata endpoints, which could allow an attacker to passively collect information without triggering alerts or requiring direct execution privileges.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Vault Recon (Azure KeyVault Secrets Metadata Control Plane Exfiltration)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-vault-recon-keyvault-secret-metadata-control-plane-exfiltration</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-vault-recon-keyvault-secret-metadata-control-plane-exfiltration</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Key Vault enforces a separation between the Control Plane (management) and Data Plane (secrets access). However, a flaw in this isolation allows unauthorized users to enumerate secrets and keys within a vault.
By having Reader access or lesser privileges on a Key Vault, an attacker could leverage Azure Resource Explorer to access metadata about stored secrets. This is due to unintended exposure through the Control Plane, which should not provide insight into Data Plane resources.
The root cause of this issue is insufficient isolation between the two planes, where metadata retrieval is permitted even when direct access to secrets is restricted. This allows attackers to gain information about sensitive assets without full permissions.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Key Vault enforces a separation between the Control Plane (management) and Data Plane (secrets access). However, a flaw in this isolation allows unauthorized users to enumerate secrets and keys within a vault.
By having Reader access or lesser privileges on a Key Vault, an attacker could leverage Azure Resource Explorer to access metadata about stored secrets. This is due to unintended exposure through the Control Plane, which should not provide insight into Data Plane resources.
The root cause of this issue is insufficient isolation between the two planes, where metadata retrieval is permitted even when direct access to secrets is restricted. This allows attackers to gain information about sensitive assets without full permissions.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS EKS Logged ServiceAccount Tokens in Plaintext]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/eks-logged-serviceaccount-tokens-plaintext</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/eks-logged-serviceaccount-tokens-plaintext</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS EKS was logging ServiceAccount tokens in plaintext, including those used for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity and connecting to the Kubernetes API server. This issue affected clusters between March 2020 and May 2021, potentially exposing sensitive credentials in CloudWatch logs.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS EKS was logging ServiceAccount tokens in plaintext, including those used for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity and connecting to the Kubernetes API server. This issue affected clusters between March 2020 and May 2021, potentially exposing sensitive credentials in CloudWatch logs.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Abusing AWS Serverless Image Handler Configuration Weakness]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-serverless-image-handler-weakness</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-serverless-image-handler-weakness</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS solution 'Dynamic Image Transformation for Amazon CloudFront', prior to version 6.2.6, contains a configuration weakness. The Lambda role doesn't constrain bucket access, and the environment variable can be set to a wildcard, allowing access to any bucket. This could potentially lead to unintended access to sensitive images across multiple buckets in the AWS account.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS solution 'Dynamic Image Transformation for Amazon CloudFront', prior to version 6.2.6, contains a configuration weakness. The Lambda role doesn't constrain bucket access, and the environment variable can be set to a wildcard, allowing access to any bucket. This could potentially lead to unintended access to sensitive images across multiple buckets in the AWS account.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Entra ID Allows Users to Update Principal Names]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/entra-id-upn-update-flaw</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/entra-id-upn-update-flaw</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A configuration change in Entra ID allowed unprivileged users to update their own User Principal Names (UPNs) through interfaces like the Entra admin center and PowerShell. This could lead to impersonation risks. Microsoft quickly fixed the issue after it was reported. The vulnerability affected synchronized hybrid environments as well.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A configuration change in Entra ID allowed unprivileged users to update their own User Principal Names (UPNs) through interfaces like the Entra admin center and PowerShell. This could lead to impersonation risks. Microsoft quickly fixed the issue after it was reported. The vulnerability affected synchronized hybrid environments as well.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Sign-in IAM User Login Flow Username Enumeration]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-iam-login-username-enumeration</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-iam-login-username-enumeration</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS IAM Sign-in login flow could allow attackers to enumerate IAM usernames by measuring server response times. This issue affected AWS Sign-in IAM User login flow prior to January 16, 2025. AWS has since introduced a delay in response times across all authentication failure scenarios to mitigate the vulnerability.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS IAM Sign-in login flow could allow attackers to enumerate IAM usernames by measuring server response times. This issue affected AWS Sign-in IAM User login flow prior to January 16, 2025. AWS has since introduced a delay in response times across all authentication failure scenarios to mitigate the vulnerability.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Finding SSRFs in Azure DevOps]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ssrfs-azure-devops</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ssrfs-azure-devops</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Three SSRF vulnerabilities were discovered in Azure DevOps, allowing access to internal metadata endpoints and potential CRLF injection. The issues affected the endpointproxy and Service Hooks functionality. DNS rebinding could bypass initial fixes. Microsoft awarded $15,000 in bug bounties for the findings.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Three SSRF vulnerabilities were discovered in Azure DevOps, allowing access to internal metadata endpoints and potential CRLF injection. The issues affected the endpointproxy and Service Hooks functionality. DNS rebinding could bypass initial fixes. Microsoft awarded $15,000 in bug bounties for the findings.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CloudWatch Dashboard Sharing Exposes EC2 Tags]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudwatch-dashboard-sharing-exposes-tags</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudwatch-dashboard-sharing-exposes-tags</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS CloudWatch dashboard sharing allowed viewers to access EC2 instance tags and potentially invoke Lambda functions in the source account. The issue stemmed from a logic bug in the AWS Console combined with a "fail open" condition in Amazon Cognito. AWS has since patched the vulnerability.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS CloudWatch dashboard sharing allowed viewers to access EC2 instance tags and potentially invoke Lambda functions in the source account. The issue stemmed from a logic bug in the AWS Console combined with a "fail open" condition in Amazon Cognito. AWS has since patched the vulnerability.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Issue with Amazon WorkSpaces and AppStream 2.0 Clients]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/amazon-workspaces-appstream-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/amazon-workspaces-appstream-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS identified two vulnerabilities in specific versions of native clients for Amazon WorkSpaces, Amazon AppStream 2.0, and Amazon DCV. These issues could allow man-in-the-middle attacks, potentially giving attackers access to remote sessions. Affected versions include WorkSpaces clients 5.20.0 or earlier, AppStream 2.0 Windows client 1.1.1326 or earlier, and various DCV clients. AWS recommends upgrading to patched versions to address these security concerns.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS identified two vulnerabilities in specific versions of native clients for Amazon WorkSpaces, Amazon AppStream 2.0, and Amazon DCV. These issues could allow man-in-the-middle attacks, potentially giving attackers access to remote sessions. Affected versions include WorkSpaces clients 5.20.0 or earlier, AppStream 2.0 Windows client 1.1.1326 or earlier, and various DCV clients. AWS recommends upgrading to patched versions to address these security concerns.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hijacking Azure Machine Learning Notebooks]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-ml-notebook-hijacking</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-ml-notebook-hijacking</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Machine Learning notebooks can be hijacked by attackers with Storage Account access to inject malicious code. A now-fixed vulnerability allowed Reader role escalation to code execution. The article details the attack methods, including modifying notebooks, obtaining managed identity tokens, and exfiltrating data. It also introduces a tool for dumping AML workspace credentials.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Machine Learning notebooks can be hijacked by attackers with Storage Account access to inject malicious code. A now-fixed vulnerability allowed Reader role escalation to code execution. The article details the attack methods, including modifying notebooks, obtaining managed identity tokens, and exfiltrating data. It also introduces a tool for dumping AML workspace credentials.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Neuron SDK Dependency Confusion Vulnerability Recurs]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-neuron-sdk-dependency-confusion</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-neuron-sdk-dependency-confusion</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 29 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS Neuron SDK has reintroduced a dependency confusion vulnerability three times in four years. The issue stems from using the --extra-index-url parameter in pip install commands, which allows potential installation of malicious packages from PyPI instead of AWS's private repository. Despite previous reports, AWS has not fully addressed the problem, leaving new packages vulnerable to exploitation.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS Neuron SDK has reintroduced a dependency confusion vulnerability three times in four years. The issue stems from using the --extra-index-url parameter in pip install commands, which allows potential installation of malicious packages from PyPI instead of AWS's private repository. Despite previous reports, AWS has not fully addressed the problem, leaving new packages vulnerable to exploitation.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dirty DAG - Azure Apache Airflow Integration Vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-airflow-vulnerabilities</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-airflow-vulnerabilities</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Unit 42 researchers identified vulnerabilities in the Azure Data Factory's integration with Apache Airflow. These vulnerabilities include misconfigured Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), improper secret handling in Azure’s internal Geneva service, and weak authentication mechanisms. 
Exploiting these flaws, attackers could gain shadow admin control over Azure infrastructure by crafting malicious DAG files or compromising service principals, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, malware deployment, and persistent control of the cluster. 
Once attackers gain access, they can escalate privileges within the Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) cluster, compromise containerized environments, and exploit Azure’s Geneva service to manipulate logs and metrics. 
The research highlighted how weak default configurations allowed attackers to escape containers, obtain root access to host nodes, and enumerate critical Azure resources. This included access to storage accounts, DNS zones, and other sensitive assets. 
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Unit 42 researchers identified vulnerabilities in the Azure Data Factory's integration with Apache Airflow. These vulnerabilities include misconfigured Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), improper secret handling in Azure’s internal Geneva service, and weak authentication mechanisms. 
Exploiting these flaws, attackers could gain shadow admin control over Azure infrastructure by crafting malicious DAG files or compromising service principals, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, malware deployment, and persistent control of the cluster. 
Once attackers gain access, they can escalate privileges within the Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) cluster, compromise containerized environments, and exploit Azure’s Geneva service to manipulate logs and metrics. 
The research highlighted how weak default configurations allowed attackers to escape containers, obtain root access to host nodes, and enumerate critical Azure resources. This included access to storage accounts, DNS zones, and other sensitive assets. 
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bedrock API Logging Issue]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bedrock-api-logging-issue</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bedrock-api-logging-issue</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Sysdig's Threat Research Team discovered an issue with Amazon Bedrock API logging in CloudTrail. Failed API calls were logged as successful without error codes, hindering detection efforts and potentially generating false positives. The issue affected Bedrock Runtime APIs, specifically InvokeModel and Converse. AWS resolved the problem.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Sysdig's Threat Research Team discovered an issue with Amazon Bedrock API logging in CloudTrail. Failed API calls were logged as successful without error codes, hindering detection efforts and potentially generating false positives. The issue affected Bedrock Runtime APIs, specifically InvokeModel and Converse. AWS resolved the problem.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Code Execution in Azure API Management Developer Portal]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-api-management-dev-portal-rce</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-api-management-dev-portal-rce</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure API Management Developer Portal allows arbitrary code execution and secret exfiltration. The issue stems from a workflow that loads untrusted data from opened issues, potentially allowing attackers to inject malicious commands. This could lead to code execution in the runner, granting access to sensitive tokens and permissions.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure API Management Developer Portal allows arbitrary code execution and secret exfiltration. The issue stems from a workflow that loads untrusted data from opened issues, potentially allowing attackers to inject malicious commands. This could lead to code execution in the runner, granting access to sensitive tokens and permissions.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ModeLeak: LLM Model Exfiltration Vulnerability in Vertex AI]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-vertexai-vulnerabilities</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-vertexai-vulnerabilities</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in GCP's Vertex AI service allows privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive LLM models. Attackers can exfiltrate these models by exploiting misconfigurations in access controls and service bindings.
By exploiting custom job permissions, researchers were able to escalate their privileges and gain unauthorized access to all data services in the project.
In addition, deploying a poisoned model in Vertex AI led to the exfiltration of all other fine-tuned models, posing a proprietary and sensitive data exfiltration attack risk.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in GCP's Vertex AI service allows privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive LLM models. Attackers can exfiltrate these models by exploiting misconfigurations in access controls and service bindings.
By exploiting custom job permissions, researchers were able to escalate their privileges and gain unauthorized access to all data services in the project.
In addition, deploying a poisoned model in Vertex AI led to the exfiltration of all other fine-tuned models, posing a proprietary and sensitive data exfiltration attack risk.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Sketchy Cheat Sheet]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloud-architecture-tool-vulnerabilities</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloud-architecture-tool-vulnerabilities</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 09 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in Google's Cloud Architecture Diagramming Tool, including XSS, unauthorized access to user data, and misconfigured storage buckets. The issues allowed accessing sensitive customer information and potentially executing arbitrary code. Google ultimately decommissioned the service due to the severity of the flaws.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in Google's Cloud Architecture Diagramming Tool, including XSS, unauthorized access to user data, and misconfigured storage buckets. The issues allowed accessing sensitive customer information and potentially executing arbitrary code. Google ultimately decommissioned the service due to the severity of the flaws.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Issue with data.all Framework Multiple CVEs]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/data-all-framework-cves</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/data-all-framework-cves</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Multiple security vulnerabilities were identified in data.all, an open source development framework for building data marketplaces on AWS. The issues affect versions 1.0.0 through 2.6.0 and include problems with authentication token invalidation, unauthorized operations on DataSets and Environments, incorrect object-level authorizations, potential access to sensitive data via logs, and unauthorized mutating update operations on notification records.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Multiple security vulnerabilities were identified in data.all, an open source development framework for building data marketplaces on AWS. The issues affect versions 1.0.0 through 2.6.0 and include problems with authentication token invalidation, unauthorized operations on DataSets and Environments, incorrect object-level authorizations, potential access to sensitive data via logs, and unauthorized mutating update operations on notification records.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Confused Deputy Vulnerability in Amazon DataZone]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/datazone-confused-deputy-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/datazone-confused-deputy-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Amazon DataZone allowed potential attackers to assume roles in AWS accounts by exploiting a confused deputy problem. This could have granted unauthorized access to sensitive data managed by DataZone or other AWS services accessible by the IAM role trusting DataZone. The issue has been resolved, with no customers reportedly impacted.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Amazon DataZone allowed potential attackers to assume roles in AWS accounts by exploiting a confused deputy problem. This could have granted unauthorized access to sensitive data managed by DataZone or other AWS services accessible by the IAM role trusting DataZone. The issue has been resolved, with no customers reportedly impacted.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Repo swatting attack deletes/blocks GitHub and GitLab accounts]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/repo-swatting-attack-deletes-github-gitlab-accounts</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/repo-swatting-attack-deletes-github-gitlab-accounts</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A technique called "repo swatting" allows attackers to delete GitHub and block GitLab accounts by exploiting file upload features and abuse reporting mechanisms. Attackers upload malicious files to a target's repository, then report the account for hosting malicious content, potentially resulting in account deletion. The vulnerability was partially mitigated by October 2024 via changes in upload URL paths and requirement for each uploader to be authenticated (in GitHub).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A technique called "repo swatting" allows attackers to delete GitHub and block GitLab accounts by exploiting file upload features and abuse reporting mechanisms. Attackers upload malicious files to a target's repository, then report the account for hosting malicious content, potentially resulting in account deletion. The vulnerability was partially mitigated by October 2024 via changes in upload URL paths and requirement for each uploader to be authenticated (in GitHub).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS CDK Bucket Squatting Risk]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-cdk-squatting</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-cdk-squatting</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Oct 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AWS Cloud Development Kit (CDK) is a way of deploying infrastructure-as-code. The vulnerability involves AWS CDK’s use of a predictable S3 bucket name format
(cdk-{Qualifier}-assets-{Account-ID}-{Region}), where the default “random” qualifier (hnb659fds) is common and easily guessed. If an AWS customer deletes this bucket and reuses CDK, 
an attacker who claims the bucket can inject malicious CloudFormation templates, potentially gaining admin access. Attackers supposedly only need the AWS account ID to prepare the bucket 
in various regions, exploiting the default naming convention. However, it is important to note that the additional conditions greatly lower the likelihood of exploitation. 
The victim must use the CDK, having deleted the bucket, and then subsequently attempt to deploy with the CDK. Making it so that even if there is a vulnerable account, it could be months, 
if ever for the attack to work.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AWS Cloud Development Kit (CDK) is a way of deploying infrastructure-as-code. The vulnerability involves AWS CDK’s use of a predictable S3 bucket name format
(cdk-{Qualifier}-assets-{Account-ID}-{Region}), where the default “random” qualifier (hnb659fds) is common and easily guessed. If an AWS customer deletes this bucket and reuses CDK, 
an attacker who claims the bucket can inject malicious CloudFormation templates, potentially gaining admin access. Attackers supposedly only need the AWS account ID to prepare the bucket 
in various regions, exploiting the default naming convention. However, it is important to note that the additional conditions greatly lower the likelihood of exploitation. 
The victim must use the CDK, having deleted the bucket, and then subsequently attempt to deploy with the CDK. Making it so that even if there is a vulnerable account, it could be months, 
if ever for the attack to work.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Missing JWT issuer and signer validation in ALB middleware]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/missing-jwt-issuer</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/missing-jwt-issuer</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CloudShell Vulnerability Grants Unintended AWS Access]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudshell-aws-access-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudshell-aws-access-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Oct 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS CloudShell allowed users to gain unintended command-line access to the underlying AWS infrastructure. During a training session, a delegate unexpectedly received the identity context of an EC2 instance role within an ECS cluster, instead of the intended AWS account. This issue potentially bypassed existing controls aimed at preventing lateral movement and access to higher-privileged management roles.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS CloudShell allowed users to gain unintended command-line access to the underlying AWS infrastructure. During a training session, a delegate unexpectedly received the identity context of an EC2 instance role within an ECS cluster, instead of the intended AWS account. This issue potentially bypassed existing controls aimed at preventing lateral movement and access to higher-privileged management roles.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Data exfil via VPC endpoint denials in CloudTrail]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/vpc-endpoint-log-data-exfil</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/vpc-endpoint-log-data-exfil</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Oct 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[CloudTrail delivered events to the resource owner and API caller even when the API action was denied by the VPC endpoint policy.
This could have enabled a stealthy data exfiltration method in cases where an attacker had previously compromised a VPC, by smuggling data through the user agent field in denied requests.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[CloudTrail delivered events to the resource owner and API caller even when the API action was denied by the VPC endpoint policy.
This could have enabled a stealthy data exfiltration method in cases where an attacker had previously compromised a VPC, by smuggling data through the user agent field in denied requests.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Subdomain Takeover Vulnerability in GitLab Pages]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/subdomain-takeover-vulnerability-gitlab-pages</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/subdomain-takeover-vulnerability-gitlab-pages</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Oct 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in GitLab Pages allowed attackers to take over dangling custom domains pointing to 'instanceX.gitlab.io'. The issue occured when adding an unverified custom domain to GitLab Pages, which serves content for 7 days before disabling. This could lead to cookie stealing, phishing campaigns, and bypassing of Content-Security Policies and CORS.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in GitLab Pages allowed attackers to take over dangling custom domains pointing to 'instanceX.gitlab.io'. The issue occured when adding an unverified custom domain to GitLab Pages, which serves content for 7 days before disabling. This could lead to cookie stealing, phishing campaigns, and bypassing of Content-Security Policies and CORS.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud Data Fusion GitHub Actions Vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/data-fusion-github-actions-vulns</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/data-fusion-github-actions-vulns</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Multiple "pwn request" vulnerabilities were discovered in Google Cloud Data Fusion, which is based on open-source CDAP code. These vulnerabilities affect GitHub Actions and allow for remote code execution (RCE) and compromise of build artifacts. The issues potentially impact both the Google Cloud platform and GitHub's CI/CD infrastructure.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Multiple "pwn request" vulnerabilities were discovered in Google Cloud Data Fusion, which is based on open-source CDAP code. These vulnerabilities affect GitHub Actions and allow for remote code execution (RCE) and compromise of build artifacts. The issues potentially impact both the Google Cloud platform and GitHub's CI/CD infrastructure.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CloudImposer]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudimposer-gcp</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudimposer-gcp</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Google Cloud Composer is a managed service for Apache Airflow. Tenable discovered that the Cloud Composer package was vulnerable to dependency confusion, which could have allowed attackers to
inject malicious code when the package was compiled from source. This could have led to remote code execution on machines running Cloud Composer, which include various other GCP services as
well as internal servers at Google. The dependency confusion stemmed from Google's risky recommendation in their documentation to use the --extra-index-url argument when installing private
Python packages. Following disclosure, Google fixed the dependency confusion vulnerability and also updated their documentation.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Google Cloud Composer is a managed service for Apache Airflow. Tenable discovered that the Cloud Composer package was vulnerable to dependency confusion, which could have allowed attackers to
inject malicious code when the package was compiled from source. This could have led to remote code execution on machines running Cloud Composer, which include various other GCP services as
well as internal servers at Google. The dependency confusion stemmed from Google's risky recommendation in their documentation to use the --extra-index-url argument when installing private
Python packages. Following disclosure, Google fixed the dependency confusion vulnerability and also updated their documentation.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Document AI data exfiltration]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-document-ai-data-exfil</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-document-ai-data-exfil</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The Document AI service unintentionally allows users to read any Cloud Storage object in the same project, in a way that isn't properly documented.
The Document AI service agent is auto-assigned with excessive permissions, allowing it to access all objects from Cloud Storage buckets in the same project.
Malicious actors can exploit this to exfiltrate data from Cloud Storage by indirectly leveraging the service agent's permissions.
This vulnerability is an instance of transitive access abuse, a class of security flaw where unauthorized access is gained indirectly
through a trusted intermediary.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Document AI service unintentionally allows users to read any Cloud Storage object in the same project, in a way that isn't properly documented.
The Document AI service agent is auto-assigned with excessive permissions, allowing it to access all objects from Cloud Storage buckets in the same project.
Malicious actors can exploit this to exfiltrate data from Cloud Storage by indirectly leveraging the service agent's permissions.
This vulnerability is an instance of transitive access abuse, a class of security flaw where unauthorized access is gained indirectly
through a trusted intermediary.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Escalating from Reader to Contributor in Azure API Management]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-apim-reader-contributor-escalation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-apim-reader-contributor-escalation</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure API Management allowed users with Reader access to escalate privileges to Contributor level by accessing admin user keys via the ARM API. This permitted full management capabilities through the Direct Management API, including reading secrets and modifying configurations.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure API Management allowed users with Reader access to escalate privileges to Contributor level by accessing admin user keys via the ARM API. This permitted full management capabilities through the Direct Management API, including reading secrets and modifying configurations.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Security Flaw in AWS Transit Gateway Peering Attachments]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-transit-gateway-peering-flaw</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-transit-gateway-peering-flaw</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A security flaw in AWS Transit Gateway Peering attachments allowed unauthorized acceptance of peering requests between regions. The exploit bypassed the approval step, granting potential unauthorized access to networks. AWS patched the issue on August 7, 2024, after being notified on July 25, 2024.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A security flaw in AWS Transit Gateway Peering attachments allowed unauthorized acceptance of peering requests between regions. The exploit bypassed the approval step, granting potential unauthorized access to networks. AWS patched the issue on August 7, 2024, after being notified on July 25, 2024.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Copilot Studio information disclosure via SSRF]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/copilot-studio-infoleak-ssrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/copilot-studio-infoleak-ssrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Aug 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[WireServing Up Credentials in Azure Kubernetes Services]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/wireserving-credentials-azure-kubernetes</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/wireserving-credentials-azure-kubernetes</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Aug 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure Kubernetes Services allowed attackers to escalate privileges and access cluster credentials. Affected clusters used Azure CNI for network configuration and Azure for network policy. Attackers could exploit this issue to steal data and cause financial and reputational damage. The vulnerability has been fixed by Microsoft after disclosure by Mandiant.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure Kubernetes Services allowed attackers to escalate privileges and access cluster credentials. Affected clusters used Azure CNI for network configuration and Azure for network policy. Attackers could exploit this issue to steal data and cause financial and reputational damage. The vulnerability has been fixed by Microsoft after disclosure by Mandiant.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Direct Connect route injection issue]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-direct-connect-route-injection</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-direct-connect-route-injection</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Aug 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A BGP-based feature of the AWS Direct Connect service allowed a third party to inject an incorrect route for an external IP, effectively hijacking AWS-sourced traffic. This resulted in connectivity issues between AWS EC2 instances and external systems. The issue was caused by a typo in a Direct Connect customer's configuration, which advertised an incorrect prefix to AWS.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A BGP-based feature of the AWS Direct Connect service allowed a third party to inject an incorrect route for an external IP, effectively hijacking AWS-sourced traffic. This resulted in connectivity issues between AWS EC2 instances and external systems. The issue was caused by a typo in a Direct Connect customer's configuration, which advertised an incorrect prefix to AWS.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azue Health privilege escalation via SSRF]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-health-pe-ssrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-health-pe-ssrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Aug 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bucket Monopoly Attack on AWS Services]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bucket-monopoly-aws-attack</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bucket-monopoly-aws-attack</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Aug 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Researchers discovered critical vulnerabilities in 6 AWS services that could allow attackers to breach accounts through malicious S3 buckets. By claiming predictable bucket names, attackers could inject code, steal data, or gain admin access. AWS has since fixed the issues, but the attack vector may still apply to other services and open source projects.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Researchers discovered critical vulnerabilities in 6 AWS services that could allow attackers to breach accounts through malicious S3 buckets. By claiming predictable bucket names, attackers could inject code, steal data, or gain admin access. AWS has since fixed the issues, but the attack vector may still apply to other services and open source projects.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Privilege Elevation Vulnerability in Entra ID]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/entra-id-privilege-elevation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/entra-id-privilege-elevation</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Aug 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Semperis researchers discovered vulnerabilities in Microsoft applications that allowed privilege elevation in Entra ID beyond expected authorization controls. The most severe finding enabled adding users to privileged roles, including Global Administrator, without proper permissions. The issues affected Device Registration Service, Viva Engage, and Microsoft Rights Management Service. Microsoft has since resolved the vulnerabilities.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Semperis researchers discovered vulnerabilities in Microsoft applications that allowed privilege elevation in Entra ID beyond expected authorization controls. The most severe finding enabled adding users to privileged roles, including Global Administrator, without proper permissions. The issues affected Device Registration Service, Viva Engage, and Microsoft Rights Management Service. Microsoft has since resolved the vulnerabilities.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP Cloud Functions Privilege Escalation Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloud-functions-privilege-escalation-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloud-functions-privilege-escalation-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jul 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A privilege escalation vulnerability dubbed "ConfusedFunction" was discovered in Google Cloud Platform's Cloud Functions service. It allows attackers to escalate privileges from Cloud Function permissions to the default Cloud Build service account during function deployment. The vulnerability affects both first and second-generation Cloud Functions.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A privilege escalation vulnerability dubbed "ConfusedFunction" was discovered in Google Cloud Platform's Cloud Functions service. It allows attackers to escalate privileges from Cloud Function permissions to the default Cloud Build service account during function deployment. The vulnerability affects both first and second-generation Cloud Functions.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Client VPN buffer overflow]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-client-vpn-buffer-overflow</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-client-vpn-buffer-overflow</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jul 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AWS Client VPN service was found to be affected by two
vulnerabilities which could potentially allow malicious actors with access to
a user’s device to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges,
including escalating to root access. Both vulnerabilities stem from buffer
overflow issues, a common programming error that can be exploited to overwrite
memory and gain unauthorized control over a system. The impact of these
vulnerabilities is severe, as successful exploitation could lead to complete
compromise of an affected device. Attackers could gain access to sensitive
data, install malware, or disrupt system operations. Given the widespread use
of AWS Client VPN for secure remote access, the potential for widespread
exploitation is a significant concern. AWS has acted swiftly to address these
vulnerabilities, releasing updated versions of the Client VPN software for all
supported platforms. However, the onus is on users to promptly apply these
updates to mitigate the risk.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AWS Client VPN service was found to be affected by two
vulnerabilities which could potentially allow malicious actors with access to
a user’s device to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges,
including escalating to root access. Both vulnerabilities stem from buffer
overflow issues, a common programming error that can be exploited to overwrite
memory and gain unauthorized control over a system. The impact of these
vulnerabilities is severe, as successful exploitation could lead to complete
compromise of an affected device. Attackers could gain access to sensitive
data, install malware, or disrupt system operations. Given the widespread use
of AWS Client VPN for secure remote access, the potential for widespread
exploitation is a significant concern. AWS has acted swiftly to address these
vulnerabilities, releasing updated versions of the Client VPN software for all
supported platforms. However, the onus is on users to promptly apply these
updates to mitigate the risk.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Unauthorized Access to AWS Account Findings in Microsoft Defender for Cloud]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/mdc-aws-findings-disclosure</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/mdc-aws-findings-disclosure</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Microsoft Defender for Cloud at one point provided customers with a flawed configuration template through their public GitHub repository. This template creates resources in the customer's AWS account so that Microsoft Defender for Cloud can scan it. In the rare cases in which this template was deployed, under certain, limited circumstances, Defender for Cloud's security findings for these AWS accounts could be disclosed to unauthorized third parties.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Microsoft Defender for Cloud at one point provided customers with a flawed configuration template through their public GitHub repository. This template creates resources in the customer's AWS account so that Microsoft Defender for Cloud can scan it. In the rare cases in which this template was deployed, under certain, limited circumstances, Defender for Cloud's security findings for these AWS accounts could be disclosed to unauthorized third parties.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Machine Learning SSRF]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-ml-ssrf-pt</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-ml-ssrf-pt</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Certain API endpoints on ml.azure.com and ai.azure.com used for adding/viewing data connections
could be leveraged for server side request forgeries (SSRF). While they do have protections to
restrict making requests to internal hosts, it was possible to circumvent those protections
using a 301 or 302 redirect response which points to a sensitive host.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Certain API endpoints on ml.azure.com and ai.azure.com used for adding/viewing data connections
could be leveraged for server side request forgeries (SSRF). While they do have protections to
restrict making requests to internal hosts, it was possible to circumvent those protections
using a 301 or 302 redirect response which points to a sensitive host.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP HMAC Keys do not log creation, deletion or usage]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-hmac-keys-insufficient-logging</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-hmac-keys-insufficient-logging</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Cloud Audit Logs do not capture actions mediated through the cloud console private API 
service (cloudconsole-pa). Consequently, there is no logging of HMAC key creation or deletion 
linked to user accounts. This absence of logs hampers defenders' ability to alert or monitor 
the creation of HMAC keys for user accounts, posing a persistence risk, or their deletion, 
presenting a denial of service risk.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Cloud Audit Logs do not capture actions mediated through the cloud console private API 
service (cloudconsole-pa). Consequently, there is no logging of HMAC key creation or deletion 
linked to user accounts. This absence of logs hampers defenders' ability to alert or monitor 
the creation of HMAC keys for user accounts, posing a persistence risk, or their deletion, 
presenting a denial of service risk.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP HMAC Keys are not discoverable or revokable other than for self]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-hmac-keys-unauditable</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-hmac-keys-unauditable</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[GCP administrators face challenges in managing HMAC keys within their organizations, 
lacking visibility into which user accounts have generated these keys and whether they are 
actively being used to access storage objects. Additionally, there's a lack of functionality 
to revoke keys associated with other users, restricting their ability to enforce security 
policies effectively. Similarly, GCP incident response teams rely on Cloud Logging to monitor
Cloud Storage object access, but they lack specific indicators to determine if HMAC keys are
being utilized in these access attempts.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[GCP administrators face challenges in managing HMAC keys within their organizations, 
lacking visibility into which user accounts have generated these keys and whether they are 
actively being used to access storage objects. Additionally, there's a lack of functionality 
to revoke keys associated with other users, restricting their ability to enforce security 
policies effectively. Similarly, GCP incident response teams rely on Cloud Logging to monitor
Cloud Storage object access, but they lack specific indicators to determine if HMAC keys are
being utilized in these access attempts.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GitHub Copilot Chat Vulnerable to Data Exfiltration]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/github-copilot-chat-data-exfiltration</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/github-copilot-chat-data-exfiltration</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[GitHub Copilot Chat VS Code Extension was vulnerable to data exfiltration via prompt injection when analyzing untrusted source code. The vulnerability allowed attackers to access previous conversation turns and append information from the chat history to an image URL, which was then automatically retrieved by Copilot, sending the data to the attacker.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[GitHub Copilot Chat VS Code Extension was vulnerable to data exfiltration via prompt injection when analyzing untrusted source code. The vulnerability allowed attackers to access previous conversation turns and append information from the chat history to an image URL, which was then automatically retrieved by Copilot, sending the data to the attacker.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Issue with AWS Deployment Framework]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-deployment-framework-issue</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-deployment-framework-issue</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[CVE-2024-37293 affects the AWS Deployment Framework's bootstrap process, potentially allowing privilege escalation if an actor has permissions to change CodeBuild projects or Lambda functions. The issue is fixed in version 4.0 and above. AWS recommends immediate upgrade and temporary mitigation by adding a permissions boundary to roles created by ADF in the management account.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[CVE-2024-37293 affects the AWS Deployment Framework's bootstrap process, potentially allowing privilege escalation if an actor has permissions to change CodeBuild projects or Lambda functions. The issue is fixed in version 4.0 and above. AWS recommends immediate upgrade and temporary mitigation by adding a permissions boundary to roles created by ADF in the management account.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Issue with Amazon EC2 VM Import Export Service]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ec2-vm-import-export-issue</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ec2-vm-import-export-issue</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS addressed an issue with the Amazon EC2 VM Import Export Service where importing Windows VMs with custom Sysprep answer files resulted in an unprotected backup copy being created, potentially exposing sensitive data. The issue affected imports made before April 12, 2024, and could impact instances launched from affected AMIs.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS addressed an issue with the Amazon EC2 VM Import Export Service where importing Windows VMs with custom Sysprep answer files resulted in an unprotected backup copy being created, potentially exposing sensitive data. The issue affected imports made before April 12, 2024, and could impact instances launched from affected AMIs.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Abusing Service Tags to Bypass Azure Firewall Rules]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-firewall-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-firewall-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Tenable Research discovered a vulnerability in Azure allowing attackers to bypass firewall rules based on Service Tags by forging requests from trusted services. It affects over 10 Azure services and enables access to internal/private Azure resources. Microsoft updated documentation to clarify Service Tags' security limitations.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Tenable Research discovered a vulnerability in Azure allowing attackers to bypass firewall rules based on Service Tags by forging requests from trusted services. It affects over 10 Azure services and enables access to internal/private Azure resources. Microsoft updated documentation to clarify Service Tags' security limitations.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Non-Production AWS Endpoints as Attack Surface]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-non-production-endpoints-attack</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-non-production-endpoints-attack</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Researchers identified non-production AWS API endpoints that could be abused for defense evasion, including silent permission enumeration, accessing account data without logging, and partially bypassing CloudTrail. AWS has remediated specific issues but thousands of such endpoints may exist.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Researchers identified non-production AWS API endpoints that could be abused for defense evasion, including silent permission enumeration, accessing account data without logging, and partially bypassing CloudTrail. AWS has remediated specific issues but thousands of such endpoints may exist.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Internal Azure Container Registry writable via exposed secret]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-internal-acr-secret</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-internal-acr-secret</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A Microsoft employee accidentally published credentials via a git commit to a public repository.
These credentials granted privileged access to an internal Azure Container Registry (ACR) used by Azure,
which reportedly held container images utilized by multiple Azure projects, including Azure IoT Edge, Akri,
and Apollo. The privileged access could have allowed an attacker to download private images as well
as upload new images and (most importantly) overwrite existing ones. In theory, an attacker could have
leveraged the latter to implement a supply chain attack against these Azure projects and their users.
However, it is currently unknown precisely which images this ACR contained or how they were used,
so the effective impact of this issue remains undetermined.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A Microsoft employee accidentally published credentials via a git commit to a public repository.
These credentials granted privileged access to an internal Azure Container Registry (ACR) used by Azure,
which reportedly held container images utilized by multiple Azure projects, including Azure IoT Edge, Akri,
and Apollo. The privileged access could have allowed an attacker to download private images as well
as upload new images and (most importantly) overwrite existing ones. In theory, an attacker could have
leveraged the latter to implement a supply chain attack against these Azure projects and their users.
However, it is currently unknown precisely which images this ACR contained or how they were used,
so the effective impact of this issue remains undetermined.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lethal Injection]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/lethal-injection</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/lethal-injection</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Multiple vulnerabilities were uncovered in Azure Health Bot service, Microsoft's health chatbot platform.
These could have potentially exposed sensitive user data and granted attackers extensive control, allowing
unrestricted code execution as root on the bot backend, unrestricted access to authentication secrets &
integration auth providers, unrestricted memory read in the bot backend, exposing sensitive secrets,
allowing cross-tenant data access and unrestricted deletion of other tenants' public resources.
These issues stemmed from various bugs related to URL sanitization, shared compute, and sandboxing.
Following disclosure, Microsoft changed the service architecture to run a completely separate ACI
instance per customer, thereby mitigating future sandbox escapes, and changed the sandboxing from
vm2 to the isolated-vm library (which uses V8 isolates).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Multiple vulnerabilities were uncovered in Azure Health Bot service, Microsoft's health chatbot platform.
These could have potentially exposed sensitive user data and granted attackers extensive control, allowing
unrestricted code execution as root on the bot backend, unrestricted access to authentication secrets &
integration auth providers, unrestricted memory read in the bot backend, exposing sensitive secrets,
allowing cross-tenant data access and unrestricted deletion of other tenants' public resources.
These issues stemmed from various bugs related to URL sanitization, shared compute, and sandboxing.
Following disclosure, Microsoft changed the service architecture to run a completely separate ACI
instance per customer, thereby mitigating future sandbox escapes, and changed the sandboxing from
vm2 to the isolated-vm library (which uses V8 isolates).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GraphNinja]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/graph-ninja</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/graph-ninja</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Microsoft Graph allowed attackers to conduct password-spray attacks without detection.
The issue involved switching the 'common' authentication endpoint with that of an unrelated tenant,
thereby avoiding the appearance of logon attempts in the victim's logs.
This technique could allow attackers to validate user credentials through verbose error messages, 
but actual successful logons using these credentials would still be recorded in the victims' logs (regardless of endpoint).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Microsoft Graph allowed attackers to conduct password-spray attacks without detection.
The issue involved switching the 'common' authentication endpoint with that of an unrelated tenant,
thereby avoiding the appearance of logon attempts in the victim's logs.
This technique could allow attackers to validate user credentials through verbose error messages, 
but actual successful logons using these credentials would still be recorded in the victims' logs (regardless of endpoint).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure tenant takeover via Microsoft application]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-tenant-takeover-microsoft-application</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-tenant-takeover-microsoft-application</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Microsoft Dynamics 365 Supply Chain Visibility allowed arbitrary takeover of Azure tenants via a malicious reply URL. Clicking a link could grant an attacker directory read access or full tenant control if clicked by a Global Admin, without requiring user consent.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Microsoft Dynamics 365 Supply Chain Visibility allowed arbitrary takeover of Azure tenants via a malicious reply URL. Clicking a link could grant an attacker directory read access or full tenant control if clicked by a Global Admin, without requiring user consent.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Amplify IAM role publicly assumable exposure]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-amplify-iam-role-publicly-assumable-exposure</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-amplify-iam-role-publicly-assumable-exposure</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AWS Amplify service was found to be misconfiguring IAM roles associated 
with Amplify projects. This misconfiguration caused these roles to be assumable 
by any other AWS account. Both the Amplify Studio and the Amplify CLI 
exhibited this behavior. Any Amplify project created using the Amplify CLI
built between July 3, 2018 and August 8, 2019 had IAM roles that were assumable by
anyone in the world. The same was true if the authentication component was removed
from an Amplify project using the Amplify CLI or Amplify Studio built between
August 2019 and January 2024. AWS mitigated this vulnerability through backend changes to
STS and IAM, and also released a patch for the Amplify CLI to ensure that newly
created roles are properly configured in accordance with these changes.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AWS Amplify service was found to be misconfiguring IAM roles associated 
with Amplify projects. This misconfiguration caused these roles to be assumable 
by any other AWS account. Both the Amplify Studio and the Amplify CLI 
exhibited this behavior. Any Amplify project created using the Amplify CLI
built between July 3, 2018 and August 8, 2019 had IAM roles that were assumable by
anyone in the world. The same was true if the authentication component was removed
from an Amplify project using the Amplify CLI or Amplify Studio built between
August 2019 and January 2024. AWS mitigated this vulnerability through backend changes to
STS and IAM, and also released a patch for the Amplify CLI to ensure that newly
created roles are properly configured in accordance with these changes.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Glue database password leakage]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-glue-database-password-leakage</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-glue-database-password-leakage</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A principal with the permissions glue:GetConnection and ec2:DescribeSubnets
can retrieve the database password of a connection, since the password is loaded into
the AWS console website when a connection's edit page is requested. The severity of
this issue is low since it requires sufficient prior access.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A principal with the permissions glue:GetConnection and ec2:DescribeSubnets
can retrieve the database password of a connection, since the password is loaded into
the AWS console website when a connection's edit page is requested. The severity of
this issue is low since it requires sufficient prior access.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS IAM Trust Policy Condition Evaluation Bug]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-iam-trust-policy-condition-evaluation-bug</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-iam-trust-policy-condition-evaluation-bug</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Tag variable names affected whether trust policy conditions were evaluated correctly.
If the request tag referenced a principal tag called MemberRole in the JWT token, and 
the IAM role referenced a resource tag with the same variable name, the condition was
always evaluated as true, regardless of whether the tag's values actually matched. Only
role trust policies that used a variable substitution for both the request tag and the
resource tag in the policy statement resulted in the policy evaluating incorrectly. The 
issue impacted statements within IAM boundary policies and SCP policies that contained 
the same pattern of STS role assumption with tag-based conditions.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Tag variable names affected whether trust policy conditions were evaluated correctly.
If the request tag referenced a principal tag called MemberRole in the JWT token, and 
the IAM role referenced a resource tag with the same variable name, the condition was
always evaluated as true, regardless of whether the tag's values actually matched. Only
role trust policies that used a variable substitution for both the request tag and the
resource tag in the policy statement resulted in the policy evaluating incorrectly. The 
issue impacted statements within IAM boundary policies and SCP policies that contained 
the same pattern of STS role assumption with tag-based conditions.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bazel supply chain vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bazel_supply_chain</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bazel_supply_chain</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Cycode discovered a CI/CD misconfiguration in the Bazel repo, which if exploited could have
allowed an attacker to enact a supply chain attack against all Bazel users, which includes
Google themselves and therefore likely GCP as well.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Cycode discovered a CI/CD misconfiguration in the Bazel repo, which if exploited could have
allowed an attacker to enact a supply chain attack against all Bazel users, which includes
Google themselves and therefore likely GCP as well.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Critical GitLab Account Takeover Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/critical-gitlab-account-takeover-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/critical-gitlab-account-takeover-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[GitLab addressed a critical vulnerability, CVE-2023-7028, affecting managed SaaS gitlab.com instance as well as self-hosted versions 16.1 to 16.7.1. The flaw could allow account takeovers via unverified email password resets. Third party could intercept the password reset request, add their own email to the request and forward it. GitLab would then send the reset link to the added 3rd-party email. This is in effect an account takeover with only precondition of knowing victim email associated with the GitLab account.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[GitLab addressed a critical vulnerability, CVE-2023-7028, affecting managed SaaS gitlab.com instance as well as self-hosted versions 16.1 to 16.7.1. The flaw could allow account takeovers via unverified email password resets. Third party could intercept the password reset request, add their own email to the request and forward it. GitLab would then send the reset link to the added 3rd-party email. This is in effect an account takeover with only precondition of knowing victim email associated with the GitLab account.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Flaw in Bedrock's Foundation Model Access Control]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bedrock-access-control-flaw</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bedrock-access-control-flaw</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A flaw in AWS Bedrock's foundation model access control allowed unauthorized subscriptions to certain models, bypassing IAM policies using the aws-marketplace:ProductId condition key. This could lead to compliance issues and financial risks. AWS has since fixed the issue and notified affected customers.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A flaw in AWS Bedrock's foundation model access control allowed unauthorized subscriptions to certain models, bypassing IAM policies using the aws-marketplace:ProductId condition key. This could lead to compliance issues and financial risks. AWS has since fixed the issue and notified affected customers.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[IAM Policy Flaw Allowed Unauthorized Access to Bedrock Models]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bedrock-models-iam-flaw</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bedrock-models-iam-flaw</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 24 Mar 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[TrustOnCloud identified a flaw in how AWS Bedrock enforces IAM access controls using the
aws-marketplace:ProductId condition key, which is meant to restrict subscriptions to specific
foundation models. Their testing revealed that some Bedrock models, including those from Cohere
and Stability AI, were not consistently blocked or allowed as intended by IAM policies, posing
potential compliance and cost risks. AWS acknowledged and fixed the issue, notifying affected
customers and updating testing procedures to prevent future issues.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[TrustOnCloud identified a flaw in how AWS Bedrock enforces IAM access controls using the
aws-marketplace:ProductId condition key, which is meant to restrict subscriptions to specific
foundation models. Their testing revealed that some Bedrock models, including those from Cohere
and Stability AI, were not consistently blocked or allowed as intended by IAM policies, posing
potential compliance and cost risks. AWS acknowledged and fixed the issue, notifying affected
customers and updating testing procedures to prevent future issues.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[FlowFixation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/flowfixation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/flowfixation</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Mar 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A flaw in Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (MWAA) could have allowed potential session hijacking and remote code execution.
The issue stemmed from a combination of session fixation in the MWAA web management panel and an AWS domain configuration error leading
to a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. Attackers exploiting this could manipulate victims' configurations, trigger workflows, and
potentially move laterally to other services within the cloud environment. The exploit of this bug involved deploying malicious code
via an Amazon API Gateway that interacts with the victim’s Airflow instance, setting a session cookie that bypasses normal authentication
and grants the attacker access.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A flaw in Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (MWAA) could have allowed potential session hijacking and remote code execution.
The issue stemmed from a combination of session fixation in the MWAA web management panel and an AWS domain configuration error leading
to a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. Attackers exploiting this could manipulate victims' configurations, trigger workflows, and
potentially move laterally to other services within the cloud environment. The exploit of this bug involved deploying malicious code
via an Amazon API Gateway that interacts with the victim’s Airflow instance, setting a session cookie that bypasses normal authentication
and grants the attacker access.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Synapse Analytics privilege escalation via intelligent caching]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/synapse-vegas-lpe</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/synapse-vegas-lpe</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Mar 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Tenable Research discovered a privilege escalation flaw that allows a user to escalate privileges to that 
of the root user within the context of a Spark VM. This escalation was achieved because of a permissions
issue with scripts utilized by the intelligent caching service (AKA "Vegas") present in the environment.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Tenable Research discovered a privilege escalation flaw that allows a user to escalate privileges to that 
of the root user within the context of a Spark VM. This escalation was achieved because of a permissions
issue with scripts utilized by the intelligent caching service (AKA "Vegas") present in the environment.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Site Recovery privilege escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-site-recovery-pe</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-site-recovery-pe</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[When the ASR service is enabled, it uses an Automation Account with a System-Assigned Managed Identity
to manage Site Recovery extensions on VMs. However, the Runbook (a set of scripts for managing extensions)
executed by the Automation Account had its job output visible to users, and this output mistakenly included
a cleartext Management-scoped Access Token for the System-Assigned Managed Identity, which possesses the
Contributor role over the entire Azure subscription. Therefore, lower-privileged user roles who could access
the Automation Account's job output could see and use this Access Token. This access allowed these users to
impersonate the Managed Identity, thereby elevating their privileges to that of a Contributor for the whole
subscription, including the ability to execute commands on VMs as `NT Authority\\SYSTEM`.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[When the ASR service is enabled, it uses an Automation Account with a System-Assigned Managed Identity
to manage Site Recovery extensions on VMs. However, the Runbook (a set of scripts for managing extensions)
executed by the Automation Account had its job output visible to users, and this output mistakenly included
a cleartext Management-scoped Access Token for the System-Assigned Managed Identity, which possesses the
Contributor role over the entire Azure subscription. Therefore, lower-privileged user roles who could access
the Automation Account's job output could see and use this Access Token. This access allowed these users to
impersonate the Managed Identity, thereby elevating their privileges to that of a Contributor for the whole
subscription, including the ability to execute commands on VMs as `NT Authority\\SYSTEM`.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure HDInsight privilege escalation and DoS vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-hdinsight-dos</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-hdinsight-dos</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Three privilege escalation and denial-of-service vulnerabilities were discovered in Azure HDinsight, related to their usage of Apache Oozie and Ambari.
The root cause of at least one of these vulnerabilities is a flaw in Apache Oozie itself, leading to regex denial-of-service (ReDoS). The other two vulnerabilities
could allow an authenticated attacker with HDI cluster access to gain cluster administrator privileges and perform any resource service management operation.
The vulnerabilities were patched in the October 2023 security update of Azure HDinsight.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Three privilege escalation and denial-of-service vulnerabilities were discovered in Azure HDinsight, related to their usage of Apache Oozie and Ambari.
The root cause of at least one of these vulnerabilities is a flaw in Apache Oozie itself, leading to regex denial-of-service (ReDoS). The other two vulnerabilities
could allow an authenticated attacker with HDI cluster access to gain cluster administrator privileges and perform any resource service management operation.
The vulnerabilities were patched in the October 2023 security update of Azure HDinsight.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Devops Zero-Click CI/CD Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-devops-zero-click</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-devops-zero-click</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Legit Security found a zero-click vulnerability in Azure Pipelines that allows
an attacker to access secrets and internal information and perform actions in
elevated permissions in the context of a pipeline workflow. This could allow 
attackers to move laterally in the organization and initiate supply chain attacks.
When a pipeline is triggered by a "pipeline resource trigger," it shows in the
platform as "Automatically Triggered For …" Instead of running in fork default
permissions, preventing any access to secrets and sensitive actions, Azure Pipelines
"confuses" the trigger for an internal build allowing access sensitive build secrets.
Exploitability depends on a public GitHub repository that runs Azure pipelines on pull-request,
with default Azure pipeline fork configurations to trigger pipeline run, and Pipeline-Triggers.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Legit Security found a zero-click vulnerability in Azure Pipelines that allows
an attacker to access secrets and internal information and perform actions in
elevated permissions in the context of a pipeline workflow. This could allow 
attackers to move laterally in the organization and initiate supply chain attacks.
When a pipeline is triggered by a "pipeline resource trigger," it shows in the
platform as "Automatically Triggered For …" Instead of running in fork default
permissions, preventing any access to secrets and sensitive actions, Azure Pipelines
"confuses" the trigger for an internal build allowing access sensitive build secrets.
Exploitability depends on a public GitHub repository that runs Azure pipelines on pull-request,
with default Azure pipeline fork configurations to trigger pipeline run, and Pipeline-Triggers.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud GKE Unsecure Sys:All Binding]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-gke-sys-all</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-gke-sys-all</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The system:authenticated group in Kubernetes is a special group that includes all authenticated entities,
including human users and service accounts. Anyone who successfully authenticates to the Kubernetes API server,
regardless of the authentication method used, will be automatically included in this unique group. Thus, it will
share the same roles and permissions of the group. This misunderstanding then creates a significant security
loophole when administrators unknowingly bind this group with overly permissive roles.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The system:authenticated group in Kubernetes is a special group that includes all authenticated entities,
including human users and service accounts. Anyone who successfully authenticates to the Kubernetes API server,
regardless of the authentication method used, will be automatically included in this unique group. Thus, it will
share the same roles and permissions of the group. This misunderstanding then creates a significant security
loophole when administrators unknowingly bind this group with overly permissive roles.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Amazon Q for Business Data Exfiltration]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-amazon-q-data-exfil</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-amazon-q-data-exfil</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An Indirect Prompt Injection attack can cause the LLM to return
markdown tags. This allows an adversary who’s data makes it into
the chat context (e.g via an uploaded file) to achieve data
exfiltration of the victim’s data by rendering hyperlinks.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An Indirect Prompt Injection attack can cause the LLM to return
markdown tags. This allows an adversary who’s data makes it into
the chat context (e.g via an uploaded file) to achieve data
exfiltration of the victim’s data by rendering hyperlinks.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Microsoft Healthcare Chatbot Vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/microsoft-healthcare-chatbot-vulnerabilities</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/microsoft-healthcare-chatbot-vulnerabilities</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Multiple vulnerabilities in Microsoft's Azure Health Bot service were discovered, allowing access to sensitive infrastructure and confidential medical data. Issues included sandbox escapes, unrestricted code execution, access to authentication secrets, cross-tenant data exposure, and unauthorized deletion of resources. Microsoft quickly patched the vulnerabilities and restructured the service architecture for improved security.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Multiple vulnerabilities in Microsoft's Azure Health Bot service were discovered, allowing access to sensitive infrastructure and confidential medical data. Issues included sandbox escapes, unrestricted code execution, access to authentication secrets, cross-tenant data exposure, and unauthorized deletion of resources. Microsoft quickly patched the vulnerabilities and restructured the service architecture for improved security.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Amazon Cognito Rate Limit Bypass Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cognito-rate-limit-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cognito-rate-limit-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A rate limit bypass vulnerability was discovered in Amazon Cognito, allowing attackers to potentially brute-force login credentials, password reset PINs, and MFA codes by sending requests in parallel. The vulnerability affected the main login flow, password reset function, and MFA process, potentially exposing user accounts to unauthorized access.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A rate limit bypass vulnerability was discovered in Amazon Cognito, allowing attackers to potentially brute-force login credentials, password reset PINs, and MFA codes by sending requests in parallel. The vulnerability affected the main login flow, password reset function, and MFA process, potentially exposing user accounts to unauthorized access.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Data Exfiltration Through CloudTrail]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudtrail-data-exfiltration</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudtrail-data-exfiltration</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This scenario describes a potential data exfiltration technique using AWS CloudTrail. An attacker with access to CloudTrail logs could potentially extract sensitive information from logged events, including API calls and data modifications. This poses a risk to data confidentiality and could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[This scenario describes a potential data exfiltration technique using AWS CloudTrail. An attacker with access to CloudTrail logs could potentially extract sensitive information from logged events, including API calls and data modifications. This poses a risk to data confidentiality and could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Poisoning GitHub's Runner Images Supply Chain Attack]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/github-runner-images-supply-chain</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/github-runner-images-supply-chain</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A critical vulnerability in GitHub's actions/runner-images repository allowed arbitrary code execution on self-hosted runners, potentially enabling modification of GitHub's runner base images. The flaw stemmed from misconfigured self-hosted runners on a public repository with default workflow approval settings. The researcher gained persistence, accessed secrets, and could have inserted malicious code into GitHub's runner images used by customers.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A critical vulnerability in GitHub's actions/runner-images repository allowed arbitrary code execution on self-hosted runners, potentially enabling modification of GitHub's runner base images. The flaw stemmed from misconfigured self-hosted runners on a public repository with default workflow approval settings. The researcher gained persistence, accessed secrets, and could have inserted malicious code into GitHub's runner images used by customers.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Pipelines Agent poisoned pipeline execution]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/pipelines-agent-ppe</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/pipelines-agent-ppe</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Pipelines and GitHub Actions allow deployment of runners and agents using VM images sourced from a GitHub-managed
repository (github.com/actions/runner-images). This repo was misconfigured to use self-hosted runners insecurely,
in a way that could have allowed a malicious external contributor (i.e., anyone who had previously had at least one PR
approved and merged in the repo) to poison the repository and achieve code execution on runners in the repo. This in turn
could have theoretically allowed an attacker to modify the source code of the images, and thereby conduct a supply chain
attack against Pipelines and Actions customers.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Pipelines and GitHub Actions allow deployment of runners and agents using VM images sourced from a GitHub-managed
repository (github.com/actions/runner-images). This repo was misconfigured to use self-hosted runners insecurely,
in a way that could have allowed a malicious external contributor (i.e., anyone who had previously had at least one PR
approved and merged in the repo) to poison the repository and achieve code execution on runners in the repo. This in turn
could have theoretically allowed an attacker to modify the source code of the images, and thereby conduct a supply chain
attack against Pipelines and Actions customers.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS IAM Identity Center Expiry]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-iam-identity-center-expiry</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-iam-identity-center-expiry</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS IAM Identity Center exchanges third-party OIDC tokens for
Identity Center-issued tokens. Identity Center relies on the jti
claim in the third-party tokens to prevent replay attacks. 
Identity Center maintained a cache of previously-seen jti values
for a fixed period (24 hours) and didn’t enforce that the third-party
tokens had expiry claims. This meant that a token with a jti claim and
without an exp claim could be replayed after >24 hours had passed. 
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS IAM Identity Center exchanges third-party OIDC tokens for
Identity Center-issued tokens. Identity Center relies on the jti
claim in the third-party tokens to prevent replay attacks. 
Identity Center maintained a cache of previously-seen jti values
for a fixed period (24 hours) and didn’t enforce that the third-party
tokens had expiry claims. This meant that a token with a jti claim and
without an exp claim could be replayed after >24 hours had passed. 
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google OAuth Vulnerability Allows Indefinite Access]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-oauth-vulnerability-indefinite-access</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-oauth-vulnerability-indefinite-access</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google OAuth allows employees to retain indefinite access to applications like Slack and Zoom after being removed from their company's Google organization. The issue stems from the ability to create Google accounts using corporate email aliases, which can't be off-boarded by the organization. This bypasses typical account removal processes and poses a significant security risk.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google OAuth allows employees to retain indefinite access to applications like Slack and Zoom after being removed from their company's Google organization. The issue stems from the ability to create Google accounts using corporate email aliases, which can't be off-boarded by the organization. This bypasses typical account removal processes and poses a significant security risk.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Control plane bypass in Azure OpenAI]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-openai-control-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-openai-control-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A way to manage Azure OpenAI deployments via the Data Plane was discovered, bypassing key security controls. This allows creation/modification/deletion of deployments without the usual protections of Resource Manager Locks, Azure Policy, and Entra ID authentication.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A way to manage Azure OpenAI deployments via the Data Plane was discovered, bypassing key security controls. This allows creation/modification/deletion of deployments without the usual protections of Resource Manager Locks, Azure Policy, and Entra ID authentication.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Workspace Domain-Wide Delegation Flaw]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-workspace-domain-wide-delegation-risk</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-workspace-domain-wide-delegation-risk</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Unit 42 researchers discovered a security risk in Google Workspace's domain-wide delegation feature that allows a GCP identity with necessary permissions to generate access tokens to impersonate Google Workspace users and access their data. This mismatch between GCP permissions and Google Workspace access could be exploited by malicious insiders or attackers with stolen credentials.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Unit 42 researchers discovered a security risk in Google Workspace's domain-wide delegation feature that allows a GCP identity with necessary permissions to generate access tokens to impersonate Google Workspace users and access their data. This mismatch between GCP permissions and Google Workspace access could be exploited by malicious insiders or attackers with stolen credentials.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Extracting Managed Identity Credentials from Azure Functions]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-function-credential-extraction</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-function-credential-extraction</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure Function Apps allowed extraction of Managed Identity credentials from the encrypted startup context of Linux containers. This gave attackers with container access the ability to persist as the Managed Identity, breaking the intended security model. Microsoft has since patched the issue by encrypting the sensitive payload.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure Function Apps allowed extraction of Managed Identity credentials from the encrypted startup context of Linux containers. This gave attackers with container access the ability to persist as the Managed Identity, breaking the intended security model. Microsoft has since patched the issue by encrypting the sensitive payload.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure CLI Leaks Credentials in GitHub Actions Logs]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-cli-credential-leak</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-cli-credential-leak</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure CLI commands were found to leak sensitive information, including credentials, through GitHub Actions logs. The vulnerability affects multiple Azure CLI commands and could expose secrets in public and private repositories. Microsoft has issued updates to Azure CLI, Azure Pipelines, and GitHub Actions to address the issue.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure CLI commands were found to leak sensitive information, including credentials, through GitHub Actions logs. The vulnerability affects multiple Azure CLI commands and could expose secrets in public and private repositories. Microsoft has issued updates to Azure CLI, Azure Pipelines, and GitHub Actions to address the issue.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CLI Tools Leak Credentials in GitHub Actions Logs]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cli-tools-leak-credentials-github-actions-logs</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cli-tools-leak-credentials-github-actions-logs</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Palo Alto discovered that Azure CLI commands were found to leak sensitive credentials and environment variables in GitHub Actions logs.
This issue affects both public and private repositories, potentially exposing secrets to unauthorized parties.
The problem stems from the Azure CLI's design to echo back accessed/created/updated/deleted resource information, which can include sensitive data.
Later research by Orca Security revealed that AWS CLI and Google Cloud CLI were affected by the same issue, but AWS and GCP view this as expected behavior.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Palo Alto discovered that Azure CLI commands were found to leak sensitive credentials and environment variables in GitHub Actions logs.
This issue affects both public and private repositories, potentially exposing secrets to unauthorized parties.
The problem stems from the Azure CLI's design to echo back accessed/created/updated/deleted resource information, which can include sensitive data.
Later research by Orca Security revealed that AWS CLI and Google Cloud CLI were affected by the same issue, but AWS and GCP view this as expected behavior.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Automation Service Used for Cryptocurrency Mining]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-automation-crypto-mining</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-automation-crypto-mining</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[SafeBreach Labs researchers developed methods to leverage Microsoft Azure's Automation Service for free, undetectable cryptocurrency mining. They found three ways to execute miners: two using their own environment and Azure's resources for free, and one in a victim's environment undetected. The techniques could potentially be used for any task requiring code execution on Azure.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[SafeBreach Labs researchers developed methods to leverage Microsoft Azure's Automation Service for free, undetectable cryptocurrency mining. They found three ways to execute miners: two using their own environment and Azure's resources for free, and one in a victim's environment undetected. The techniques could potentially be used for any task requiring code execution on Azure.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS AppFlow secrets disclosure]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-appflow-secrets-disclosure</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-appflow-secrets-disclosure</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AppFlow had an undocumented service called sandstoneconfigurationservicelambda. 
An undocumented field (awsOwnedManagedAppCredentialsArn) could be used during
connector registration and connector updates. Specifying a victim's Secret ARN
as that field disclosed the clientId and clientSecret, so long as the victim
Secret ARN belonged to a connection profile which is of the type 
OAuth or contains clientId and clientSecret.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AppFlow had an undocumented service called sandstoneconfigurationservicelambda. 
An undocumented field (awsOwnedManagedAppCredentialsArn) could be used during
connector registration and connector updates. Specifying a victim's Secret ARN
as that field disclosed the clientId and clientSecret, so long as the victim
Secret ARN belonged to a connection profile which is of the type 
OAuth or contains clientId and clientSecret.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS AppFlow WooCommerce SSRF]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-appflow-woocommerce-ssrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-appflow-woocommerce-ssrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AppFlow WooCommerce connector allowed specification of a full URL.
The connector included details of response content when the URL
offered an unexpected response. This means you could make arbitrary
GET requests to any URL from the WooCommerce connector, and view the 
response content. The response in the error was truncated to 500 characters.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AppFlow WooCommerce connector allowed specification of a full URL.
The connector included details of response content when the URL
offered an unexpected response. This means you could make arbitrary
GET requests to any URL from the WooCommerce connector, and view the 
response content. The response in the error was truncated to 500 characters.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hacking Google Bard via Prompt Injection]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-bard-prompt-injection</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-bard-prompt-injection</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google Bard allowed for prompt injection and data exfiltration through its Extensions feature. By injecting malicious instructions into shared Google Docs, an attacker could force Bard to render images with exfiltrated chat history data in the URL. The exploit bypassed Content Security Policy using Google Apps Script.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google Bard allowed for prompt injection and data exfiltration through its Extensions feature. By injecting malicious instructions into shared Google Docs, an attacker could force Bard to render images with exfiltrated chat history data in the URL. The exploit bypassed Content Security Policy using Google Apps Script.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ApatchMe]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/apatchme</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/apatchme</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (MWAA) and the Task instance details
page in the Google Composer UI were not patched against CVE-2023-29247 (Stored XSS).
This meant that post-authentication, a threat actor could have exploited this
to store their JavaScript payload in the victim's managed Apache Airflow instance
and run JavaScript on behalf of the victim (who could be an admin or another
user with higher permissions than the threat actor, thereby leading to privilege escalation).
With JavaScript, threat actors could have run any operation in the session that the victim
is able to run — edit tasks, read jobs, run jobs, read plugins and configurations, 
list connections, add variables and more.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (MWAA) and the Task instance details
page in the Google Composer UI were not patched against CVE-2023-29247 (Stored XSS).
This meant that post-authentication, a threat actor could have exploited this
to store their JavaScript payload in the victim's managed Apache Airflow instance
and run JavaScript on behalf of the victim (who could be an admin or another
user with higher permissions than the threat actor, thereby leading to privilege escalation).
With JavaScript, threat actors could have run any operation in the session that the victim
is able to run — edit tasks, read jobs, run jobs, read plugins and configurations, 
list connections, add variables and more.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure AI Playground data exfiltration]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-ai-playground-data-exfil</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-ai-playground-data-exfil</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Oct 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In Azure AI Playground, a Prompt Injection attack could cause an LLM to return markdown tags. 
This would have allowed an adversary whose data makes it into the chat context
(e.g., via an uploaded file) to achieve exfiltration of the victim’s 
data by rendering hyperlinks. However, the severity of this issue is low,
as there were no integrations that could pull remote content. This means
Indirect Prompt Injection was not possible, and it would require the victim to copy
the malicious prompt from elsewhere. A similar issue affected GCP Vertex AI.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[In Azure AI Playground, a Prompt Injection attack could cause an LLM to return markdown tags. 
This would have allowed an adversary whose data makes it into the chat context
(e.g., via an uploaded file) to achieve exfiltration of the victim’s 
data by rendering hyperlinks. However, the severity of this issue is low,
as there were no integrations that could pull remote content. This means
Indirect Prompt Injection was not possible, and it would require the victim to copy
the malicious prompt from elsewhere. A similar issue affected GCP Vertex AI.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Vertex AI Studio data exfiltration]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-vertex-ai-data-exfil</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-vertex-ai-data-exfil</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Oct 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In Vertex AI Studio, a Prompt Injection attack could cause the LLM to return
markdown tags. This could have allowed an adversary whose data makes it into
the chat context (e.g., via an uploaded file) to achieve
exfiltration of the victim’s data by rendering hyperlinks. However, the severity of this issue is low,
as there were no integrations that could pull remote content. This means
Indirect Prompt Injection was not possible, and it would require the victim to copy
the malicious prompt from elsewhere. A similar issue affected Azure AI.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[In Vertex AI Studio, a Prompt Injection attack could cause the LLM to return
markdown tags. This could have allowed an adversary whose data makes it into
the chat context (e.g., via an uploaded file) to achieve
exfiltration of the victim’s data by rendering hyperlinks. However, the severity of this issue is low,
as there were no integrations that could pull remote content. This means
Indirect Prompt Injection was not possible, and it would require the victim to copy
the malicious prompt from elsewhere. A similar issue affected Azure AI.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Amazon WorkSpaces Windows client credential logging]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-2023-010</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-2023-010</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Oct 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS identified an issue in the Amazon WorkSpaces Windows client which resulted in unintentionally logging
connection debugging information to a user's local system. This data could include usernames or passwords
if they contain specific characters: \ (backslash) or " (double quotes). If an attacker gained access to
an Amazon WorkSpaces user's machine, they could then compromise such credentials from the log.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS identified an issue in the Amazon WorkSpaces Windows client which resulted in unintentionally logging
connection debugging information to a user's local system. This data could include usernames or passwords
if they contain specific characters: \ (backslash) or " (double quotes). If an attacker gained access to
an Amazon WorkSpaces user's machine, they could then compromise such credentials from the log.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS API Gateway Header Smuggling and Cache Confusion]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-api-gateway-header-smuggling</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-api-gateway-header-smuggling</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Sep 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Researchers at Omegapoint identified two issues in AWS API Gateway authorizers: 1) A header rewrite feature could be abused to bypass authorization by overwriting headers after the authorizer lambda processed them. 2) Caching of authorization policies could be exploited to reuse cached policies with modified identification sources, bypassing the authorizer.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Researchers at Omegapoint identified two issues in AWS API Gateway authorizers: 1) A header rewrite feature could be abused to bypass authorization by overwriting headers after the authorizer lambda processed them. 2) Caching of authorization policies could be exploited to reuse cached policies with modified identification sources, bypassing the authorizer.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Chronicle cross-customer bucket access]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-chronicle-cross-customer-bucket-access</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-chronicle-cross-customer-bucket-access</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Sep 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Customers can configure Chronicle to ingest data from customer-owned 
Cloud Storage buckets using an ingestion feed. Chronicle previously used a shared
service account for all customers for granting permission to the bucket.
Therefore, one customer's Chronicle instance could be configured to ingest data 
from another customer's Cloud Storage bucket. However, this required knowledge 
of the bucket URI.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Customers can configure Chronicle to ingest data from customer-owned 
Cloud Storage buckets using an ingestion feed. Chronicle previously used a shared
service account for all customers for granting permission to the bucket.
Therefore, one customer's Chronicle instance could be configured to ingest data 
from another customer's Cloud Storage bucket. However, this required knowledge 
of the bucket URI.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS AppStream Cloudtrail Bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-appstream-cloudtrail-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-appstream-cloudtrail-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Credentials can be extracted from AppStream. When used, they obscure
the sourceIP and userName of the initial user. The sourceIP appears 
as appstream.amazonaws.com.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Credentials can be extracted from AppStream. When used, they obscure
the sourceIP and userName of the initial user. The sourceIP appears 
as appstream.amazonaws.com.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Power Platform Privilege Escalation in Azure AD]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/power-platform-privilege-escalation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/power-platform-privilege-escalation</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Aug 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Secureworks researchers discovered an Azure AD application with an abandoned reply URL related to Microsoft Power Platform. An attacker could leverage this URL to redirect authorization codes, exchange them for access tokens, and call Power Platform API via a middle-tier service to obtain elevated privileges. Microsoft quickly addressed the issue by removing the identified abandoned reply URL from the Azure AD application.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Secureworks researchers discovered an Azure AD application with an abandoned reply URL related to Microsoft Power Platform. An attacker could leverage this URL to redirect authorization codes, exchange them for access tokens, and call Power Platform API via a middle-tier service to obtain elevated privileges. Microsoft quickly addressed the issue by removing the identified abandoned reply URL from the Azure AD application.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Power Platform Custom Code information disclosure]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/power-platform-info-leak</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/power-platform-info-leak</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Aug 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Power Platform could lead to unauthorized access to Custom
Code functions used for custom connectors, thereby allowing cross-tenant information
disclosure of secrets or other sensitive information if these were embedded in a
Custom Code function. The issue occurred as a result of insufficient access control
to Azure Function hosts, which are launched as part of the creation and operation of
custom connectors in Microsoft’s Power Platform. An attacker who determined the
hostname of the Azure Function associated with the custom connector could interact
with the function without authentication. Microsoft fixed the issue by requiring Azure
Function keys for accessing the Function hosts and their HTTP trigger. An initial fix
was deployed (on June 7th, 2023), but customers using affected Custom Code in a "soft
deleted state" (part of a data recovery mechanism) remained vulnerable until a later
fix was applied (on August 2nd, 2023).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Power Platform could lead to unauthorized access to Custom
Code functions used for custom connectors, thereby allowing cross-tenant information
disclosure of secrets or other sensitive information if these were embedded in a
Custom Code function. The issue occurred as a result of insufficient access control
to Azure Function hosts, which are launched as part of the creation and operation of
custom connectors in Microsoft’s Power Platform. An attacker who determined the
hostname of the Azure Function associated with the custom connector could interact
with the function without authentication. Microsoft fixed the issue by requiring Azure
Function keys for accessing the Function hosts and their HTTP trigger. An initial fix
was deployed (on June 7th, 2023), but customers using affected Custom Code in a "soft
deleted state" (part of a data recovery mechanism) remained vulnerable until a later
fix was applied (on August 2nd, 2023).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bad.Build]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/badbuild</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/badbuild</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An information disclosure vulnerability in the Google Cloud Build service could have
allowed an attacker to view sensitive logs if they had gained prior access to a GCP
environment and had permission to create a new Cloud Build instance (cloudbuild.builds.create)
or permission to directly impersonate the Cloud Build default service account (which is highly
privileged by design and therefore considered to be a known privilege escalation vector in GCP).
An attacker could then potentially use this information in order to better facilitate lateral movement,
privilege escalation or a supply chain attack by other means. This issue was due to excessive
permissions granted to the default service account created by Cloud Build, particularly access to
audit logs containing all project permissions (logging.privateLogEntries.list).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An information disclosure vulnerability in the Google Cloud Build service could have
allowed an attacker to view sensitive logs if they had gained prior access to a GCP
environment and had permission to create a new Cloud Build instance (cloudbuild.builds.create)
or permission to directly impersonate the Cloud Build default service account (which is highly
privileged by design and therefore considered to be a known privilege escalation vector in GCP).
An attacker could then potentially use this information in order to better facilitate lateral movement,
privilege escalation or a supply chain attack by other means. This issue was due to excessive
permissions granted to the default service account created by Cloud Build, particularly access to
audit logs containing all project permissions (logging.privateLogEntries.list).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Front Door client-side desync]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-front-door-desync</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-front-door-desync</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A client-side desync vulnerability was discovered in Front Door, one of Azure's CDN solutions,
caused by mishandling of the 'Content-Length' header in HTTP requests. Exploiting this vulnerability
would most likely require user interaction through social engineering (such as clicking on a malicious
link), but could allow an attacker to steal session cookies or forge responses to victim requests.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A client-side desync vulnerability was discovered in Front Door, one of Azure's CDN solutions,
caused by mishandling of the 'Content-Length' header in HTTP requests. Exploiting this vulnerability
would most likely require user interaction through social engineering (such as clicking on a malicious
link), but could allow an attacker to steal session cookies or forge responses to victim requests.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Critical Authentication Bypass in Google Cloud API Gateway]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-api-gateway-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-api-gateway-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A critical authentication bypass vulnerability was discovered in Google Cloud API Gateway, affecting its JWT authentication method. The flaw, stemming from a business logic bug in the ESPv2 service proxy, allowed attackers to bypass authentication controls by manipulating HTTP methods. This vulnerability impacted various authentication methods including Firebase, Auth0, Okta, and Google ID tokens.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A critical authentication bypass vulnerability was discovered in Google Cloud API Gateway, affecting its JWT authentication method. The flaw, stemming from a business logic bug in the ESPv2 service proxy, allowed attackers to bypass authentication controls by manipulating HTTP methods. This vulnerability impacted various authentication methods including Firebase, Auth0, Okta, and Google ID tokens.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[nOAuth]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/noauth</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/noauth</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Descope identified a possible misconfiguration in Azure AD which could lead to misuse of the "Log in with Microsoft"
authentication method on a web app. If an application relies on email attribute claims for authentication (which is
against best practice) and also merges user accounts without proper validation, an attacker could falsify an email
claim to gain full control over the target account. Descope and Microsoft Microsoft identified several popular multi-tenant
applications with users that used an email address with an unverified domain owner, which would therefore be vulnerable
to this type of takeover. Following  disclosure, Microsoft deployed mitigations to omit token claims from unverified
domain owners for most applications.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Descope identified a possible misconfiguration in Azure AD which could lead to misuse of the "Log in with Microsoft"
authentication method on a web app. If an application relies on email attribute claims for authentication (which is
against best practice) and also merges user accounts without proper validation, an attacker could falsify an email
claim to gain full control over the target account. Descope and Microsoft Microsoft identified several popular multi-tenant
applications with users that used an email address with an unverified domain owner, which would therefore be vulnerable
to this type of takeover. Following  disclosure, Microsoft deployed mitigations to omit token claims from unverified
domain owners for most applications.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[XSS in Azure Bastion and Container Registry]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bastion-container-reg-xss</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bastion-container-reg-xss</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Orca discovered vulnerabilities in Azure Bastion and Azure Container Registry
that could have enabled an attacker to achieve Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) by
using iframe postMessages. The vulnerabilities allowed embedding of endpoints
within remote attacker-controlled servers using the iframe tag, thereby granting
unauthorized access to the victim’s session in the affected service if they
were tricked into navigating to an attacker-controlled website. The root cause
was that certain web pages in the Bastion and Container Registry customer-facing
portals allowed embedding of iframes in remote servers, meaning they were not
using mitigations such as the X-Frame-Options header or the frame-ancestors
directive in a Content Security Policy (CSP), which would have prevented these issues.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Orca discovered vulnerabilities in Azure Bastion and Azure Container Registry
that could have enabled an attacker to achieve Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) by
using iframe postMessages. The vulnerabilities allowed embedding of endpoints
within remote attacker-controlled servers using the iframe tag, thereby granting
unauthorized access to the victim’s session in the affected service if they
were tricked into navigating to an attacker-controlled website. The root cause
was that certain web pages in the Bastion and Container Registry customer-facing
portals allowed embedding of iframes in remote servers, meaning they were not
using mitigations such as the X-Frame-Options header or the frame-ancestors
directive in a Content Security Policy (CSP), which would have prevented these issues.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bucket Traversal in Google Cloud Storage Transfer Manager]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcs-bucket-traversal</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcs-bucket-traversal</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A bucket traversal vulnerability was discovered in the google.cloud.storage.transfer_manager.upload_chunks_concurrently() function of Google Cloud Storage. This issue could potentially allow unauthorized access to files in different buckets or directories within the same project.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A bucket traversal vulnerability was discovered in the google.cloud.storage.transfer_manager.upload_chunks_concurrently() function of Google Cloud Storage. This issue could potentially allow unauthorized access to files in different buckets or directories within the same project.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure App Services takeover via legacy API]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-mgmt-api-rce</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-mgmt-api-rce</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Binary Security found two vulnerabilities in the legacy Azure Resource Manager (ARM) REST API.
The first vulnerability allowed an attacker with Reader access to an Azure Function, acting from
a Windows host, to get an admin token that could be exchanged for a master key granting access
to all operations in Kudu (the Functions deployment service). This would allow them to tamper
with the function by deploying malicious code to it. The other vulnerability allowed an attacker
with Reader access to an Azure App Service to read all process environment variables, including
Key Vault references. For Azure Functions, this would result in complete compromise of the app.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Binary Security found two vulnerabilities in the legacy Azure Resource Manager (ARM) REST API.
The first vulnerability allowed an attacker with Reader access to an Azure Function, acting from
a Windows host, to get an admin token that could be exchanged for a master key granting access
to all operations in Kudu (the Functions deployment service). This would allow them to tamper
with the function by deploying malicious code to it. The other vulnerability allowed an attacker
with Reader access to an Azure App Service to read all process environment variables, including
Key Vault references. For Azure Functions, this would result in complete compromise of the app.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Directory Service not checking PassRole on EnableRoleAccess]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-directory-service-passrole</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-directory-service-passrole</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS Directory Service didn't check the iam:PassRole permissions when using the
EnableRoleAccess action. This could have been used for privilege escalation by an
authenticated user with sufficient permissions (ds:EnableRoleAccess), if the
role had a trust policy that allowed use by Directory Service.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS Directory Service didn't check the iam:PassRole permissions when using the
EnableRoleAccess action. This could have been used for privilege escalation by an
authenticated user with sufficient permissions (ds:EnableRoleAccess), if the
role had a trust policy that allowed use by Directory Service.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Privilege escalation in GCP Cloud SQL]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-2023-007</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-2023-007</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in Cloud SQL for SQL Server
that allowed customer administrator accounts to create triggers 
in the tempdb database and use those to gain sysadmin privileges in the instance. 
The sysadmin privileges would give the attacker access to system databases
and partial access to the machine running that SQL Server instance.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in Cloud SQL for SQL Server
that allowed customer administrator accounts to create triggers 
in the tempdb database and use those to gain sysadmin privileges in the instance. 
The sysadmin privileges would give the attacker access to system databases
and partial access to the machine running that SQL Server instance.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cloud SQL for SQL Server privilege escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudsql-privesc</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudsql-privesc</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 May 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability discovered in GCP's Cloud SQL service allowed customer
administrator accounts to create triggers in the tempdb database and use
those to gain sysadmin privileges in the instance. This could be abused
to result in complete control of the database engine and access to the
host OS. An attacker could have listed and accessed files in the host OS,
including any secrets on the machine, as well as gaining access to service
agents. However, it is unclear from the report if this level of access could
have allowed lateral movement within the Cloud SQL service or grant cross-tenant
access to other customers' data. The reporters did not disclose any lateral movement
and Google stated in their security bulletin that it was not possible.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability discovered in GCP's Cloud SQL service allowed customer
administrator accounts to create triggers in the tempdb database and use
those to gain sysadmin privileges in the instance. This could be abused
to result in complete control of the database engine and access to the
host OS. An attacker could have listed and accessed files in the host OS,
including any secrets on the machine, as well as gaining access to service
agents. However, it is unclear from the report if this level of access could
have allowed lateral movement within the Cloud SQL service or grant cross-tenant
access to other customers' data. The reporters did not disclose any lateral movement
and Google stated in their security bulletin that it was not possible.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GuardDuty bypass via S3 permission modification]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/guardduty-s3-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/guardduty-s3-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Threat actors in possession of IAM active credentials that had the power to
update S3 bucket policies could have bypassed GuardDuty’s S3 detections and
silently updated permissions for S3 resources, resulting in a bucket configuration
that allowed anonymous data access. This gap in GuardDuty’s alert coverage
occurred only when S3’s Block Public Access was not enabled on the account
or the bucket, and when KMS-based server-side bucket encryption was not in
use. In order to trigger on opening public access, GuardDuty needs to invoke
two API calls: GetBucketPublicAccessBlock and GetBucketPolicyStatus. Blocking
these specific API calls essentially blocked GuardDuty’s ability to trigger
the alerts. Following disclosure, AWS added GD alerts on the creation of any
policy that both allows data access but seeks to deny access to configuration information.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Threat actors in possession of IAM active credentials that had the power to
update S3 bucket policies could have bypassed GuardDuty’s S3 detections and
silently updated permissions for S3 resources, resulting in a bucket configuration
that allowed anonymous data access. This gap in GuardDuty’s alert coverage
occurred only when S3’s Block Public Access was not enabled on the account
or the bucket, and when KMS-based server-side bucket encryption was not in
use. In order to trigger on opening public access, GuardDuty needs to invoke
two API calls: GetBucketPublicAccessBlock and GetBucketPolicyStatus. Blocking
these specific API calls essentially blocked GuardDuty’s ability to trigger
the alerts. Following disclosure, AWS added GD alerts on the creation of any
policy that both allows data access but seeks to deny access to configuration information.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[API Management SSRF and path traversal vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/api-mgmt-ssrf-path-traversal</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/api-mgmt-ssrf-path-traversal</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 May 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure API Management is an API gateway service meant to help organizations to create, manage, secure,
and monitor APIs across all of their environments. Researchers found three high severity vulnerabilities
in the service, two of which are SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) vulnerabilities, and the third is a
path traversal bug. The SSRF issues affected the Azure API Management CORS proxy (which handles schema
retrieval) and hosting proxy (which routes API requests to the correct server). An attacker successful
in exploiting each of these SSRF vulnerabilities could fake requests from these legitimate servers and
thereby gain access to internal Azure services. However, the researchers did not determine the effective
impact of this access level, and it's therefore possible that Azure had security measures in place which
would have blocked further lateral movement. The path-traversal vulnerability allowed for an unrestricted
file upload to the Azure developer portal server. The portal's authenticated mode allows users to upload
static files and images to be displayed within the portal website, but this vulnerability could have allowed
an attacker to upload code instead, and then potentially execute it on the server itself.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure API Management is an API gateway service meant to help organizations to create, manage, secure,
and monitor APIs across all of their environments. Researchers found three high severity vulnerabilities
in the service, two of which are SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) vulnerabilities, and the third is a
path traversal bug. The SSRF issues affected the Azure API Management CORS proxy (which handles schema
retrieval) and hosting proxy (which routes API requests to the correct server). An attacker successful
in exploiting each of these SSRF vulnerabilities could fake requests from these legitimate servers and
thereby gain access to internal Azure services. However, the researchers did not determine the effective
impact of this access level, and it's therefore possible that Azure had security measures in place which
would have blocked further lateral movement. The path-traversal vulnerability allowed for an unrestricted
file upload to the Azure developer portal server. The portal's authenticated mode allows users to upload
static files and images to be displayed within the portal website, but this vulnerability could have allowed
an attacker to upload code instead, and then potentially execute it on the server itself.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[MFA enforcement IAM policy bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/iam-multiple-mfa</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/iam-multiple-mfa</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An AWS-recommended IAM policy that enforced MFA on access keys could have been bypassed
due to a change implemented by AWS in November 2022 that allowed IAM users to assign
multiple MFA devices to their account. Prior to this change, an attacker that had compromised
credentials could not create and assign a new MFA device to bypass the MFA requirement as they
would need to first deactivate the user’s existing MFA device. Organisations using SSO which
enforces MFA, either via an external IdP or AWS SSO, were not affected by this issue.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An AWS-recommended IAM policy that enforced MFA on access keys could have been bypassed
due to a change implemented by AWS in November 2022 that allowed IAM users to assign
multiple MFA devices to their account. Prior to this change, an attacker that had compromised
credentials could not create and assign a new MFA device to bypass the MFA requirement as they
would need to first deactivate the user’s existing MFA device. Organisations using SSO which
enforces MFA, either via an external IdP or AWS SSO, were not affected by this issue.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GhostToken]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ghosttoken</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ghosttoken</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Google users can find and install third-party OAuth applications from Google Marketplace that are integrated with Google Workspace.
Each OAuth application client in Google is associated with a GCP project. A bug in the way a GCP project enters a "pending deletion"
state when deleted, could have allowed threat actors to make a malicious application invisible and unremovable from the user's account.
If an attacker had managed to install an application in an account (e.g., through a phishing attack), they could have exploited this
vulnerability to hide their activity from the target user. Depending on the permissions of the malicious application, the attacker
could have silently gained access to sensitive information such as private Gmail correspondences, personal files and planned events
within the the victim's google account, as well as any GCP resources the user had access to.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Google users can find and install third-party OAuth applications from Google Marketplace that are integrated with Google Workspace.
Each OAuth application client in Google is associated with a GCP project. A bug in the way a GCP project enters a "pending deletion"
state when deleted, could have allowed threat actors to make a malicious application invisible and unremovable from the user's account.
If an attacker had managed to install an application in an account (e.g., through a phishing attack), they could have exploited this
vulnerability to hide their activity from the target user. Depending on the permissions of the malicious application, the attacker
could have silently gained access to sensitive information such as private Gmail correspondences, personal files and planned events
within the the victim's google account, as well as any GCP resources the user had access to.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Asset Key Thief]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/asset-key-thief</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/asset-key-thief</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Asset Key Thief was a Google Cloud 
privilege escalation vulnerability that enabled 
principals with the "Cloud Asset Viewer" role (or other roles 
with the `cloudasset.assets.searchAllResources` permission) on the 
Cloud Asset Inventory API, at the Project, Folder, or Organization level 
to view and exfiltrate any user-managed Service Account 
private key under a project within the same Google Cloud environment that 
had been created or rotated up to a maximum of 12 hours ago. 
Access to Service Account private keys enable the full assumption 
of that Service Account's identity and privileges, which would have given 
attackers with existing access to a Google Cloud environment a persistent and reliable
method of lateral movement and privilege escalation. Google has since fixed this 
vulnerability, but affected customers must rotate their keys manually.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Asset Key Thief was a Google Cloud 
privilege escalation vulnerability that enabled 
principals with the "Cloud Asset Viewer" role (or other roles 
with the `cloudasset.assets.searchAllResources` permission) on the 
Cloud Asset Inventory API, at the Project, Folder, or Organization level 
to view and exfiltrate any user-managed Service Account 
private key under a project within the same Google Cloud environment that 
had been created or rotated up to a maximum of 12 hours ago. 
Access to Service Account private keys enable the full assumption 
of that Service Account's identity and privileges, which would have given 
attackers with existing access to a Google Cloud environment a persistent and reliable
method of lateral movement and privilege escalation. Google has since fixed this 
vulnerability, but affected customers must rotate their keys manually.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[BrokenSesame]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/brokensesame</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/brokensesame</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[ApsaraDB and AnalyticDB contained several vulnerabilities in their PostgreSQL offerings
which ultimately allowed unauthorized access to other tenants' databases and the ability
to perform a supply-chain attack on both services, which in turn would have allowed remote
code execution (RCE) as well. Both services implemented multi-tenancy through a shared K8s
cluster, but contained several bugs related to tenant isolation which an attacker could
chain together to achieve the above impact. In ApsaraDB, these included privilege escalation
to root in a container, a shared PID namespace enabling container escape, and write permissions
granted to K8s nodes for a private container image registry utilized by both services.
In AnalyticDB, the bugs included file disclosure, command line injection in a privileged
container, and susceptibility to the core_pattern container escape technique.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[ApsaraDB and AnalyticDB contained several vulnerabilities in their PostgreSQL offerings
which ultimately allowed unauthorized access to other tenants' databases and the ability
to perform a supply-chain attack on both services, which in turn would have allowed remote
code execution (RCE) as well. Both services implemented multi-tenancy through a shared K8s
cluster, but contained several bugs related to tenant isolation which an attacker could
chain together to achieve the above impact. In ApsaraDB, these included privilege escalation
to root in a container, a shared PID namespace enabling container escape, and write permissions
granted to K8s nodes for a private container image registry utilized by both services.
In AnalyticDB, the bugs included file disclosure, command line injection in a privileged
container, and susceptibility to the core_pattern container escape technique.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[App Runner cross-tenant observability config info leak]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/app-runner-observability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/app-runner-observability</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The API action ListObservabilityConfigurationsForAccount did not properly validate the 
"AccountId" parameter that was passed to it. As a result, any account ID could be provided 
and the API would return the information for that account. This would leak minor information
about the observability configuration for App Runner in the account.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The API action ListObservabilityConfigurationsForAccount did not properly validate the 
"AccountId" parameter that was passed to it. As a result, any account ID could be provided 
and the API would return the information for that account. This would leak minor information
about the observability configuration for App Runner in the account.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[App Runner cross-tenant VPC connectors info leak]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/app-runner-vpc-connectors</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/app-runner-vpc-connectors</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The API action ListVpcConnectorsForAccount did not properly validate the "AccountId" parameter
that was passed to it. As a result, any account ID could be provided and the API would return
the information for that account. This would leak minor information about the VPC 
configuration for App Runner in the account including the subnet ID, security group ID, and the
VPC Connector ARN.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The API action ListVpcConnectorsForAccount did not properly validate the "AccountId" parameter
that was passed to it. As a result, any account ID could be provided and the API would return
the information for that account. This would leak minor information about the VPC 
configuration for App Runner in the account including the subnet ID, security group ID, and the
VPC Connector ARN.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[RCE vulnerability in Azure Pipelines]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-pipeline-rce</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-pipeline-rce</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Legit Security found an RCE vulnerability in Azure Pipelines that could have allowed an
attacker to gain complete control of variables and tasks by exploiting logging commands.
This would have enabled them to execute malicious code in a context of a pipeline workflow,
which would have granted them access to sensitive secrets such as cloud deployment keys,
move laterally in the organization, and potentially initiate supply chain attacks.
To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would have needed permissions to create
a pull request or push a commit in a repo integrated with Pipelines.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Legit Security found an RCE vulnerability in Azure Pipelines that could have allowed an
attacker to gain complete control of variables and tasks by exploiting logging commands.
This would have enabled them to execute malicious code in a context of a pipeline workflow,
which would have granted them access to sensitive secrets such as cloud deployment keys,
move laterally in the organization, and potentially initiate supply chain attacks.
To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would have needed permissions to create
a pull request or push a commit in a repo integrated with Pipelines.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure on-premises data gateway cross-tenant access]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/data_gateway_rce</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/data_gateway_rce</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure on-premises data gateway allows data transfer between an on-prem customer network and
several Azure cloud services, and also enables a connected agent installed locally in an
on-prem network to perform certain actions remotely. NetSPI discovered a deserialization
issue in Microsoft Power Platform connectors that lead to RCE on several Azure backend
servers that processed call backs from on-premises data gateways, effectively allowing
unauthorized cross-tenant access.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure on-premises data gateway allows data transfer between an on-prem customer network and
several Azure cloud services, and also enables a connected agent installed locally in an
on-prem network to perform certain actions remotely. NetSPI discovered a deserialization
issue in Microsoft Power Platform connectors that lead to RCE on several Azure backend
servers that processed call backs from on-premises data gateways, effectively allowing
unauthorized cross-tenant access.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Function Apps privilege escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-functions-eop</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-functions-eop</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Undocumented APIs used by the Azure Function Apps Portal could have allowed an attacker with existing
access to a Reader role on a Function App to escalate their privileges and gain write permissions
through arbitrary file reads on Function App containers. For Windows containers, this would only
grant an attacker the ability to extract ASP.NET encryption keys (the impact of which remains unclear),
but for Linux containers it would have allowed an attacker to read environmental variables containing
information that ultimately granted access to Function master keys. This in turn would have allowed
overwriting Function App code and gaining remote code execution within the container.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Undocumented APIs used by the Azure Function Apps Portal could have allowed an attacker with existing
access to a Reader role on a Function App to escalate their privileges and gain write permissions
through arbitrary file reads on Function App containers. For Windows containers, this would only
grant an attacker the ability to extract ASP.NET encryption keys (the impact of which remains unclear),
but for Linux containers it would have allowed an attacker to read environmental variables containing
information that ultimately granted access to Function master keys. This in turn would have allowed
overwriting Function App code and gaining remote code execution within the container.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Partial CloudTrail logging in AWS Control Tower]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-control-tower-lack-of-cloudtrail-logging</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-control-tower-lack-of-cloudtrail-logging</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS Control Tower was not properly logging to CloudTrail when API calls
failed due to a lack of permissions. This could have helped an adversary
with existing access to a victim AWS environment avoid detection while
enumerating privileges, since any unsuccessful API calls would not
generate "access denied" log entries.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS Control Tower was not properly logging to CloudTrail when API calls
failed due to a lack of permissions. This could have helped an adversary
with existing access to a victim AWS environment avoid detection while
enumerating privileges, since any unsuccessful API calls would not
generate "access denied" log entries.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CloudTrail bypass for AWS Service Catalog]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-service-catalog-cloudtrail-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-service-catalog-cloudtrail-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Due to an exposed development endpoint, it was possible to bypass CloudTrail
logging for both read and write API actions for the Service Catalog service.
This could have enabled adversaries to alter Service Catalog resources undetected
after gaining a foothold in a victim AWS environment.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Due to an exposed development endpoint, it was possible to bypass CloudTrail
logging for both read and write API actions for the Service Catalog service.
This could have enabled adversaries to alter Service Catalog resources undetected
after gaining a foothold in a victim AWS environment.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Super FabriXss]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2023-23383</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2023-23383</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Service Fabric Explorer (SFX) was affected by an XSS vulnerability that
could have allowed a malicious script to be reflected off a web application.
After a potential victim clicked on a crafted malicious URL, the attacker could
remotely toggle the ‘Cluster’ Event Type setting under the Events tab. This could
lead to unauthenticated remote code execution on a container hosted on a Service Fabric node.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Service Fabric Explorer (SFX) was affected by an XSS vulnerability that
could have allowed a malicious script to be reflected off a web application.
After a potential victim clicked on a crafted malicious URL, the attacker could
remotely toggle the ‘Cluster’ Event Type setting under the Events tab. This could
lead to unauthenticated remote code execution on a container hosted on a Service Fabric node.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Imposter commits vulnerability in GitHub Actions]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/imposter-commits-vulnerability-github-actions</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/imposter-commits-vulnerability-github-actions</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in GitHub Actions allows bypassing workflow settings using commits from forked repositories (rather than commits of the main action repo). This "imposter commits" issue can potentially introduce untrusted code into CI/CD pipelines, posing a risk to the security of the software supply chain. The vulnerability stems from GitHub's handling of forked repositories and how commits are shared between forks and parent repositories. A partial solution to this was GitHub prohibiting partial commit references in workflows, however, no full solution exists currently.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in GitHub Actions allows bypassing workflow settings using commits from forked repositories (rather than commits of the main action repo). This "imposter commits" issue can potentially introduce untrusted code into CI/CD pipelines, posing a risk to the security of the software supply chain. The vulnerability stems from GitHub's handling of forked repositories and how commits are shared between forks and parent repositories. A partial solution to this was GitHub prohibiting partial commit references in workflows, however, no full solution exists currently.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Unauthorized access to Codespace secrets in GitHub]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/unauthorized-access-codespace-secrets-github</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/unauthorized-access-codespace-secrets-github</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in GitHub's Repository Security Advisory feature allowed unauthorized users to access plaintext Codespace secrets of any organization, including GitHub itself. The issue stemmed from the new beta feature that allows external users to report vulnerabilities to public repositories, inadvertently granting access to sensitive organization-level secrets.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in GitHub's Repository Security Advisory feature allowed unauthorized users to access plaintext Codespace secrets of any organization, including GitHub itself. The issue stemmed from the new beta feature that allows external users to report vulnerabilities to public repositories, inadvertently granting access to sensitive organization-level secrets.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS CodeBuild Token Leakage]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-codebuild-access-token-leak</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-codebuild-access-token-leak</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An attacker with elevated permissions in CodeBuild could leak 
the configured credentials for Github/Bitbucket. This was possible by 
configuring the http_proxy and https_proxy variables, which would allow 
you to capture the credentials via MITM.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An attacker with elevated permissions in CodeBuild could leak 
the configured credentials for Github/Bitbucket. This was possible by 
configuring the http_proxy and https_proxy variables, which would allow 
you to capture the credentials via MITM.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Overprivileged CodeBuild default ECR IAM policy]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-codebuild-ecr-iam-vuln</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-codebuild-ecr-iam-vuln</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[For AWS CodeBuild, when using a custom container image stored in ECR and the 
project service role for the credentials to pull the image, the default IAM 
policy attached to the role to allow pulling the container was over-privileged 
and allowed the CodeBuild container to overwrite its own build image. 
An attacker with the ability to read the container credentials from the meta-data 
service or run commands within the container could thereby overwrite the container to gain 
persistence within the CodeBuild project.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[For AWS CodeBuild, when using a custom container image stored in ECR and the 
project service role for the credentials to pull the image, the default IAM 
policy attached to the role to allow pulling the container was over-privileged 
and allowed the CodeBuild container to overwrite its own build image. 
An attacker with the ability to read the container credentials from the meta-data 
service or run commands within the container could thereby overwrite the container to gain 
persistence within the CodeBuild project.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure AD B2C cryptographic flaw allowing account compromise]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-b2c-crypto-flaw</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-b2c-crypto-flaw</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Active Directory B2C service (AD B2C) mistakenly implemented RSA key authentication using the public part of the key pair instead of the private one.
This cryptographic flaw could have allowed an unauthenticated attacker to craft an OAuth refresh token for any AD B2C user account if they knew their public key.
Moreover, every AD B2C user's public key was recoverable through an unrelated vulnerability (though asymmetric cryptography should not rely on public key secrecy regardless).
An attacker could redeem this refresh token for a session token, thereby gaining access to the victim account as if they had logged in through a legitimate login flow.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Active Directory B2C service (AD B2C) mistakenly implemented RSA key authentication using the public part of the key pair instead of the private one.
This cryptographic flaw could have allowed an unauthenticated attacker to craft an OAuth refresh token for any AD B2C user account if they knew their public key.
Moreover, every AD B2C user's public key was recoverable through an unrelated vulnerability (though asymmetric cryptography should not rely on public key secrecy regardless).
An attacker could redeem this refresh token for a session token, thereby gaining access to the victim account as if they had logged in through a legitimate login flow.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS EC2 Autoscaling Privilege Escalation Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-ec2-autoscaling-privilege-escalation-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-ec2-autoscaling-privilege-escalation-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A privilege escalation vulnerability in Amazon EC2 Autoscaling was identified. The CreateLaunchConfiguration action lacked PassRole validation, allowing users to launch EC2 instances with unauthorized roles. AWS fixed the issue for both CreateLaunchConfiguration and CreateAutoScalingGroup actions, implementing proper PassRole validation when using the instance-id option.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A privilege escalation vulnerability in Amazon EC2 Autoscaling was identified. The CreateLaunchConfiguration action lacked PassRole validation, allowing users to launch EC2 instances with unauthorized roles. AWS fixed the issue for both CreateLaunchConfiguration and CreateAutoScalingGroup actions, implementing proper PassRole validation when using the instance-id option.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure App Service on Azure Stack Hub privilege escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2023-21777</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2023-21777</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A privilege escalation vulnerability was discovered in Azure App Service on Azure Stack Hub
(an on-prem private cloud offering). To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have
access to the targeted worker role and the ability to deploy a malicious application within
the worker. The attack itself is carried out locally on the worker role where a malicious
application has been deployed. Exploiting this vulnerability could grant an attacker the
ability to access and modify content of a targeted application or workload, allowing them
to interact with other tenants' applications and content.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A privilege escalation vulnerability was discovered in Azure App Service on Azure Stack Hub
(an on-prem private cloud offering). To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have
access to the targeted worker role and the ability to deploy a malicious application within
the worker. The attack itself is carried out locally on the worker role where a malicious
application has been deployed. Exploiting this vulnerability could grant an attacker the
ability to access and modify content of a targeted application or workload, allowing them
to interact with other tenants' applications and content.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Console rate limit bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-console-rate-limit-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-console-rate-limit-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Feb 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS applies a rate limit to authentication requests made to the AWS Console
in an effort to prevent brute-force and credential stuffing attacks. However,
a weakness was discovered in the AWS Console authentication flow that allowed
a partial bypass of this rate limit by pausing for 5 seconds every 30 attempts.
This would enable an attacker to continuously attempt more than 280 passwords
per minute (4.6 per second) against IAM users, which could have resulted in
account compromise of users without MFA enabled.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS applies a rate limit to authentication requests made to the AWS Console
in an effort to prevent brute-force and credential stuffing attacks. However,
a weakness was discovered in the AWS Console authentication flow that allowed
a partial bypass of this rate limit by pausing for 5 seconds every 30 attempts.
This would enable an attacker to continuously attempt more than 280 passwords
per minute (4.6 per second) against IAM users, which could have resulted in
account compromise of users without MFA enabled.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[EmojiDeploy]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/emojideploy</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/emojideploy</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Multiple Azure Web services use a source control management (SCM) panel powered by Kudu and
enabled by default. These services were all susceptible to a CSRF vulnerability due to an
overly-permissive regular expression (regex) in a filter for malformed origins. This allowed
origin bypass when using a domain name structured as 'victim.scm.azurewebsites.net._.attacker.com'
(note the use of '._.', which looks like an emoji). Thus, if a target Azure user were tricked
into visiting a specially crafted webpage served by a domain with the above name format,
an attacker could exploit this CSRF vulnerability to deploy a zip file containing a malicious
payload (such as a webshell) into a target web application (via the /api/zipdeploy endpoint).
This could have allowed the attacker to gain remote code execution (RCE) as the 'www' user
on the target app, and potentially also lateral movement to other Azure services used by
the target organization, depending on what privileges were granted to the app's managed identity.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Multiple Azure Web services use a source control management (SCM) panel powered by Kudu and
enabled by default. These services were all susceptible to a CSRF vulnerability due to an
overly-permissive regular expression (regex) in a filter for malformed origins. This allowed
origin bypass when using a domain name structured as 'victim.scm.azurewebsites.net._.attacker.com'
(note the use of '._.', which looks like an emoji). Thus, if a target Azure user were tricked
into visiting a specially crafted webpage served by a domain with the above name format,
an attacker could exploit this CSRF vulnerability to deploy a zip file containing a malicious
payload (such as a webshell) into a target web application (via the /api/zipdeploy endpoint).
This could have allowed the attacker to gain remote code execution (RCE) as the 'www' user
on the target app, and potentially also lateral movement to other Azure services used by
the target organization, depending on what privileges were granted to the app's managed identity.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure AD Flaw Allowed SAML Token Persistence]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-ad-saml-persistence-flaw</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-ad-saml-persistence-flaw</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure Active Directory allowed users to retain access to SAML applications after their assignment was removed. Attackers could exploit this to establish persistence and elevate privileges on targeted SAML applications. The flaw was triggered by chaining sign-in with additional application and specific parameters in the token request, bypassing user assignment verification.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Azure Active Directory allowed users to retain access to SAML applications after their assignment was removed. Attackers could exploit this to establish persistence and elevate privileges on targeted SAML applications. The flaw was triggered by chaining sign-in with additional application and specific parameters in the token request, bypassing user assignment verification.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS CloudTrail bypass for specific IAM actions]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-iamadmin-cloudtrail-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-iamadmin-cloudtrail-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Through an undocumented API service called 'iamadmin', attackers could invoke any of 13 read-only IAM actions without the activity being being logged to CloudTrail.
These actions included listing group policies (iam:ListGroupPolicies), listing access keys (iam:ListAccessKeys), retrieving information about a role (iam:GetRole), and more.
This could have enabled adversaries to perform enumeration and reconnaissance activity undetected after gaining a foothold in a victim AWS environment.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Through an undocumented API service called 'iamadmin', attackers could invoke any of 13 read-only IAM actions without the activity being being logged to CloudTrail.
These actions included listing group policies (iam:ListGroupPolicies), listing access keys (iam:ListAccessKeys), retrieving information about a role (iam:GetRole), and more.
This could have enabled adversaries to perform enumeration and reconnaissance activity undetected after gaining a foothold in a victim AWS environment.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Multiple SSRF vulnerablities in Azure services]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-multiple-ssrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-multiple-ssrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[SSRF vulnerabilities were discovered in four Azure services: unauthenticated SSRF in
Azure Digital Twins Explorer and Azure Functions, and authenticated SSRF in Azure API
Management Service and Azure Machine Learning Service. All four vulnerabilities were
full (non-blind) SSRF. The impact of these vulnerabilities was limited: while they
would have allowed an adversary to scan local ports and find new services, endpoints,
and files; they would not have allowed them to access metadata, connect to internal
services, access unauthorized data, or obtain cross-tenant access.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[SSRF vulnerabilities were discovered in four Azure services: unauthenticated SSRF in
Azure Digital Twins Explorer and Azure Functions, and authenticated SSRF in Azure API
Management Service and Azure Machine Learning Service. All four vulnerabilities were
full (non-blind) SSRF. The impact of these vulnerabilities was limited: while they
would have allowed an adversary to scan local ports and find new services, endpoints,
and files; they would not have allowed them to access metadata, connect to internal
services, access unauthorized data, or obtain cross-tenant access.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[XSS in Google Cloud Theia notebooks]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-vertex-theia-xss</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-vertex-theia-xss</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This vulnerability chain exploits a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) flaw (CVE-2021-41038) within the Theia IDE used in Google Vertex AI Workbench.
An attacker could inject malicious JavaScript code into the Theia IDE. This code could then be used to steal the OAuth token associated with the project's default Compute Engine service account,
because when a user-managed Vertex AI Workbench instance is created, it utilizes the project's default Compute Engine service account. At the time, this default service account had the Editor Role assigned by default.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[This vulnerability chain exploits a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) flaw (CVE-2021-41038) within the Theia IDE used in Google Vertex AI Workbench.
An attacker could inject malicious JavaScript code into the Theia IDE. This code could then be used to steal the OAuth token associated with the project's default Compute Engine service account,
because when a user-managed Vertex AI Workbench instance is created, it utilizes the project's default Compute Engine service account. At the time, this default service account had the Editor Role assigned by default.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bypassing authorization in Google Cloud Workstations]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudworkstations-auth-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudworkstations-auth-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Several vulnerabilities were present in how Google Cloud Shell (ssh.cloud.google.com) handled OAuth credentials. These included an open-redirect vulnerability, where attackers could redirect users to malicious sites to capture their credentials, 
and a validation bypass that allowed tokens to be submitted to user-defined URIs, circumventing normal security checks. Additionally, Google Cloud Workstations did not correctly tie the state parameter to the session that generated it, 
which allowed valid state parameters to be reused across different sessions and users. Combined, these issues created a scenario where credentials to Google Cloud Workstations were susceptible to phishing attacks.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Several vulnerabilities were present in how Google Cloud Shell (ssh.cloud.google.com) handled OAuth credentials. These included an open-redirect vulnerability, where attackers could redirect users to malicious sites to capture their credentials, 
and a validation bypass that allowed tokens to be submitted to user-defined URIs, circumventing normal security checks. Additionally, Google Cloud Workstations did not correctly tie the state parameter to the session that generated it, 
which allowed valid state parameters to be reused across different sessions and users. Combined, these issues created a scenario where credentials to Google Cloud Workstations were susceptible to phishing attacks.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Client-Side SSRF to Google Cloud Project Takeover]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/client-side-ssrf-google-cloud-project-takeover</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/client-side-ssrf-google-cloud-project-takeover</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Vertex AI Workbench allowed attackers to take over victims' Google Cloud projects through client-side SSRF.
The initial bug involved unauthorized access to authentication tokens, which was later fixed.
A bypass was later discovered (and also fixed) using open redirects in Feedburner and CSRF token manipulation.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Vertex AI Workbench allowed attackers to take over victims' Google Cloud projects through client-side SSRF.
The initial bug involved unauthorized access to authentication tokens, which was later fixed.
A bypass was later discovered (and also fixed) using open redirects in Feedburner and CSRF token manipulation.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SSH key injection in Google Cloud Compute Engine]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gce_ssh_key_injection</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gce_ssh_key_injection</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Google Cloud Compute Engine (GCE) was vulnerable to SSH key injection by abusing an SSH-in-browser feature to change username and password.
An attacker could send a specially-crafted link to a target user, and if the victim was logged into GCP and clicked the link,
the attacker's SSH username and password would be added to the target machine, thereby allowing the attacker to log into it.
This was possible because no random token or CSRF protection had been implemented for the abused feature. For this attack to be successful,
an attacker would need to know certain details of the target machine in advance (including the project name, instance zone and instance name),
and the machine would need to be configured to allow SSH connections (which is the default setting), and accept connections from any IP address.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Google Cloud Compute Engine (GCE) was vulnerable to SSH key injection by abusing an SSH-in-browser feature to change username and password.
An attacker could send a specially-crafted link to a target user, and if the victim was logged into GCP and clicked the link,
the attacker's SSH username and password would be added to the target machine, thereby allowing the attacker to log into it.
This was possible because no random token or CSRF protection had been implemented for the abused feature. For this attack to be successful,
an attacker would need to know certain details of the target machine in advance (including the project name, instance zone and instance name),
and the machine would need to be configured to allow SSH connections (which is the default setting), and accept connections from any IP address.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[IAP CORS Misconfiguration Allows Email Disclosure]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-iap-cors-misconfiguration-email-disclosure</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-iap-cors-misconfiguration-email-disclosure</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A CORS misconfiguration in Google Cloud's Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP) could have allowed attackers to disclose the email address of an authenticated user in websites protected by IAP, by convincing the user to connect to an attacker-controlled domain. This vulnerability enabled attackers to exploit CORS settings to access sensitive email information of both authenticated and unauthenticated users (with the latter requiring additional social engineering).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A CORS misconfiguration in Google Cloud's Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP) could have allowed attackers to disclose the email address of an authenticated user in websites protected by IAP, by convincing the user to connect to an attacker-controlled domain. This vulnerability enabled attackers to exploit CORS settings to access sensitive email information of both authenticated and unauthenticated users (with the latter requiring additional social engineering).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ACSESSED]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/acsessed</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/acsessed</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Dec 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Cognitive Search (ACS) is a full-text search engine service.
A new non-default feature allowed for a network control to bypassed, permitting an attacker to submit search queries to any other tenant's network-isolated ACS instance. However, abusing this required a valid API key 
to access the data plane of the target, along with a number of pieces of information about the target environment (such as the subscription ID and the name of the index to query).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Cognitive Search (ACS) is a full-text search engine service.
A new non-default feature allowed for a network control to bypassed, permitting an attacker to submit search queries to any other tenant's network-isolated ACS instance. However, abusing this required a valid API key 
to access the data plane of the target, along with a number of pieces of information about the target environment (such as the subscription ID and the name of the index to query).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Serverless Functions escape to host]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-func-escape</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-func-escape</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Dec 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In Azure Serverless Functions, a new container is generated by the host for every function,
which is then terminated and deleted after several minutes. Palo Alto discovered that an
API call was available to bind one path to another within the container (called "init_server_pkg_mount_BindMount")
that could be called by a low-privileged user but executed with root privileges. This could
enable a malicious tenant to escalate their privileges to root, and then escape their container
by abusing the Linux cgroup v1 “notification on release” feature (a well-known escape to host technique).
This last step was possible because the container had been granted the SYS_ADMIN capability,
did not have an AppArmor profile, and the cgroup v1 virtual filesystem was mounted as
read-writable from within the container (all against container hardening best practice).
However, the underlying HyperV host was single-tenant, thereby limiting the blast radius
of this vulnerability chain. Following disclosure, Azure added additional validation for
bind mount APIs, but the other elements of this attack sequence remain exploitable.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[In Azure Serverless Functions, a new container is generated by the host for every function,
which is then terminated and deleted after several minutes. Palo Alto discovered that an
API call was available to bind one path to another within the container (called "init_server_pkg_mount_BindMount")
that could be called by a low-privileged user but executed with root privileges. This could
enable a malicious tenant to escalate their privileges to root, and then escape their container
by abusing the Linux cgroup v1 “notification on release” feature (a well-known escape to host technique).
This last step was possible because the container had been granted the SYS_ADMIN capability,
did not have an AppArmor profile, and the cgroup v1 virtual filesystem was mounted as
read-writable from within the container (all against container hardening best practice).
However, the underlying HyperV host was single-tenant, thereby limiting the blast radius
of this vulnerability chain. Following disclosure, Azure added additional validation for
bind mount APIs, but the other elements of this attack sequence remain exploitable.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ECR Public vulnerability in undocumented API]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/public-ecr-undocumented-api</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/public-ecr-undocumented-api</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Elastic Container Registry (ECR) Public could have allowed a
malicious actor to delete, update, or create ECR Public images, layers, or tags
in registries and repositories belonging to any other AWS account, by abusing
undocumented API calls. A malicious actor could have exploited this to delete
any or all images in the Amazon ECR Public Gallery or update the content of any
existing image to inject malicious code on any machine that would pull and run it.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Elastic Container Registry (ECR) Public could have allowed a
malicious actor to delete, update, or create ECR Public images, layers, or tags
in registries and repositories belonging to any other AWS account, by abusing
undocumented API calls. A malicious actor could have exploited this to delete
any or all images in the Amazon ECR Public Gallery or update the content of any
existing image to inject malicious code on any machine that would pull and run it.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hell's Keychain]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/hellskeychain</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/hellskeychain</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Dec 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[IBM Cloud Databases for PostgreSQL was vulnerable to an attack sequence
comprised of PostgreSQL privilege escalation via SQL Injection and chaining
of three secrets scattered in the service environment (a K8s service account
token, a private container registry password, and CI/CD server credentials),
which were abusable due to overly permissive network access to internal build
servers. A malicious actor could have exploited this vulnerability to remotely
execute code in other customers’ environments in order to read and modify data
stored in their PostgreSQL databases.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[IBM Cloud Databases for PostgreSQL was vulnerable to an attack sequence
comprised of PostgreSQL privilege escalation via SQL Injection and chaining
of three secrets scattered in the service environment (a K8s service account
token, a private container registry password, and CI/CD server credentials),
which were abusable due to overly permissive network access to internal build
servers. A malicious actor could have exploited this vulnerability to remotely
execute code in other customers’ environments in order to read and modify data
stored in their PostgreSQL databases.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS AppSync confused deputy via ServiceRoleArn]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-appsync-confused-deputy</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-appsync-confused-deputy</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Nov 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AWS AppSync service could be coerced to assume arbitrary roles in
other customers' accounts which trusted the AppSync service. This was
due to insufficient validation of a serviceRoleArn parameter (caused by
a case-sensitivity parsing issue). With this vulnerability, if an adversary
knew the ARN of the role associated with AppSync in the target account,
they could use it invoke arbitrary AWS API calls.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AWS AppSync service could be coerced to assume arbitrary roles in
other customers' accounts which trusted the AppSync service. This was
due to insufficient validation of a serviceRoleArn parameter (caused by
a case-sensitivity parsing issue). With this vulnerability, if an adversary
knew the ARN of the role associated with AppSync in the target account,
they could use it invoke arbitrary AWS API calls.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Devops account takeover via dangling subdomain takeover]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-devops-dangling-domain</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-devops-dangling-domain</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Nov 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Binary Security discovered and registered two dangling cloudapp.azure.com
subdomains corresponding to subdomains at visualstudio.com. Had these been
discovered and registered by an attacker, this would have been equivalent
to a 1-click vulnerability for Azure DevOps: the attacker could have crafted
a URL referring to the sign-in API for Azure DevOps Services (app.vssps.visualstudio.com)
using one of the two subdomains in the "reply_to" field (since subdomains
of visualstudio.com would be allowed by the API). If clicked on by a target
Azure DevOps user, this would have sent an authentication token to an
attacker-controlled server, thereby allowing account takeover.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Binary Security discovered and registered two dangling cloudapp.azure.com
subdomains corresponding to subdomains at visualstudio.com. Had these been
discovered and registered by an attacker, this would have been equivalent
to a 1-click vulnerability for Azure DevOps: the attacker could have crafted
a URL referring to the sign-in API for Azure DevOps Services (app.vssps.visualstudio.com)
using one of the two subdomains in the "reply_to" field (since subdomains
of visualstudio.com would be allowed by the API). If clicked on by a target
Azure DevOps user, this would have sent an authentication token to an
attacker-controlled server, thereby allowing account takeover.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CosMiss]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cosmiss</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cosmiss</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Nov 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Cosmos DB notebooks lacked an authentication check, meaning that if an attacker
somehow had prior knowledge of a notebook’s temporary ‘forwardingId’ (a 128bit
cryptographically random GUID assigned to a short-lived workspace that expires
after an hour), they could gain full permissions on the notebook, including
read and write access and the ability to modify the file system of the
container running the notebook. These permissions would suffice for an
attacker to obtain remote code execution (RCE) in the notebook container.
However, this would not allow an attacker to execute notebooks, automatically
save notebooks in the victim’s (optionally) connected GitHub repository, or
access data in the Cosmos DB account. Following disclosure, Cosmos DB notebooks
now require an authorization token in the request header before allowing access.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Cosmos DB notebooks lacked an authentication check, meaning that if an attacker
somehow had prior knowledge of a notebook’s temporary ‘forwardingId’ (a 128bit
cryptographically random GUID assigned to a short-lived workspace that expires
after an hour), they could gain full permissions on the notebook, including
read and write access and the ability to modify the file system of the
container running the notebook. These permissions would suffice for an
attacker to obtain remote code execution (RCE) in the notebook container.
However, this would not allow an attacker to execute notebooks, automatically
save notebooks in the victim’s (optionally) connected GitHub repository, or
access data in the Cosmos DB account. Following disclosure, Cosmos DB notebooks
now require an authorization token in the request header before allowing access.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure CLI code injection vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-39327</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-39327</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure CLI contained a code injection vulnerability that could be exploited in
a scenario where the host runs a command where parameter values have been provided
by an external untrusted source - these could be specially crafted in such a way
as to exploit the vulnerability, leading to remote code execution on the host.
The vulnerability is only applicable when the Azure CLI command is run on a Windows
machine and with any version of PowerShell and when the parameter value contains
the `&` or `|` symbols.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure CLI contained a code injection vulnerability that could be exploited in
a scenario where the host runs a command where parameter values have been provided
by an external untrusted source - these could be specially crafted in such a way
as to exploit the vulnerability, leading to remote code execution on the host.
The vulnerability is only applicable when the Azure CLI command is run on a Windows
machine and with any version of PowerShell and when the parameter value contains
the `&` or `|` symbols.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Docker Command Escaping in GitHub Actions Runner]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/docker-command-escaping-github-actions-runner</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/docker-command-escaping-github-actions-runner</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Oct 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in the GitHub Actions Runner allowed untrusted inputs in environment variables to escape and modify docker command invocations. This affected jobs using container actions, job containers, or service containers. The issue has been patched in multiple versions of the runner.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in the GitHub Actions Runner allowed untrusted inputs in environment variables to escape and modify docker command invocations. This affected jobs using container actions, job containers, or service containers. The issue has been patched in multiple versions of the runner.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[BlueBleed]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bluebleed</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/bluebleed</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In September 22', SOCRadar discovered an insecure public Azure blob storage owned by Microsoft (olyympusv2.blob.core.windows[.]net). This blob storage was used for storing emails and other documents from interactions with their customers (such as contracts and purchase orders). In total, the blob storage contained 2.4TB of data with information concerning thousands of Microsoft customers across dozens of countries, dated between 2017 and August 22'. Following disclosure, Microsoft reconfigured it to be private. According to Microsoft, they found no indication customer accounts or systems were compromised, and directly notified affected customers.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[In September 22', SOCRadar discovered an insecure public Azure blob storage owned by Microsoft (olyympusv2.blob.core.windows[.]net). This blob storage was used for storing emails and other documents from interactions with their customers (such as contracts and purchase orders). In total, the blob storage contained 2.4TB of data with information concerning thousands of Microsoft customers across dozens of countries, dated between 2017 and August 22'. Following disclosure, Microsoft reconfigured it to be private. According to Microsoft, they found no indication customer accounts or systems were compromised, and directly notified affected customers.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[FabriXss]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-35829</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-35829</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Service Fabric Explorer (SFX) is a tool for inspecting and managing Azure Service Fabric clusters.
An attacker with existing access to a "Deployer" type user with CreateComposeDeployment permissions
in a given cluster could create a malicious application with a specially-crafted name. This would
lead to client-side template injection (CSTI) and storing a malicious XSS payload in a dashboard
shared between users of the same cluster. If a victim user with administrative permissions logged
into the compromised SFX dashboard and clicked on the aforementioned payload, the attacker could
hijack their permissions to perform a cluster node reset, erasing all customized settings including
passwords and security configurations. This would allow the attacker to create new passwords and
thereby gain full administrator access of the cluster.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Service Fabric Explorer (SFX) is a tool for inspecting and managing Azure Service Fabric clusters.
An attacker with existing access to a "Deployer" type user with CreateComposeDeployment permissions
in a given cluster could create a malicious application with a specially-crafted name. This would
lead to client-side template injection (CSTI) and storing a malicious XSS payload in a dashboard
shared between users of the same cluster. If a victim user with administrative permissions logged
into the compromised SFX dashboard and clicked on the aforementioned payload, the attacker could
hijack their permissions to perform a cluster node reset, erasing all customized settings including
passwords and security configurations. This would allow the attacker to create new passwords and
thereby gain full administrator access of the cluster.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Arc-enabled Kubernetes privilege escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-37968</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-37968</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Arc allows customers to connect on-premises Kubernetes clusters to Azure.
This is facilitated by middleware (the Azure Arc-enabled Kubernetes agent) which
includes a "cluster connect" feature in the form of a reverse proxy. A vulnerability
in this feature could allow an unauthenticated user to elevate their privileges
and potentially gain remote administrative control over any Azure Arc-enabled
cluster, as long as they know its randomly generated external DNS endpoint.
Azure Stack Edge devices are also affected, because the service supports
deployment of Kubernetes workloads via Azure Arc.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Arc allows customers to connect on-premises Kubernetes clusters to Azure.
This is facilitated by middleware (the Azure Arc-enabled Kubernetes agent) which
includes a "cluster connect" feature in the form of a reverse proxy. A vulnerability
in this feature could allow an unauthenticated user to elevate their privileges
and potentially gain remote administrative control over any Azure Arc-enabled
cluster, as long as they know its randomly generated external DNS endpoint.
Azure Stack Edge devices are also affected, because the service supports
deployment of Kubernetes workloads via Azure Arc.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AttachMe]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/attachme</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/attachme</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Any unattached storage volume, or attached storage volumes allowing multi-attachment,
could have been read from or written to as long as an attacker knew their Oracle Cloud Identifier (OCID),
allowing sensitive data to be exfiltrated or even more impactful attacks to be initiated via
executable file manipulation in the target tenant's environment.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Any unattached storage volume, or attached storage volumes allowing multi-attachment,
could have been read from or written to as long as an attacker knew their Oracle Cloud Identifier (OCID),
allowing sensitive data to be exfiltrated or even more impactful attacks to be initiated via
executable file manipulation in the target tenant's environment.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Cloud Shell access token theft]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-cloudshell-injection</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-cloudshell-injection</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An issue in Azure Cloud Shell could have allowed an attacker to take over
an Azure App Service domain and leverage it to inject and execute
commands in other tenants' terminals if they navigated to the domain while
logged into their account. Using this method, an attacker could query the
Azure IMDS on other tenants' behalf and thereby obtain their access tokens.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An issue in Azure Cloud Shell could have allowed an attacker to take over
an Azure App Service domain and leverage it to inject and execute
commands in other tenants' terminals if they navigated to the domain while
logged into their account. Using this method, an attacker could query the
Azure IMDS on other tenants' behalf and thereby obtain their access tokens.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Synapse Spark LPE]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/synapse-spark-lpe</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/synapse-spark-lpe</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Synapse Analytics is an analytics service for processing data using various runtimes,
among them Apache Spark. Synapse provided users the capability to mount Azure File Shares to
their Apache Spark Pools via a script called filesharemount.sh that would execute with elevated
privileges. This script would mount the File Share to the /synfs directory. There was a race
condition in the script where, if successfully exploited, a user could execute the chown command
to change the ownership of any directory—including the one containing the filesharemount.sh itself.
This enabled a user to execute additional code with root privileges. On its own, the impact of this
vulnerability was limited to the user’s own Spark pool, and did not permit cross-tenant access.
Following disclosure, Microsoft disabled the ability to mount Azure File Shares to Spark pools,
and recommended mounting Data Lake Storage Gen2 or Azure Blob Storage instead.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Synapse Analytics is an analytics service for processing data using various runtimes,
among them Apache Spark. Synapse provided users the capability to mount Azure File Shares to
their Apache Spark Pools via a script called filesharemount.sh that would execute with elevated
privileges. This script would mount the File Share to the /synfs directory. There was a race
condition in the script where, if successfully exploited, a user could execute the chown command
to change the ownership of any directory—including the one containing the filesharemount.sh itself.
This enabled a user to execute additional code with root privileges. On its own, the impact of this
vulnerability was limited to the user’s own Spark pool, and did not permit cross-tenant access.
Following disclosure, Microsoft disabled the ability to mount Azure File Shares to Spark pools,
and recommended mounting Data Lake Storage Gen2 or Azure Blob Storage instead.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SNS SigningCertUrl improper validation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/sns-signingcerturl-improper-validation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/sns-signingcerturl-improper-validation</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Amazon SNS' signature validation in the official SDK relied on a weak regex for default AWS certificate locations, 
that would incorrectly match an S3 bucket named `sns`. This bucket happened to be publicly readable and writeable,
allowing an attacker to forge messages to any user of the official SDK SNS validator.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Amazon SNS' signature validation in the official SDK relied on a weak regex for default AWS certificate locations, 
that would incorrectly match an S3 bucket named `sns`. This bucket happened to be publicly readable and writeable,
allowing an attacker to forge messages to any user of the official SDK SNS validator.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Remote Code Execution via GitHub Import]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/remote-code-execution-via-github-import</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/remote-code-execution-via-github-import</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A critical vulnerability in GitLab's GitHub import feature allows remote code execution. The issue stems from improper handling of Sawyer::Resource objects, enabling injection of Redis commands. This can be escalated to execute arbitrary bash commands on the SaaS managed service as well as self-hosted GitLab servers, potentially leading to full system compromise.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A critical vulnerability in GitLab's GitHub import feature allows remote code execution. The issue stems from improper handling of Sawyer::Resource objects, enabling injection of Redis commands. This can be escalated to execute arbitrary bash commands on the SaaS managed service as well as self-hosted GitLab servers, potentially leading to full system compromise.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Actions Core Delimiter Injection Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/actions-core-delimiter-injection-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/actions-core-delimiter-injection-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The @actions/core package had a delimiter injection vulnerability in the exportVariable function. Attackers could use a known delimiter to break out of a specific variable and assign values to other arbitrary variables. This may have allowed modification of path or environment variables without the intention of workflow or action authors.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The @actions/core package had a delimiter injection vulnerability in the exportVariable function. Attackers could use a known delimiter to break out of a specific variable and assign values to other arbitrary variables. This may have allowed modification of path or environment variables without the intention of workflow or action authors.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cloud SQL escape to host]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudsql-escape</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudsql-escape</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In GCP's case, they introduced a modification to the Cloud SQL's PostgreSQL engine allowing the role assigned to the
tenant (cloudsqlsuperuser) to arbitrarily change the ownership of a table to any user
or role in the database. Thus, an attacker could (1) create a new table, (2) create an
index function with a malicious payload, and (3) change the table owner to GCP’s superuser
role (cloudsqladmin). Next, by initiating an ANALYZE command, the malicious function is
executed with GCP’s superuser high privileges. Then, an attacker could gain local privilege
escalation to root using a symlink attack, and finally, having gained CAP_NET_ADMIN and
CAP_NET_RAW capabilities, escape their container via TCP injection of a fake configuration
response from the metadata service containing an attacker-controlled SSH key (this is only
possible due to the fact that communication with GCP's metadata service is unencrypted and unsigned).
A similar bug existed in Azure Database for PostgreSQL, and was part of ExtraReplica's vulnerability chain.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[In GCP's case, they introduced a modification to the Cloud SQL's PostgreSQL engine allowing the role assigned to the
tenant (cloudsqlsuperuser) to arbitrarily change the ownership of a table to any user
or role in the database. Thus, an attacker could (1) create a new table, (2) create an
index function with a malicious payload, and (3) change the table owner to GCP’s superuser
role (cloudsqladmin). Next, by initiating an ANALYZE command, the malicious function is
executed with GCP’s superuser high privileges. Then, an attacker could gain local privilege
escalation to root using a symlink attack, and finally, having gained CAP_NET_ADMIN and
CAP_NET_RAW capabilities, escape their container via TCP injection of a fake configuration
response from the metadata service containing an attacker-controlled SSH key (this is only
possible due to the fact that communication with GCP's metadata service is unencrypted and unsigned).
A similar bug existed in Azure Database for PostgreSQL, and was part of ExtraReplica's vulnerability chain.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud Shell command injection]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-command-injection</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-command-injection</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in Cloud Shell that enabled command injection and remote shell access.
By manipulating the "project" parameter, an attacker could have cause an unencoded Python script execution flaw.
Exploiting this flaw, they could inject a command to display the contents of the "/etc/passwd" file, 
successfully execute arbitrary commands and obtain remote shell access. However, the impact of this is unclear,
as an attacker would seemingly only be able to gain such a remote shell on their own instance.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in Cloud Shell that enabled command injection and remote shell access.
By manipulating the "project" parameter, an attacker could have cause an unencoded Python script execution flaw.
Exploiting this flaw, they could inject a command to display the contents of the "/etc/passwd" file, 
successfully execute arbitrary commands and obtain remote shell access. However, the impact of this is unclear,
as an attacker would seemingly only be able to gain such a remote shell on their own instance.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[S3 Replication only logs first destination bucket]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/s3-replicator-cloudtrail</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/s3-replicator-cloudtrail</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[If a malicious actor with prior access to an AWS environment has permission to modify the S3
Replication Service role access policy, they could abuse cross-account replication to exfiltrate
stolen data to an external bucket under their control. Moreover, when configured to replicate
to multiple buckets at once, and if logging is only scoped to specific buckets (as opposed to
being set to log "all current and future buckets"), then the S3 Replication Service only logs a putObject event to CloudTrail
for the first destination bucket. Thus, as long as the malicious actor's bucket isn't the first
replication destination, their activity wouldn't be logged in CloudTrail, and might go undetected.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[If a malicious actor with prior access to an AWS environment has permission to modify the S3
Replication Service role access policy, they could abuse cross-account replication to exfiltrate
stolen data to an external bucket under their control. Moreover, when configured to replicate
to multiple buckets at once, and if logging is only scoped to specific buckets (as opposed to
being set to log "all current and future buckets"), then the S3 Replication Service only logs a putObject event to CloudTrail
for the first destination bucket. Thus, as long as the malicious actor's bucket isn't the first
replication destination, their activity wouldn't be logged in CloudTrail, and might go undetected.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Persistence Vulnerability in GCP Cloud Workstations]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloud-workstations-persistence-flaw</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloud-workstations-persistence-flaw</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A critical security flaw in Google Cloud Platform's Cloud Workstations allows unauthorized access and privilege escalation. The vulnerability stems from persistent session management, enabling users to access and exploit credentials of higher-privileged users. This can lead to impersonation, creation of new service accounts with elevated permissions, and bypassing of access controls.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A critical security flaw in Google Cloud Platform's Cloud Workstations allows unauthorized access and privilege escalation. The vulnerability stems from persistent session management, enabling users to access and exploit credentials of higher-privileged users. This can lead to impersonation, creation of new service accounts with elevated permissions, and bypassing of access controls.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dependency confusion in AWS CodeArtifact]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dependency-confusion-in-aws-codeartifact</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dependency-confusion-in-aws-codeartifact</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS CodeArtifact was susceptible to dependency confusion / substitution (i.e, publication of a
malicious package to a public repository with the same name as an organization’s internal package).
AWS fixed this issue by adding package origin controls, allowing users to limit how versions of a
given package can be added to a CodeArtifact repository.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS CodeArtifact was susceptible to dependency confusion / substitution (i.e, publication of a
malicious package to a public repository with the same name as an organization’s internal package).
AWS fixed this issue by adding package origin controls, allowing users to limit how versions of a
given package can be added to a CodeArtifact repository.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Microsoft Azure Site Recovery DLL hijacking]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-33675</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-33675</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The Microsoft Azure Site Recovery suite contained a DLL hijacking flaw that allowed for
privilege escalation from any low privileged user to SYSTEM on hosts where this service was installed.
Incorrect permissions on the cxprocessserver service's executable directory allowed new files to be
created in it by any user. Since the service ran automatically and with SYSTEM privileges and attempted
to load DLLs from the directory, this allowed for a DLL hijacking / planting attack.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Microsoft Azure Site Recovery suite contained a DLL hijacking flaw that allowed for
privilege escalation from any low privileged user to SYSTEM on hosts where this service was installed.
Incorrect permissions on the cxprocessserver service's executable directory allowed new files to be
created in it by any user. Since the service ran automatically and with SYSTEM privileges and attempted
to load DLLs from the directory, this allowed for a DLL hijacking / planting attack.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS IAM Authenticator for Kubernetes AccessKeyID Validation Bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/CVE-2022-2385</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/CVE-2022-2385</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) uses IAM to provide authentication to the cluster through the AWS IAM Authenticator for Kubernetes (aws-iam-authenticator).
aws-iam-authenticator can be installed on any Kubernetes cluster, and it is installed by default in any EKS cluster both on AWS cloud and on-premises (Amazon EKS Anywhere).
A security issue was discovered in aws-iam-authenticator where an allow-listed IAM identity may be able to modify their username and escalate privileges.
The bug allowed an attacker to (1) craft a malicious token with any action value, (2) without signing the cluster ID, (3) that would manipulate the AccessKeyID value.
Essentially, in clusters using aws-iam-authenticator, if an {{AccessKeyID}} was mapped to an IAM user with cluster admin privileges, any non-privileged user could have escalated their privileges to cluster admin.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) uses IAM to provide authentication to the cluster through the AWS IAM Authenticator for Kubernetes (aws-iam-authenticator).
aws-iam-authenticator can be installed on any Kubernetes cluster, and it is installed by default in any EKS cluster both on AWS cloud and on-premises (Amazon EKS Anywhere).
A security issue was discovered in aws-iam-authenticator where an allow-listed IAM identity may be able to modify their username and escalate privileges.
The bug allowed an attacker to (1) craft a malicious token with any action value, (2) without signing the cluster ID, (3) that would manipulate the AccessKeyID value.
Essentially, in clusters using aws-iam-authenticator, if an {{AccessKeyID}} was mapped to an IAM user with cluster admin privileges, any non-privileged user could have escalated their privileges to cluster admin.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[FabricScape (CVE-2022-30137) - Azure Service Fabric privilege escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/CVE-2022-30137</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/CVE-2022-30137</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Service Fabric allows Linux containers to escalate their privileges in
order to gain root privileges on the node, and then compromise all of the nodes in the cluster.
An attacker would need to have read/write access to the cluster, and the vulnerability could be
exploited on containers that are configured to have runtime access, but this is granted by default
to every container. Though the bug exists in both the Windows and Linux versions, it is only
exploitable on Linux.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Service Fabric allows Linux containers to escalate their privileges in
order to gain root privileges on the node, and then compromise all of the nodes in the cluster.
An attacker would need to have read/write access to the cluster, and the vulnerability could be
exploited on containers that are configured to have runtime access, but this is granted by default
to every container. Though the bug exists in both the Windows and Linux versions, it is only
exploitable on Linux.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Open Management Infrastructure (OMI) Elevation of Privilege]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-29149</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-29149</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure forces the install of an agent on Linux VMs, which contained a vulnerability that allowed privilege escalation
(note that this vulnerability is different than OMIGOD, which also resided in the OMI agent).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure forces the install of an agent on Linux VMs, which contained a vulnerability that allowed privilege escalation
(note that this vulnerability is different than OMIGOD, which also resided in the OMI agent).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Privilege escalation and file poisoning in Synapse Analytics]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/synapse-pwnalytics</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/synapse-pwnalytics</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Tenable Research discovered a privilege escalation flaw that allows a user to escalate privileges to that 
of the root user within the context of a Spark VM. They also discovered a separate flaw that allows a user to poison 
the hosts file on all nodes in their Spark pool, which would allow an attacker to redirect subsets of traffic and snoop on 
services users generally do not have access to.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Tenable Research discovered a privilege escalation flaw that allows a user to escalate privileges to that 
of the root user within the context of a Spark VM. They also discovered a separate flaw that allows a user to poison 
the hosts file on all nodes in their Spark pool, which would allow an attacker to redirect subsets of traffic and snoop on 
services users generally do not have access to.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GKE Authorized Networks bypass via Cloud Functions or Cloud Run]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloud-func-gke-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloud-func-gke-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Executing Cloud Functions or Cloud Run in any project and in any organization allowed bypassing the GKE Authorized Networks (aka Kubernetes 
control plane firewalls) of a cluster in a different project or organization.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Executing Cloud Functions or Cloud Run in any project and in any organization allowed bypassing the GKE Authorized Networks (aka Kubernetes 
control plane firewalls) of a cluster in a different project or organization.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[MWAA logs leak tokens and hostnames]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/mwaa-leaky-logs</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/mwaa-leaky-logs</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Two API calls used by Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (MWAA)
to convert AWS IAM credentials into tokens that can be used to login to Airflow
(CreateCliToken and CreateWebLoginToken) were logging the tokens to Cloudtrail.
The event included the hostname for the airflow server, so everything required
to login to Airflow was in the event. However, the issue was largely mitigated
by the fact that the tokens are only valid for 60 seconds and CloudTrail delivers
logs on average about every 15 minutes, so the chance of receiving a valid token
were low.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Two API calls used by Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (MWAA)
to convert AWS IAM credentials into tokens that can be used to login to Airflow
(CreateCliToken and CreateWebLoginToken) were logging the tokens to Cloudtrail.
The event included the hostname for the airflow server, so everything required
to login to Airflow was in the event. However, the issue was largely mitigated
by the fact that the tokens are only valid for 60 seconds and CloudTrail delivers
logs on average about every 15 minutes, so the chance of receiving a valid token
were low.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ELB Cache mechanism HTTP header smuggling]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/elb-cache-http-smuggling</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/elb-cache-http-smuggling</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[While testing rate-limiter protection, The researcher noticed that when forcing HTTP/1 requests and injecting 
a space after `X-Forwarded-For` he was able to override this specific header, letting him impersonate any IP.
Any internal header could have beem overridden, also the one that should not be exposed/forwarded by the
client, such as `CloudFront-Viewer-Country-Region` or any other `CloudFront` enhanced header. 
This special security issue was affecting all AWS users with that a specific setting enabled.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[While testing rate-limiter protection, The researcher noticed that when forcing HTTP/1 requests and injecting 
a space after `X-Forwarded-For` he was able to override this specific header, letting him impersonate any IP.
Any internal header could have beem overridden, also the one that should not be exposed/forwarded by the
client, such as `CloudFront-Viewer-Country-Region` or any other `CloudFront` enhanced header. 
This special security issue was affecting all AWS users with that a specific setting enabled.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Synlapse]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/synlapse</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/synlapse</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Synapse Analytics and Azure Data Factory were vulnerable to cross-tenant access and code execution.
This was made possible via a combination of (1) a shell injection RCE vulnerability in the integration runtime,
(2) credentials for multiple customers stored on a shared host and (3) an insecure management server API.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Synapse Analytics and Azure Data Factory were vulnerable to cross-tenant access and code execution.
This was made possible via a combination of (1) a shell injection RCE vulnerability in the integration runtime,
(2) credentials for multiple customers stored on a shared host and (3) an insecure management server API.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS package backfill attack]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-package-backfill</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-package-backfill</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Two malicious versions were created of packages previously used by AWS.
The packages were officially authored and maintained by AWS before they
were removed by their legitimate author, and once the packages were
removed, their names became available and the two packages were then
populated with malicious code. If AWS-deployed software had any dependencies
on these packages, this would have led to a dependency confusion attack.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Two malicious versions were created of packages previously used by AWS.
The packages were officially authored and maintained by AWS before they
were removed by their legitimate author, and once the packages were
removed, their names became available and the two packages were then
populated with malicious code. If AWS-deployed software had any dependencies
on these packages, this would have led to a dependency confusion attack.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ExtraReplica]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/extrareplica</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/extrareplica</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A chain of critical vulnerabilities was discovered in Azure Database for PostgreSQL Flexible Server,
allowing unauthorized read access to other customers’ PostgreSQL databases, thus bypassing tenant isolation.
If exploited, a malicious actor could have replicated and gained read access to Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Server customer databases.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A chain of critical vulnerabilities was discovered in Azure Database for PostgreSQL Flexible Server,
allowing unauthorized read access to other customers’ PostgreSQL databases, thus bypassing tenant isolation.
If exploited, a malicious actor could have replicated and gained read access to Azure PostgreSQL Flexible Server customer databases.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS SSM agent local privilege escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-29527</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-29527</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The Amazon SSM Agent (used for managing EC2 instances via Amazon Systems Manager) created a world-writable sudoers file,
which would have allowed local attackers to inject Sudo rules and escalate privileges to root.
This could occur in certain situations involving a race condition.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Amazon SSM Agent (used for managing EC2 instances via Amazon Systems Manager) created a world-writable sudoers file,
which would have allowed local attackers to inject Sudo rules and escalate privileges to root.
This could occur in certain situations involving a race condition.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Log4Shell Hot Patch Vulnerable to Container Escape and Privilege Escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/log4shell-hotpatch</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/log4shell-hotpatch</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS's hotpatches for Log4shell worked as intended but introduced new container escape vulnerabilities.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS's hotpatches for Log4shell worked as intended but introduced new container escape vulnerabilities.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Privilege Escalation to SYSTEM in AWS VPN Client]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-25165</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2022-25165</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AWS VPN Client application is affected by an arbitrary file write as SYSTEM,
which can lead to privilege escalation and an information disclosure vulnerability
that allows the user's Net-NTLMv2 hash to be leaked via a UNC path in a VPN configuration file.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AWS VPN Client application is affected by an arbitrary file write as SYSTEM,
which can lead to privilege escalation and an information disclosure vulnerability
that allows the user's Net-NTLMv2 hash to be leaked via a UNC path in a VPN configuration file.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS RDS local file read]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-rds-local-file-read</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-rds-local-file-read</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in the Aurora PostgreSQL log_fdw extension
for Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS), allowing an attacker to read
files on the EC2 host and obtain credentials for an internal AWS service.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in the Aurora PostgreSQL log_fdw extension
for Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS), allowing an attacker to read
files on the EC2 host and obtain credentials for an internal AWS service.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure AD information disclosure via undocumented APIs]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-info-disclosure</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-info-disclosure</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Undocumented Azure AD APIs could allow access to internal information of any organization
that uses Azure AD. Collected details included licensing information, mailbox information, and
directory synchronization status.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Undocumented Azure AD APIs could allow access to internal information of any organization
that uses Azure AD. Collected details included licensing information, mailbox information, and
directory synchronization status.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GKE Sandbox side channel attack]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-2022-011</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-2022-011</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[There was a misconfiguration with Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT),
also known as Hyper-threading, in GKE Sandbox images, causing nodes
to be potentially exposed to side channel attacks such as
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[There was a misconfiguration with Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT),
also known as Hyper-threading, in GKE Sandbox images, causing nodes
to be potentially exposed to side channel attacks such as
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS RDS does not enforce SSL/TLS encryption]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-rds-no-ssl-tls</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-rds-no-ssl-tls</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AWS RDS service does not enable secure transport layer security by default, allowing clients to connect insecurely.
Additionally, for the more commonly used MySQL and MariaDB RDS engine types, this setting cannot be enabled at all.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AWS RDS service does not enable secure transport layer security by default, allowing clients to connect insecurely.
Additionally, for the more commonly used MySQL and MariaDB RDS engine types, this setting cannot be enabled at all.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Logic Apps privilege escalation to root]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-logic-app-contributor-escalation-to-root-owner</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-logic-app-contributor-escalation-to-root-owner</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Logic Apps use API Connections to authenticate actions to services. Having Contributor access to
an Azure Resource Manager (ARM) API Connection would allow someone to create arbitrary role assignments as the connected user.
This was supposed to be limited to actions at the Resource Group level, but an attacker could escape to the Subscription or Root level with a path traversal payload.
The root cause of this behavior was that such a payload would meet the Swagger API definition,
and it would be resolved by the server, resulting in a request to an unintended scope.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Logic Apps use API Connections to authenticate actions to services. Having Contributor access to
an Azure Resource Manager (ARM) API Connection would allow someone to create arbitrary role assignments as the connected user.
This was supposed to be limited to actions at the Resource Group level, but an attacker could escape to the Subscription or Root level with a path traversal payload.
The root cause of this behavior was that such a payload would meet the Swagger API definition,
and it would be resolved by the server, resulting in a request to an unintended scope.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Autopilot node compromise via allowlisted workload masquerade]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gke-autopilot-allowlist</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gke-autopilot-allowlist</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Unit 42 researchers disclosed several vulnerabilities and attack techniques in GKE Autopilot to Google, the root cause being insufficient verification of allowlisted workload image names. 
An attacker with permissions to create a pod could have abused these vulnerabilities to (1) escape their pod and compromise the underlying node, (2) escalate privileges and become full cluster administrators, 
and (3) covertly persist administrative access through backdoors that are completely invisible to cluster operators.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Unit 42 researchers disclosed several vulnerabilities and attack techniques in GKE Autopilot to Google, the root cause being insufficient verification of allowlisted workload image names. 
An attacker with permissions to create a pod could have abused these vulnerabilities to (1) escape their pod and compromise the underlying node, (2) escalate privileges and become full cluster administrators, 
and (3) covertly persist administrative access through backdoors that are completely invisible to cluster operators.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AutoWarp]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/autowarp</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/autowarp</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An exposed endpoint in the Azure Automation Service allowed to steal Azure
API credentials from other customers
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An exposed endpoint in the Azure Automation Service allowed to steal Azure
API credentials from other customers
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud Armor packet size bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-8kb-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-8kb-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Cloud Armor has a documented limitation of 8 KB as the maximum size of web
request that it will inspect. The default behavior of Cloud Armor in this case can allow
oversized malicious requests to bypass Cloud Armor and directly reach an underlying application.
Moreover, Cloud Armor does not warn users of this limitation during policy creation
or when configuring rules from within the web UI, and can only find a reference to
the 8 KB limit in the [Cloud Armor documentation](https://cloud.google.com/armor/docs/security-policy-overview).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Cloud Armor has a documented limitation of 8 KB as the maximum size of web
request that it will inspect. The default behavior of Cloud Armor in this case can allow
oversized malicious requests to bypass Cloud Armor and directly reach an underlying application.
Moreover, Cloud Armor does not warn users of this limitation during policy creation
or when configuring rules from within the web UI, and can only find a reference to
the 8 KB limit in the [Cloud Armor documentation](https://cloud.google.com/armor/docs/security-policy-overview).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cognito User Group spoofing]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cognito-user-group-spoofing</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cognito-user-group-spoofing</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Opsmorph discovered an improper access control vulnerability in authorization logic common in applications built on AWS. The vulnerability means a user 
with permission to create a new Cognito User Group could fool authorization checks into thinking that the user is in any other existing Cognito User 
Group in the same User Pool, referred to as user group spoofing. 
When API Gateway is secured with a Cognito User Pool Authorizer it concatenates group names from the identity token into a comma separated string, 
and as Cognito also permits commas in the group names, this was an ambiguous representation of the groups a user was in that provided an opportunity 
for injection type attack. AWS have since fixed the Cognito User Pool Authorizer so that it now escapes special characters when parsing the groups claim
of the token.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Opsmorph discovered an improper access control vulnerability in authorization logic common in applications built on AWS. The vulnerability means a user 
with permission to create a new Cognito User Group could fool authorization checks into thinking that the user is in any other existing Cognito User 
Group in the same User Pool, referred to as user group spoofing. 
When API Gateway is secured with a Cognito User Pool Authorizer it concatenates group names from the identity token into a comma separated string, 
and as Cognito also permits commas in the group names, this was an ambiguous representation of the groups a user was in that provided an opportunity 
for injection type attack. AWS have since fixed the Cognito User Pool Authorizer so that it now escapes special characters when parsing the groups claim
of the token.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Oracle Apiary SSRF]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/apiary-ssrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/apiary-ssrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[By misusing the Apiary web service and taking advantage of Apiary's use of IMDSv1,
a remote attacker is able to retrieve sensitive information from various endpoints
and use it to gain more access and sensitive data of other hosts in the same environment.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[By misusing the Apiary web service and taking advantage of Apiary's use of IMDSv1,
a remote attacker is able to retrieve sensitive information from various endpoints
and use it to gain more access and sensitive data of other hosts in the same environment.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Codebuild data exfiltration]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/codebuild-data-exfil</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/codebuild-data-exfil</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[When customers attach a CodeBuild project to their VPC, CodeBuild’s build container
will apply the same network routing rules as defined in the customer’s VPC Security Group.
However, CodeBuild EC2 hosts retained Internet connectivity via AWS's own VPC, thus allowing
an attacker to bypass any custom VPC rules the customer had set up, and use CodeBuild for
data exfiltration from the targeted environment. AWS later updated the CodeBuild service
to block all outbound network access for newly created CodeBuild projects which contain a
customer-defined VPC configuration.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[When customers attach a CodeBuild project to their VPC, CodeBuild’s build container
will apply the same network routing rules as defined in the customer’s VPC Security Group.
However, CodeBuild EC2 hosts retained Internet connectivity via AWS's own VPC, thus allowing
an attacker to bypass any custom VPC rules the customer had set up, and use CodeBuild for
data exfiltration from the targeted environment. AWS later updated the CodeBuild service
to block all outbound network access for newly created CodeBuild projects which contain a
customer-defined VPC configuration.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[BreakingFormation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/breakingformation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/breakingformation</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Read access of host of AWS internal Cloudformation service via XXE SSRF.
The level of access with the compromised IAM role from there is unclear.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Read access of host of AWS internal Cloudformation service via XXE SSRF.
The level of access with the compromised IAM role from there is unclear.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SuperGlue]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/superglue</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/superglue</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Compromise of internal AWS Glue service to assume the glue role in any
AWS account that used glue.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Compromise of internal AWS Glue service to assume the glue role in any
AWS account that used glue.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS AI services ToS allow sharing of customer data]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/terms-conditions-customer-data</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/terms-conditions-customer-data</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Use of the AI services on AWS allows customer data to be moved outside of
the regions it is used in and potentially shared with third-parties.
Note: This issue is outside the scope of this database's usual criteria for inclusion, but has
been kept for historic reasons, as it was included in the original CSP Security Mistakes dataset.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Use of the AI services on AWS allows customer data to be moved outside of
the regions it is used in and potentially shared with third-parties.
Note: This issue is outside the scope of this database's usual criteria for inclusion, but has
been kept for historic reasons, as it was included in the original CSP Security Mistakes dataset.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bypassing Identity-Aware Proxy in Google Cloud]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/iap-bypass-google-cloud</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/iap-bypass-google-cloud</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google Cloud Platform's Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP) allowed attackers to bypass authentication and access IAP-secured web applications. The exploit involved creating a malicious IAP-secured app using the target's OAuth client ID, configuring query parameter-based routing to capture redirect tokens, and using these tokens to hijack authorized sessions.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google Cloud Platform's Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP) allowed attackers to bypass authentication and access IAP-secured web applications. The exploit involved creating a malicious IAP-secured app using the target's OAuth client ID, configuring query parameter-based routing to capture redirect tokens, and using these tokens to hijack authorized sessions.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dataflow RCE via unauthenticated JMX service]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dataflow-rce-jmx</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dataflow-rce-jmx</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Dataflow worker nodes ran an unauthenticated Java Management Extensions (JMX) service that under
certain circumstances would be exposed to the Internet, thus allowing unauthenticated remote code
execution (RCE) as root in an unprivileged container. The impact of the vulnerability depended on
which service account qA assigned to Dataflow worker nodes (by default, that would be the Google
Compute Engine default service account, which has the project-wide Editor role assigned).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Dataflow worker nodes ran an unauthenticated Java Management Extensions (JMX) service that under
certain circumstances would be exposed to the Internet, thus allowing unauthenticated remote code
execution (RCE) as root in an unprivileged container. The impact of the vulnerability depended on
which service account qA assigned to Dataflow worker nodes (by default, that would be the Google
Compute Engine default service account, which has the project-wide Editor role assigned).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud Shell command injection]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-open-in-command-injection</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-open-in-command-injection</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in Cloud Shell that enabled command injection and remote shell access.
The "Open in Cloud Shell" functionality allowed a user to provide values for both the "git_repo" and "go_get_repo" parameters,
which would clone the target repo in the user's environment. While "git_repo" was validated against a list of trusted repos,
"go_get_repo" was not. Therefore, an attacker could have supplied a trusted repository as "git_repo" and
an arbitrary command in the "go_get_repo" parameter. The command would then be executed in a trusted environment where it is
possible to access the user's home directory and to perform API calls using the user's credentials. However, the impact of this is unclear,
as an attacker would seemingly only be able to gain such a remote shell on their own instance. In theory, phishing
could be used to try and coerce a user into running a command that exposed their credentials to the attacker.
Google mitigated this issue by preventing users from being able to provide both parameters at once.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in Cloud Shell that enabled command injection and remote shell access.
The "Open in Cloud Shell" functionality allowed a user to provide values for both the "git_repo" and "go_get_repo" parameters,
which would clone the target repo in the user's environment. While "git_repo" was validated against a list of trusted repos,
"go_get_repo" was not. Therefore, an attacker could have supplied a trusted repository as "git_repo" and
an arbitrary command in the "go_get_repo" parameter. The command would then be executed in a trusted environment where it is
possible to access the user's home directory and to perform API calls using the user's credentials. However, the impact of this is unclear,
as an attacker would seemingly only be able to gain such a remote shell on their own instance. In theory, phishing
could be used to try and coerce a user into running a command that exposed their credentials to the attacker.
Google mitigated this issue by preventing users from being able to provide both parameters at once.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Overprivileged AWS support IAM role policy]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/overprivileged-aws-support-iam</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/overprivileged-aws-support-iam</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS added an excessive s3:getObject permission to AWSSupportServiceRolePolicy
IAM policy used by AWS Support teams, and removed it a day later.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS added an excessive s3:getObject permission to AWSSupportServiceRolePolicy
IAM policy used by AWS Support teams, and removed it a day later.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[LPE vulnerability in Eltima (3rd-party cloud desktop driver)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/eltima-cloud-desktop-lpe</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/eltima-cloud-desktop-lpe</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Several cloud desktop solutions rely on a 3rd-party library called Eltima SDK to provide
USB over Ethernet capabilities, to allow users to connect and share local devices such as
webcams. SentinelLabs discovered vulnerabilities in Eltima drivers, including proprietary
versions used by several cloud services (among them AWS Workspaces), that would allow
unprivileged users to escalate privileges to kernel mode.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Several cloud desktop solutions rely on a 3rd-party library called Eltima SDK to provide
USB over Ethernet capabilities, to allow users to connect and share local devices such as
webcams. SentinelLabs discovered vulnerabilities in Eltima drivers, including proprietary
versions used by several cloud services (among them AWS Workspaces), that would allow
unprivileged users to escalate privileges to kernel mode.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS SageMaker Jupyter Notebook instance CSRF]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/sagemaker-jupyter-csrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/sagemaker-jupyter-csrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS SageMaker Notebook server lacked a check of the Origin header that
led to a CSRF vulnerability. An attacker could have read sensitive data and execute
arbitrary actions in customer environments. The exact same issue existed in GCP previously.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS SageMaker Notebook server lacked a check of the Origin header that
led to a CSRF vulnerability. An attacker could have read sensitive data and execute
arbitrary actions in customer environments. The exact same issue existed in GCP previously.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CredManifest (Azure AD keyCredential property information disclosure)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2021-42306</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2021-42306</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Automation Account 'Run as' credentials (PFX certificates) were being stored
in cleartext, in Azure Active Directory (AAD). These credentials were available
to anyone with the ability to read information about App Registrations (typically
most AAD users).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Automation Account 'Run as' credentials (PFX certificates) were being stored
in cleartext, in Azure Active Directory (AAD). These credentials were available
to anyone with the ability to read information about App Registrations (typically
most AAD users).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS SOC 2 type 2 failure (Fall 2021)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-fall-2021-soc2</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-fall-2021-soc2</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Information about this issue is under NDA, but AWS customers can read about it on page 98 of the report,
which is available for download through AWS Artifact.
Note: This issue is outside the scope of this database's usual criteria for inclusion, but has
been kept for historic reasons, as it was included in the original CSP Security Mistakes dataset.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Information about this issue is under NDA, but AWS customers can read about it on page 98 of the report,
which is available for download through AWS Artifact.
Note: This issue is outside the scope of this database's usual criteria for inclusion, but has
been kept for historic reasons, as it was included in the original CSP Security Mistakes dataset.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS API Gateway HTTP header smuggling]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-api-gw-smuggling</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-api-gw-smuggling</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Nov 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A flaw in AWS API Gateway enabled hiding HTTP request headers. Tampering
with HTTP requests visibility enabled bypassing IP restrictions, cache poisoning
and request smuggling.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A flaw in AWS API Gateway enabled hiding HTTP request headers. Tampering
with HTTP requests visibility enabled bypassing IP restrictions, cache poisoning
and request smuggling.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cloud SQL vulnerabilities in Google's RDS offering]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloud-sql-vulns-google-rds</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloud-sql-vulns-google-rds</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Multiple vulnerabilities were found in Google Cloud SQL, including config file injection leading to RCE, information disclosure in the Cloud SQL Auth Proxy, and a design issue in Postgres IAM authentication allowing access token theft. Other issues included GCR permission misconfigurations and potential for terminal escape sequence injection attacks via gcloud.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Multiple vulnerabilities were found in Google Cloud SQL, including config file injection leading to RCE, information disclosure in the Cloud SQL Auth Proxy, and a design issue in Postgres IAM authentication allowing access token theft. Other issues included GCR permission misconfigurations and potential for terminal escape sequence injection attacks via gcloud.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure NotLegit]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/notlegit</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/notlegit</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure App Service had an insecure default behavior that exposed the source code of customer applications
written in PHP, Python, Ruby, or Node, that were deployed using “Local Git”.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure App Service had an insecure default behavior that exposed the source code of customer applications
written in PHP, Python, Ruby, or Node, that were deployed using “Local Git”.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure AD Seamless SSO logging bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aad-seamless-sso-log-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aad-seamless-sso-log-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure Active Directory Seamless Single Sign-On feature allowed single-factor brute-force attacks
against Azure AD without generating sign-in events in the targeted organization’s tenant.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure Active Directory Seamless Single Sign-On feature allowed single-factor brute-force attacks
against Azure AD without generating sign-in events in the targeted organization’s tenant.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dropped active Google Cloud Armor security policy]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-2021-019</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-2021-019</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[There is a known issue where updating a BackendConfig resource
using the v1beta1 API removes an active Google Cloud Armor 
security policy from its service. If you do not configure Google Cloud Armor
on your Ingress resources via the BackendConfig, then this issue does not affect your clusters.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[There is a known issue where updating a BackendConfig resource
using the v1beta1 API removes an active Google Cloud Armor 
security policy from its service. If you do not configure Google Cloud Armor
on your Ingress resources via the BackendConfig, then this issue does not affect your clusters.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Predictible seed in Anthos Identity Service LDAP module]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-2021-022</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-2021-022</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in the Anthos Identity Service (AIS) LDAP module
of Anthos clusters on VMware versions 1.8 and 1.8.1 where a seed key used in generating
keys is predictable. With this vulnerability, an authenticated user could add arbitrary
claims and escalate privileges indefinitely.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in the Anthos Identity Service (AIS) LDAP module
of Anthos clusters on VMware versions 1.8 and 1.8.1 where a seed key used in generating
keys is predictable. With this vulnerability, an authenticated user could add arbitrary
claims and escalate privileges indefinitely.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Exfiltrate data via the logs of GCP Org policy]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-org-policy-exfiltrate-data</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-org-policy-exfiltrate-data</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Upon blocking a request, GCP Org policy constraints were logging the deny
logs in Principal''s project and the blocking project. An attacker could use those
logs to exfiltrate any data, by making request from a Principal they own from
a defender project.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Upon blocking a request, GCP Org policy constraints were logging the deny
logs in Principal''s project and the blocking project. An attacker could use those
logs to exfiltrate any data, by making request from a Principal they own from
a defender project.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Workspace client RCE]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2021-38112</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2021-38112</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[If a user with AWS WorkSpaces 3.0.10-3.1.8 installed visits a page in their
web browser with attacker controlled content, the attacker can get zero click
RCE under common circumstances.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[If a user with AWS WorkSpaces 3.0.10-3.1.8 installed visits a page in their
web browser with attacker controlled content, the attacker can get zero click
RCE under common circumstances.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP IAP bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-iap-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-iap-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Convincing a victim to click a specially crafted link would allow the attacker
to bypass the Identity-Aware Proxy (a core component of BeyondCorp).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Convincing a victim to click a specially crafted link would allow the attacker
to bypass the Identity-Aware Proxy (a core component of BeyondCorp).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure privilege escalation via Log Analytics role]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/log-analytics-role-privesc</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/log-analytics-role-privesc</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure AD users could escalate their privileges using the Log Analytics
Contributor role to reach the full Subscription Contributor role.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure AD users could escalate their privileges using the Log Analytics
Contributor role to reach the full Subscription Contributor role.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Org policies bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-org-policies-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-org-policies-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Allows an attacker with privileges in the account to share resources outside
of the account even when an org policy restricts this, thus enabling them to backdoor
their access.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Allows an attacker with privileges in the account to share resources outside
of the account even when an org policy restricts this, thus enabling them to backdoor
their access.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azurescape]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azurescape</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azurescape</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Sep 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Cross-account container escape
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Cross-account container escape
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ChaosDB]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/chaosdb</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/chaosdb</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Aug 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure's Cosmos DB database service was vulnerable to remote account takeover.
Any Azure user could gain full admin access to other customers' Cosmos DB instances without authorization.
The vulnerability had a trivial exploit that doesn't require any previous access to the target environment.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure's Cosmos DB database service was vulnerable to remote account takeover.
Any Azure user could gain full admin access to other customers' Cosmos DB instances without authorization.
The vulnerability had a trivial exploit that doesn't require any previous access to the target environment.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lightsail object storage access keys logged]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/lightsail-keys-logged</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/lightsail-keys-logged</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Aug 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Lightsail object storage allows the creation of access keys which were
logged to CloudTrail (both access key and secret key)
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Lightsail object storage allows the creation of access keys which were
logged to CloudTrail (both access key and secret key)
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[DHCP abuse for code exec]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dhcp-abuse-code-exec</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dhcp-abuse-code-exec</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Jun 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Under certain conditions, an attacker can flood DHCP packets to the victim
VM, allowing it to impersonate the Metadata server, and grant themselves SSH access.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Under certain conditions, an attacker can flood DHCP packets to the victim
VM, allowing it to impersonate the Metadata server, and grant themselves SSH access.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Privilege escalation on Dialogflow cloud platform]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dialogflow-privilege-escalation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/dialogflow-privilege-escalation</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Jun 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A privilege escalation vulnerability was discovered in Google's Dialogflow cloud platform. When downgrading a user's role from Developer to Reviewer, the permissions were not properly updated, allowing the user to retain Developer-level access. This issue persisted in the Google Cloud Console, where role changes resulted in additive permissions instead of replacements.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A privilege escalation vulnerability was discovered in Google's Dialogflow cloud platform. When downgrading a user's role from Developer to Reviewer, the permissions were not properly updated, allowing the user to retain Developer-level access. This issue persisted in the Google Cloud Console, where role changes resulted in additive permissions instead of replacements.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Elastic Beanstalk - XSS in Web Console]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-xss-console</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-xss-console</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jun 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An adversary could gain access to IAM credentials in a victim's account, and make an API request to Elastic Beanstalk (even if they didn't have the proper IAM permissions). This request would be displayed in the management console in the Elastic Beanstalk section. Due to improper sanitization, an attacker could insert an XSS payload that would execute in a victim's browser.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An adversary could gain access to IAM credentials in a victim's account, and make an API request to Elastic Beanstalk (even if they didn't have the proper IAM permissions). This request would be displayed in the management console in the Elastic Beanstalk section. Due to improper sanitization, an attacker could insert an XSS payload that would execute in a victim's browser.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[OMIGOD]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/omigod</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/omigod</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Azure forces the install of an agent on Linux VMs, which contained a vulnerability
that would grant root RCE if an attacker could send a web request to them. Initially,
Microsoft did not update the agent automatically, and so customers had to patch manually,
but a few days later they began patching some services remotely.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Azure forces the install of an agent on Linux VMs, which contained a vulnerability
that would grant root RCE if an attacker could send a web request to them. Initially,
Microsoft did not update the agent automatically, and so customers had to patch manually,
but a few days later they began patching some services remotely.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Password Reset Code Brute-Force Vulnerability in AWS Cognito]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-cognito-reset-vulnerability</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-cognito-reset-vulnerability</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS Cognito's password reset function allowed attackers to brute-force the six-digit reset code, potentially leading to account takeovers. Using concurrent HTTP requests, an attacker could make up to 1587 guesses instead of the documented limit of 20. The issue affected accounts without multi-factor authentication and was fixed by AWS on April 20, 2021.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in AWS Cognito's password reset function allowed attackers to brute-force the six-digit reset code, potentially leading to account takeovers. Using concurrent HTTP requests, an attacker could make up to 1587 guesses instead of the documented limit of 20. The issue affected accounts without multi-factor authentication and was fixed by AWS on April 20, 2021.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Privilege escalation in GCP OS Login]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-os-login-pe</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-os-login-pe</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[GCP provides an OS Login service for managing SSH access to compute instances using IAM roles.
An attacker could abuse this feature via LXD, Docker (if available on the target system) and
DHCP poisoning of the metadata server to escalate their privileges on a Google Compute Engine VM.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[GCP provides an OS Login service for managing SSH access to compute instances using IAM roles.
An attacker could abuse this feature via LXD, Docker (if available on the target system) and
DHCP poisoning of the metadata server to escalate their privileges on a Google Compute Engine VM.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS CloudShell terminal escape]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-cloudshell-terminal-escape</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-cloudshell-terminal-escape</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[If attacker controlled data is viewed in Cloudshell it could have led to
code execution. This exact same issue existed in Azure previously.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[If attacker controlled data is viewed in Cloudshell it could have led to
code execution. This exact same issue existed in Azure previously.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Linux VM extension credential leak]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2021-27075</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2021-27075</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in the Azure Linux VM extension mechanism allowed an unprivileged
user to leak any Azure VM extension’s private data. An attacker could have abused
this to gain credentials for the VM itself as well as credentials for extensions
associated with the VM. Paired with the design of the VMAccess extension (an official
Azure extension for managing VM credentials), this could have been used to achieve
privilege escalation, as an unprivileged attacker would have been able to elevate themselves
to a higher privileged user by leaking the VMAccess admin password. Additionally, if the VMAccess
password happened to be shared among other Azure VMs, the attacker would have been able to perform
lateral movement to other machines. The root cause of this vulnerability was that the
certificates endpoint used for decrypting extension credentials did not validate transport
certificates, so an attacker could simply issue their own valid transport certificate.
Moreover, although an iptables rule was in place to prevent unprivileged access to this
endpoint, an attacker could bypass it by directing their requests to the Azure IMDS instead,
which happened to be located on the same machine as the certificates endpoint.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in the Azure Linux VM extension mechanism allowed an unprivileged
user to leak any Azure VM extension’s private data. An attacker could have abused
this to gain credentials for the VM itself as well as credentials for extensions
associated with the VM. Paired with the design of the VMAccess extension (an official
Azure extension for managing VM credentials), this could have been used to achieve
privilege escalation, as an unprivileged attacker would have been able to elevate themselves
to a higher privileged user by leaking the VMAccess admin password. Additionally, if the VMAccess
password happened to be shared among other Azure VMs, the attacker would have been able to perform
lateral movement to other machines. The root cause of this vulnerability was that the
certificates endpoint used for decrypting extension credentials did not validate transport
certificates, so an attacker could simply issue their own valid transport certificate.
Moreover, although an iptables rule was in place to prevent unprivileged access to this
endpoint, an attacker could bypass it by directing their requests to the Azure IMDS instead,
which happened to be located on the same machine as the certificates endpoint.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Cloud Shell and Container Instances breakout]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-cloud-shell-and-container-instance-lpe</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-cloud-shell-and-container-instance-lpe</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Feb 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An attacker could gain root privileges on their Azure Cloud Shell container,
escape from the container, and then gain root privileges on the underlying node,
the root cause being an insecure kubelet port (10250), among other cluster misconfigurations.
Once they could access the node filesystem, an attacker could extract kubelet API
credentials which allowed listing all pods and nodes in the cluster, including
those belonging to other tenants. Moreover, an attacker could bypass RBAC policies
in the cluster by deploying a pod with the "NodeSelector" flag, and thereby escalate
their privileges to root on other tenants' containers (the same issue affected
Azure Container Instances).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An attacker could gain root privileges on their Azure Cloud Shell container,
escape from the container, and then gain root privileges on the underlying node,
the root cause being an insecure kubelet port (10250), among other cluster misconfigurations.
Once they could access the node filesystem, an attacker could extract kubelet API
credentials which allowed listing all pods and nodes in the cluster, including
those belonging to other tenants. Moreover, an attacker could bypass RBAC policies
in the cluster by deploying a pod with the "NodeSelector" flag, and thereby escalate
their privileges to root on other tenants' containers (the same issue affected
Azure Container Instances).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GKE gVisor sandbox escape]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gke-gvisor-sandbox-escape</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gke-gvisor-sandbox-escape</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Dec 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A bug in the GKE gVisor sandbox's network policy implementation allowed access to the Google Compute Engine metadata API.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A bug in the GKE gVisor sandbox's network policy implementation allowed access to the Google Compute Engine metadata API.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS SOC 2 type 2 failure (Fall 2020)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-fall-2020-soc2</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-fall-2020-soc2</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Dec 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Information about this issue is under NDA, but AWS customers can read about it on pages 120-121 of the report,
which is available for download through AWS Artifact.
Note: This issue is outside the scope of this database's usual criteria for inclusion, but has
been kept for historic reasons, as it was included in the original CSP Security Mistakes dataset.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Information about this issue is under NDA, but AWS customers can read about it on pages 120-121 of the report,
which is available for download through AWS Artifact.
Note: This issue is outside the scope of this database's usual criteria for inclusion, but has
been kept for historic reasons, as it was included in the original CSP Security Mistakes dataset.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP Default compute account is project Editor]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-default-compute-account</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-default-compute-account</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[When the compute API is enabled on a GCP Project, the default compute account
is created. This account gets the primitive role Editor assigned by default, which
allows for a wide variety of privilege excalation and resource abuse in the project.
Especially, all new VMs created inherit this permissions by default. This issue
is arguably a technical decision by GCP, but the documents advise customers to
undo this.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[When the compute API is enabled on a GCP Project, the default compute account
is created. This account gets the primitive role Editor assigned by default, which
allows for a wide variety of privilege excalation and resource abuse in the project.
Especially, all new VMs created inherit this permissions by default. This issue
is arguably a technical decision by GCP, but the documents advise customers to
undo this.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[IAM privilege escalation in multiple GCP services]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-iam-pe-multiple-services</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-iam-pe-multiple-services</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Composer, Dataflow, Dataproc, Dataprep and Data Fusion all used the Compute Engine
default service account by default and relied on product-level IAM permissions
without requiring the iam.serviceAccount.actAs permission, meaning that users of
these services could elevate their privileges. Following disclosure, GCP changed
these services to require this permission.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Composer, Dataflow, Dataproc, Dataprep and Data Fusion all used the Compute Engine
default service account by default and relied on product-level IAM permissions
without requiring the iam.serviceAccount.actAs permission, meaning that users of
these services could elevate their privileges. Following disclosure, GCP changed
these services to require this permission.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SSRF in Google Cloud Monitoring]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ssrf-in-google-cloud-monitoring</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ssrf-in-google-cloud-monitoring</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An SSRF bug in Google Cloud Monitoring's uptime check feature could have been
used to leak the authentication token of the service account used for these checks.
The issue was resolved but later bypassed by Omar Espino (@omespino), requiring another fix.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An SSRF bug in Google Cloud Monitoring's uptime check feature could have been
used to leak the authentication token of the service account used for these checks.
The issue was resolved but later bypassed by Omar Espino (@omespino), requiring another fix.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Route table modification to imitate metadata service]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-route-table-modify</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-route-table-modify</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An attacker with sufficient privileges in AWS to modify the route table
and some other EC2 privileges, could pretend to be a metadata server and provide
an attacker controlled bootup script to EC2s to move laterally.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An attacker with sufficient privileges in AWS to modify the route table
and some other EC2 privileges, could pretend to be a metadata server and provide
an attacker controlled bootup script to EC2s to move laterally.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AI Hub Jupyter Notebook instance CSRF]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ai-hub-jupyter-csrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ai-hub-jupyter-csrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AI Hub Jupyter Notebook server lacked a check of the Origin header that
led to a CSRF vulnerability. An attacker could have read sensitive data and execute
arbitrary actions in customer environments.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AI Hub Jupyter Notebook server lacked a check of the Origin header that
led to a CSRF vulnerability. An attacker could have read sensitive data and execute
arbitrary actions in customer environments.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Enumeration of Privileges Without Being Logged to CloudTrail]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/privilege-identification-cloudtrail</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/privilege-identification-cloudtrail</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An attacker who gained access to IAM credentials could enumerate a subset of the privileges they had access to without logging to CloudTrail. This would allow them to perform the typically noisy permission enumeration process undetected.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An attacker who gained access to IAM credentials could enumerate a subset of the privileges they had access to without logging to CloudTrail. This would allow them to perform the typically noisy permission enumeration process undetected.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lack of internal change controls for IAM managed policies]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/iam-managed-policies-lack-controls</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/iam-managed-policies-lack-controls</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS have released or changed managed IAM policies in unexpected and insecure ways.
Examples include: CheesepuffsServiceRolePolicy, AWSServiceRoleForThorInternalDevPolicy,
AWSCodeArtifactReadOnlyAccess.json, AmazonCirrusGammaRoleForInstaller. The worst
being the ReadOnlyAccess policy having almost all privileges removed and unexpected
ones added.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS have released or changed managed IAM policies in unexpected and insecure ways.
Examples include: CheesepuffsServiceRolePolicy, AWSServiceRoleForThorInternalDevPolicy,
AWSCodeArtifactReadOnlyAccess.json, AmazonCirrusGammaRoleForInstaller. The worst
being the ReadOnlyAccess policy having almost all privileges removed and unexpected
ones added.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Multiple issues in AWS IAM Authenticator for Kubernetes]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-auth-multiple-issues</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-auth-multiple-issues</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) uses IAM to provide authentication to the cluster
through the AWS IAM Authenticator for Kubernetes (aws-iam-authenticator). Multiple issues
were identified in the authenticator that could have allowed exploitation, namely (1) a
lax regular expression used to verify presigned URLs; (2) HTTP client redirect follow
(due to using Golang HTTP client in its default configuration); (3) use of the Golang URL.Query
function (which silently drops parameters that Go considers invalid, rather than raising
an error and rejecting invalid tokens); and (4) no verification that the cluster uses Go
versions newer than 1.12 (as older versions are vulnerable to request smuggling).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) uses IAM to provide authentication to the cluster
through the AWS IAM Authenticator for Kubernetes (aws-iam-authenticator). Multiple issues
were identified in the authenticator that could have allowed exploitation, namely (1) a
lax regular expression used to verify presigned URLs; (2) HTTP client redirect follow
(due to using Golang HTTP client in its default configuration); (3) use of the Golang URL.Query
function (which silently drops parameters that Go considers invalid, rather than raising
an error and rejecting invalid tokens); and (4) no verification that the cluster uses Go
versions newer than 1.12 (as older versions are vulnerable to request smuggling).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud Shell XSS to RCE Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-shell-xss-rce</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-shell-xss-rce</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google Cloud Shell allowed escalation from XSS to full instance takeover as root. The attack exploited an XSS in the markdown preview functionality to read sensitive files, obtain the instance's private key and hostname, and gain SSH access as root. The issue affected the Eclipse Theia-based editor used in Cloud Shell.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google Cloud Shell allowed escalation from XSS to full instance takeover as root. The attack exploited an XSS in the markdown preview functionality to read sensitive files, obtain the instance's private key and hostname, and gain SSH access as root. The issue affected the Eclipse Theia-based editor used in Cloud Shell.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Encryption SDK vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/encryption-sdk-issues</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/encryption-sdk-issues</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS KMS and all versions of AWS Encryption SDKs prior to version 2.0.0 were susceptible to
information leakage (an attacker could create ciphertexts that would leak the user’s AWS account ID,
encryption context, user agent, and IP address upon decryption), ciphertext forgery (an attacker could
create ciphertexts that were accepted by other users) and lack of robustness (an attacker could create
ciphertexts that decrypt to different plaintexts for different users).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS KMS and all versions of AWS Encryption SDKs prior to version 2.0.0 were susceptible to
information leakage (an attacker could create ciphertexts that would leak the user’s AWS account ID,
encryption context, user agent, and IP address upon decryption), ciphertext forgery (an attacker could
create ciphertexts that were accepted by other users) and lack of robustness (an attacker could create
ciphertexts that decrypt to different plaintexts for different users).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[S3 bucket tagging not restricted]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/s3-bucket-tagging-not-restricted</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/s3-bucket-tagging-not-restricted</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Lack of the privilege s3:PutBucketTagging did not restrict the ability
to tag S3 buckets.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Lack of the privilege s3:PutBucketTagging did not restrict the ability
to tag S3 buckets.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CloudFormer review]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudformer-review</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudformer-review</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An audit of an AWS open-source project identified a great deal of issues, and as a result AWS made the decision to take it down.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An audit of an AWS open-source project identified a great deal of issues, and as a result AWS made the decision to take it down.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CloudFormation resource provider credentials leak]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudformation_cred_leak</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudformation_cred_leak</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[CloudFormation allows the use of Lambda-backed resource providers,
wherein Lambda can be used to write custom provisioning logic to be
executed during CloudFormation stack operations. The aforementioned
Lambda functions were executed in an AWS-managed account (thus
effectively allowing arbitrary code execution in that account),
and were passed a set of credentials ("platformCredentials") for a
role in this account that had several EventBridge permissions.
These were sufficient for an attacker to create new rules in the AWS-managed
account that leaked credentials belonging to other users of resource
providers. For example, creating a rule that matched events with
{"detail-type": ["AWS API Call via CloudTrail"]} exposed records
of other tenants' API calls, which included copies of credentials
for roles in other tenants' accounts.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[CloudFormation allows the use of Lambda-backed resource providers,
wherein Lambda can be used to write custom provisioning logic to be
executed during CloudFormation stack operations. The aforementioned
Lambda functions were executed in an AWS-managed account (thus
effectively allowing arbitrary code execution in that account),
and were passed a set of credentials ("platformCredentials") for a
role in this account that had several EventBridge permissions.
These were sufficient for an attacker to create new rules in the AWS-managed
account that leaked credentials belonging to other users of resource
providers. For example, creating a rule that matched events with
{"detail-type": ["AWS API Call via CloudTrail"]} exposed records
of other tenants' API calls, which included copies of credentials
for roles in other tenants' accounts.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Timing attack with Lambda and CloudWatch Synthetics]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/lambda-cloudwatch-timing-attack</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/lambda-cloudwatch-timing-attack</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The immutability of Lambda versions could be violated via a timing attack
against CloudWatch Synthetics canaries.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The immutability of Lambda versions could be violated via a timing attack
against CloudWatch Synthetics canaries.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CloudFormation denial of service (in a single account)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudformation-dos</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloudformation-dos</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An attacker with the ability to create CloudFormation stacks could cause
a denial-of-service on some CloudFormation actions within a single AWS account.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An attacker with the ability to create CloudFormation stacks could cause
a denial-of-service on some CloudFormation actions within a single AWS account.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP service accounts and projects information leak]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-service-accounts-leak</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-service-accounts-leak</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[It was possible to list IAM service accounts of any GCP project, given only its ID, by forging a pageToken for the projects.serviceAccounts.list 
method of the IAM API. Due to the design of certain services in GCP, this issue could lead to exposure of sensitive information related to a project,
and could be further used to enumerate unsecured resources in the platform, such as App Engine apps, Container Registry repositories, etc.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[It was possible to list IAM service accounts of any GCP project, given only its ID, by forging a pageToken for the projects.serviceAccounts.list 
method of the IAM API. Due to the design of certain services in GCP, this issue could lead to exposure of sensitive information related to a project,
and could be further used to enumerate unsecured resources in the platform, such as App Engine apps, Container Registry repositories, etc.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dropping a Shell in Google Cloud SQL]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloud-sql-shell-drop</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cloud-sql-shell-drop</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Researchers discovered vulnerabilities in Google Cloud SQL that allowed gaining unauthorized shell access to MySQL instances. By chaining SQL injection, parameter injection in mysqldump, and network spoofing, they were able to escape a Docker container and gain full access to the host VM running Cloud SQL.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Researchers discovered vulnerabilities in Google Cloud SQL that allowed gaining unauthorized shell access to MySQL instances. By chaining SQL injection, parameter injection in mysqldump, and network spoofing, they were able to escape a Docker container and gain full access to the host VM running Cloud SQL.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud Shell Bugs Expose User Credentials]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-shell-bugs</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-shell-bugs</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Three vulnerabilities in Google Cloud Shell were discovered, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code and potentially steal user credentials. The bugs affected Ruby gemspec parsing, TypeScript plugin loading, and Go binary path manipulation in Cloud Run. These issues arose from mismatches between Cloud Shell's threat model and the assumptions of its underlying open-source components.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Three vulnerabilities in Google Cloud Shell were discovered, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code and potentially steal user credentials. The bugs affected Ruby gemspec parsing, TypeScript plugin loading, and Go binary path manipulation in Cloud Run. These issues arose from mismatches between Cloud Shell's threat model and the assumptions of its underlying open-source components.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[S3 Crypto SDK vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/s3-crypto-sdk</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/s3-crypto-sdk</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[No summary available]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CloudTrail S3 data events leak bucket Account ID]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-s3-recon-account-id-of-bucket</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-s3-recon-account-id-of-bucket</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Using CloudTrail S3 data events, it was possible to determine the AWS account ID of
any existing S3 bucket by calling any S3 API, getting denied, and looking at the value in the resource
key in error message that showed up in CloudTrail.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Using CloudTrail S3 data events, it was possible to determine the AWS account ID of
any existing S3 bucket by calling any S3 API, getting denied, and looking at the value in the resource
key in error message that showed up in CloudTrail.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[XSS on EC2 web console]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ec2-console-xss</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ec2-console-xss</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Display of EC2 tags had XSS
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Display of EC2 tags had XSS
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GKE and EKS CAP_NET_RAW metadata service MITM root privilege escalation]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cap-net-raw-metadata-mitm</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cap-net-raw-metadata-mitm</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An attacker with access to a hostNetwork=true container with CAP_NET_RAW
capability can listen to all the traffic going through the host and inject arbitrary
traffic, allowing to tamper with most unencrypted traffic (HTTP, DNS, DHCP, ...),
and disrupt encrypted traffic. In GKE the host queries the metadata service at
http://169[.]254.169.254 to get information, including the authorized SSH keys.
By manipulating the metadata service responses and injecting our own SSH key, it
is possible to gain root privilege on the host.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An attacker with access to a hostNetwork=true container with CAP_NET_RAW
capability can listen to all the traffic going through the host and inject arbitrary
traffic, allowing to tamper with most unencrypted traffic (HTTP, DNS, DHCP, ...),
and disrupt encrypted traffic. In GKE the host queries the metadata service at
http://169[.]254.169.254 to get information, including the authorized SSH keys.
By manipulating the metadata service responses and injecting our own SSH key, it
is possible to gain root privilege on the host.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[RCE in Google Cloud Deployment Manager]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/rce-in-cloud-dm</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/rce-in-cloud-dm</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An RCE in Google Cloud Deployment Manager could have allowed an attacker to make
requests to internal Google services, authenticated as a privileged service account.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An RCE in Google Cloud Deployment Manager could have allowed an attacker to make
requests to internal Google services, authenticated as a privileged service account.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GuardDuty detection bypass via cloudtrail]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/guardduty-cloudtrail-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/guardduty-cloudtrail-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[GuardDuty detected CloudTrail being outright disabled, but did not detect if an attacker with the
necessary permissions filtered out all events from CloudTrail via PutEventSelectors, resulting in
defenders having no logs to review. AWS fixed this issue by adding a GuardDuty detection that
triggers if PutEventSelectors is used to disable all event types.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[GuardDuty detected CloudTrail being outright disabled, but did not detect if an attacker with the
necessary permissions filtered out all events from CloudTrail via PutEventSelectors, resulting in
defenders having no logs to review. AWS fixed this issue by adding a GuardDuty detection that
triggers if PutEventSelectors is used to disable all event types.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP Cloudshell Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-cswsh</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-cswsh</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Google Cloudshell leveraged websockets without validating that the origin matched the current instance host.
An attacker could therefore host a CSWSH attack on a Cloudshell instance they own, disabling authentication via 
access to the underlying VM. They could then start the OAuth process with a spoofed host header, using
phishing to get the target Cloud Shell user into following a redirection link, completing the OAuth process
and ending in successful CSWSH, which would allow the attacker to hijack the target user's requests.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Google Cloudshell leveraged websockets without validating that the origin matched the current instance host.
An attacker could therefore host a CSWSH attack on a Cloudshell instance they own, disabling authentication via 
access to the underlying VM. They could then start the OAuth process with a spoofed host header, using
phishing to get the target Cloud Shell user into following a redirection link, completing the OAuth process
and ending in successful CSWSH, which would allow the attacker to hijack the target user's requests.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google wide domain check bypass]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-domain-check-bypass</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-domain-check-bypass</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google's common JavaScript library allowed bypassing domain validation checks across multiple Google products. By using a backslash character in URLs, an attacker could make the regex parser and browser disagree on the authority (domain) portion of a URL, allowing injection of arbitrary domains that pass whitelisting checks.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability in Google's common JavaScript library allowed bypassing domain validation checks across multiple Google products. By using a backslash character in URLs, an attacker could make the regex parser and browser disagree on the authority (domain) portion of a URL, allowing injection of arbitrary domains that pass whitelisting checks.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure App Service RCE]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/CVE-2019-1372</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/CVE-2019-1372</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A Vulnerability in App Service could allow an unprivileged function run by the user to execute code in the 
context of NT AUTHORITY\system, thereby escaping the sandbox. This vulnerability allowed cross-account access 
when using the Free/Shared tier.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A Vulnerability in App Service could allow an unprivileged function run by the user to execute code in the 
context of NT AUTHORITY\system, thereby escaping the sandbox. This vulnerability allowed cross-account access 
when using the Free/Shared tier.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS uploaded sensitive data to public GitHub bucket]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-data-post</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-data-post</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An AWS employee pushed sensitive data to a public github bucket, including customer information and credentials.
Note: This issue is outside the scope of this database's usual criteria for inclusion,
but has been kept for historic reasons, as it was included in the original CSP Security Mistakes dataset.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An AWS employee pushed sensitive data to a public github bucket, including customer information and credentials.
Note: This issue is outside the scope of this database's usual criteria for inclusion,
but has been kept for historic reasons, as it was included in the original CSP Security Mistakes dataset.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP Speech to Text Information Disclosure]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-speech-to-text-info-disclosure</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-speech-to-text-info-disclosure</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[GCP's Speech-to-Text "operations/list" and "operations/get" APIs would return data that did 
not belong to the caller when no parameters were provided. It is unclear whether this was 
cross-customer data disclosure, or potentially test or internal data.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[GCP's Speech-to-Text "operations/list" and "operations/get" APIs would return data that did 
not belong to the caller when no parameters were provided. It is unclear whether this was 
cross-customer data disclosure, or potentially test or internal data.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP Stackdriver Debugger SSRF]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-stackdriver-ssrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-stackdriver-ssrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Dec 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An SSRF bug in GCP's Stackdriver Debugger feature's code import could have been used to leak the authentication
token of the user to an attacker-controlled server. Exploitation would require that the user had previously
configured a specific code hosting service (such as GitHub), and could be tricked into clicking a malicious link.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[An SSRF bug in GCP's Stackdriver Debugger feature's code import could have been used to leak the authentication
token of the user to an attacker-controlled server. Exploitation would require that the user had previously
configured a specific code hosting service (such as GitHub), and could be tricked into clicking a malicious link.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP Cloudshell Vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-bugs</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-bugs</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Dec 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Wouter ter Maat discovered 9 vulnerabilities in GCP Cloudshell that could
allow an attacker to access resources in another customer's environment. 
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Wouter ter Maat discovered 9 vulnerabilities in GCP Cloudshell that could
allow an attacker to access resources in another customer's environment. 
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GCP Cloudshell XSS and CSRF bugs]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-xss-csrf</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-cloudshell-xss-csrf</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Dec 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[GCP Cloudshell has been affected by various XSS and CSRF vulnerabilities stemming from different root causes
related to authentication handling, markdown editing, file uploading and more. Explotiation of these vulnerabilities
normally requires user interaction through social engineering (convincing a potential victim to click a malicious link).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[GCP Cloudshell has been affected by various XSS and CSRF vulnerabilities stemming from different root causes
related to authentication handling, markdown editing, file uploading and more. Explotiation of these vulnerabilities
normally requires user interaction through social engineering (convincing a potential victim to click a malicious link).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google Cloud Platform VRP Prize Writeup]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-platform-vrp-prize</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-cloud-platform-vrp-prize</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Nov 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in Google Cloud Platform's AI Hub service, allowing unrestricted file uploads. This could potentially lead to bypassing Same-Origin Policy by uploading SWF files, enabling CSRF attacks across browsers, and exploiting CVE-2014-8453 on IE with Adobe Reader installed. The issue resulted in a $1337 bounty reward.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A vulnerability was discovered in Google Cloud Platform's AI Hub service, allowing unrestricted file uploads. This could potentially lead to bypassing Same-Origin Policy by uploading SWF files, enabling CSRF attacks across browsers, and exploiting CVE-2014-8453 on IE with Adobe Reader installed. The issue resulted in a $1337 bounty reward.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ALB HTTP request smuggling]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/alb-http-smuggling</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/alb-http-smuggling</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Oct 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[ALBs found vulnerable to HTTP request smuggling (desync attack).
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[ALBs found vulnerable to HTTP request smuggling (desync attack).
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Google App Engine RCE Worth $36k]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-app-engine-rce</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/google-app-engine-rce</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Aug 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Researcher discovered access to non-production Google App Engine environments and internal APIs. This allowed configuring internal settings like Service Account IDs and quotas. Google considered it RCE due to their infrastructure. Access was blocked and a $36,337 reward issued.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Researcher discovered access to non-production Google App Engine environments and internal APIs. This allowed configuring internal settings like Service Account IDs and quotas. Google considered it RCE due to their infrastructure. Access was blocked and a $36,337 reward issued.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lake Formation data lake admin override]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/lake_admin_override</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/lake_admin_override</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Aug 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Shortly after Lake Formation was made generally available, a bug was discovered
that gave anyone the ability to view and override data lake admins for any account
(an attacker would have only needed to know the target account number in advance).
The root cause was in the Catalog ID, which references the Glue metadata store that
Lake Formation uses to store its configuration - none of the methods that used this
field actually checked for permissions on the account it was accessing, only the
source account. Moreover, CloudTrail was only writing the log to the source account,
so anyone auditing the destination account would not have been able to observe any
suspicious activity. Following disclosure, AWS fixed the bug.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Shortly after Lake Formation was made generally available, a bug was discovered
that gave anyone the ability to view and override data lake admins for any account
(an attacker would have only needed to know the target account number in advance).
The root cause was in the Catalog ID, which references the Glue metadata store that
Lake Formation uses to store its configuration - none of the methods that used this
field actually checked for permissions on the account it was accessing, only the
source account. Moreover, CloudTrail was only writing the log to the source account,
so anyone auditing the destination account would not have been able to observe any
suspicious activity. Following disclosure, AWS fixed the bug.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS IAM role credential exfiltration via EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDSv1)]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-imdsv1-credential-exfiltration</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-imdsv1-credential-exfiltration</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Aug 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS offers a metadata service accessible to most EC2 Instances via a simple GET request to 169.254.169.254.
If an instance has an SSRF vulnerability, attackers can access the metadata service & exfiltrate the credentials 
of an attached IAM role to gain privileged access to the relevant AWS environment.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS offers a metadata service accessible to most EC2 Instances via a simple GET request to 169.254.169.254.
If an instance has an SSRF vulnerability, attackers can access the metadata service & exfiltrate the credentials 
of an attached IAM role to gain privileged access to the relevant AWS environment.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[IAM privilege escalation via undocumented CodeStar API]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-codestar-privilege-escalation</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-codestar-privilege-escalation</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AWS CodeStar service had an undocumented API (codestar:CreateProjectFromTemplate) that allowed
users with broadly-scoped CodeStar permissions to create a CodeStar project. As part of the creation
process, AWS would create a new CodeStarWorker IAM policy & attach it to the user making the call.
This policy granted full access to over 50 AWS services, including iam:AttachRolePolicy, iam:AttachUserPolicy and iam:PutRolePolicy permissions,
which would allow the user to escalate to full administrator access. Following disclosure, AWS removed
the majority of access granted by the CodeStarWorker policy, but this is still a viable escalation path if
there are other misconfigurations in the environment.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AWS CodeStar service had an undocumented API (codestar:CreateProjectFromTemplate) that allowed
users with broadly-scoped CodeStar permissions to create a CodeStar project. As part of the creation
process, AWS would create a new CodeStarWorker IAM policy & attach it to the user making the call.
This policy granted full access to over 50 AWS services, including iam:AttachRolePolicy, iam:AttachUserPolicy and iam:PutRolePolicy permissions,
which would allow the user to escalate to full administrator access. Following disclosure, AWS removed
the majority of access granted by the CodeStarWorker policy, but this is still a viable escalation path if
there are other misconfigurations in the environment.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[VPC Hosted Zones unauditable]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/vpc-hosted-zones-unauditable</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/vpc-hosted-zones-unauditable</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[For 6 years, it was not possible to see what hosted zones an attacker
may have created in an account. This issue could be viewed as a business decision
that adding the ability to viewing this data was not worthwhile, but the delay
is significant and would allow someone that had compromised an environment to
maintain a backdoor.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[For 6 years, it was not possible to see what hosted zones an attacker
may have created in an account. This issue could be viewed as a business decision
that adding the ability to viewing this data was not worthwhile, but the delay
is significant and would allow someone that had compromised an environment to
maintain a backdoor.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Impersonate GCP Organization Through the Organizations Update Method]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-organization-impersontaion-through-update</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/gcp-organization-impersontaion-through-update</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A GCP Organizations name could be changed through the (deprecated) organizations.update 
method in the Resource Manager, even though the documentation said the "displayName" was read-only.
With this, I could have my own organization and name it as another one and confuse users:
- Rename an organization "<IMPORTANT-COMPANY>.com"
- Share it with "domain:<IMPORTANT-COMPANY>.com" (Effectively sharing it with every 
Google user with a @<IMPORTANT-COMPANY>.com account)
- Profit from unsuspecting users creating resources in my organization, specially billing 
accounts or building projects that manage sensible information.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[A GCP Organizations name could be changed through the (deprecated) organizations.update 
method in the Resource Manager, even though the documentation said the "displayName" was read-only.
With this, I could have my own organization and name it as another one and confuse users:
- Rename an organization "<IMPORTANT-COMPANY>.com"
- Share it with "domain:<IMPORTANT-COMPANY>.com" (Effectively sharing it with every 
Google user with a @<IMPORTANT-COMPANY>.com account)
- Profit from unsuspecting users creating resources in my organization, specially billing 
accounts or building projects that manage sensible information.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azure Cloud Shell terminal escape]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-cloudshell-terminal-escape</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-cloudshell-terminal-escape</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[If attacker controlled data is viewed in Cloudshell it could have led to
code execution. This exact same issue was later discovered in AWS as well.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[If attacker controlled data is viewed in Cloudshell it could have led to
code execution. This exact same issue was later discovered in AWS as well.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Resource policy confused deputy issue with services]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/resource-policy-confused-deputy</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/resource-policy-confused-deputy</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Nov 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Resource policies lacked a way of restricting service access to only your
own account, allowing an attacker to leverage a service to potentially access
your resources. Originally discovered by Dan Peebles and presented at re:Invent
in 2018, this issue did not gain enough attention to be fixed until Shir Tamari
and Ami Luttwak from Wiz presented it at Black Hat 2021.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Resource policies lacked a way of restricting service access to only your
own account, allowing an attacker to leverage a service to potentially access
your resources. Originally discovered by Dan Peebles and presented at re:Invent
in 2018, this issue did not gain enough attention to be fixed until Shir Tamari
and Ami Luttwak from Wiz presented it at Black Hat 2021.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Launching EC2s did not require specifying AMI owner]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2018-15869</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/cve-2018-15869</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Aug 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Attackers had put malicious AMIs in the marketplace to abuse the CLI''s
way of selecting what AMI to use. Although the concept of planting  malicious
AMIs had existed for a while (ex. in the 2009 presentation "Clobbering the clouds"
by Nicholas Arvanitis, Marco Slaviero, and Haroon Meer) it had not been used specifically
to target this issue with the CLI.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Attackers had put malicious AMIs in the marketplace to abuse the CLI''s
way of selecting what AMI to use. Although the concept of planting  malicious
AMIs had existed for a while (ex. in the 2009 presentation "Clobbering the clouds"
by Nicholas Arvanitis, Marco Slaviero, and Haroon Meer) it had not been used specifically
to target this issue with the CLI.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Subdomain takeover via Azure Traffic Manager]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-subdomain-takeover</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/azure-subdomain-takeover</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Aug 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Patrick Hudak demonstrated possible subdomain takeover using the Traffic Manager in Azure.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Patrick Hudak demonstrated possible subdomain takeover using the Traffic Manager in Azure.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS ElasticSearch Index Name Leakage]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-es-index-name-leak</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-es-index-name-leak</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Even for the AWS-managed ElasticSearch clusters that had not been made public,
their index names could be learned.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Even for the AWS-managed ElasticSearch clusters that had not been made public,
their index names could be learned.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bypassable and overly-privileged IAM policies]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/iam-policies-bypass-overprivileged</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/iam-policies-bypass-overprivileged</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 2017 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[AWS has previously provided managed policies or guidance in documentation
for policies with mistakes that allow them to be bypassed. Additionally,
some policies are over-privileged. Date of disclosure is for the first issue of
this type, while references provide other examples by various individuals.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[AWS has previously provided managed policies or guidance in documentation
for policies with mistakes that allow them to be bypassed. Additionally,
some policies are over-privileged. Date of disclosure is for the first issue of
this type, while references provide other examples by various individuals.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS Java SDK XXE injection]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-java-sdk-xxe</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-java-sdk-xxe</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Oct 2017 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The AWS Java SDK was vulnerable to XML external entity (XXE) injection related to XML parsers.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The AWS Java SDK was vulnerable to XML external entity (XXE) injection related to XML parsers.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Public admin access to Azure's Red Hat Update Infrastructure]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/admin-azure-rh-update-infrastructure</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/admin-azure-rh-update-infrastructure</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Nov 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Full administrative access to the Azure Red Hat Enterprise Linux Appliance REST API was publicly exposed.
It allowed malicious actors uploading packages that would be acquired by client virtual machines on their next yum update. 
The vulnerable infrastructure supplies all the packages for all Red Hat Enterprise Linux instances booted from the Azure marketplace.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Full administrative access to the Azure Red Hat Enterprise Linux Appliance REST API was publicly exposed.
It allowed malicious actors uploading packages that would be acquired by client virtual machines on their next yum update. 
The vulnerable infrastructure supplies all the packages for all Red Hat Enterprise Linux instances booted from the Azure marketplace.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[3rd party vendor confused deputy via AssumeRole]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/assumerole-confused-deputy</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/assumerole-confused-deputy</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Nov 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[3rd party vendors can (and sometimes do) incorrectly implement sts:ExternalId in their
AWS role trust policies, leading to confused deputy issues. These misconfigurations could
allow customers to access other customers' data. Although vendors are responsible for
ensuring their own configurations are correct, AWS could theoretically add mitigations
to prevent and detect this issue.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[3rd party vendors can (and sometimes do) incorrectly implement sts:ExternalId in their
AWS role trust policies, leading to confused deputy issues. These misconfigurations could
allow customers to access other customers' data. Although vendors are responsible for
ensuring their own configurations are correct, AWS could theoretically add mitigations
to prevent and detect this issue.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AWS published official AMIs with recoverable deleted files]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ami-recoverable-files</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/ami-recoverable-files</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 04 Jun 2011 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Researchers, while investigating the security posture of Public AMIs, were
able to undelete files from an official image that was published by Amazon AWS.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Researchers, while investigating the security posture of Public AMIs, were
able to undelete files from an official image that was published by Amazon AWS.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Signature version 1 (SigV1) is insecure]]></title>
            <link>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-sigv1-insecure</link>
            <guid>https://www.cloudvulndb.org/aws-sigv1-insecure</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[When making authenticated API requests to AWS, the requests must be signed
with your AWS access key. The initial signing algorithm, SigV1, was vulnerable
to collisions. A person-in-the-middle attack would be able to modify signed requests
via specially constructed collisions.
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[When making authenticated API requests to AWS, the requests must be signed
with your AWS access key. The initial signing algorithm, SigV1, was vulnerable
to collisions. A person-in-the-middle attack would be able to modify signed requests
via specially constructed collisions.
]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>